Unfortunately, even after more than seven decades of India’s independence, the north-eastern region remains in the headlines for the wrong reasons. The security issue in the context of the country’s north-eastern states has always been delicate. The plebiscite organised by the Naga leaders for a sovereign Nagaland just after the eclipse of British colonial rule in the sub-continent initiated an anti-India upsurge in the country. The attitude and approach of both the Naga insurgent outfit and the policies of the successive regimes in New Delhi have kept the Naga issue vexed so far. The failure to sort out the Naga issue has proved disastrous in the context of the entire north-eastern region. The insurgency and the separatist movements rocked the north-east and derailed the development process in the region. Almost the whole of the north-eastern region of the country remained under the shade of insurgencies and related affairs for decades. Things have hardly changed. The menace is continuing and annexing new areas. It really seems like a never-ending nightmare as far as the prospects of the people of the entire region are concerned. As a result, democratic India always seemed to be fighting against her people across the country’s north-eastern states. The agenda of the insurgent outfits and the counter-insurgency operations have ultimately perished in the eyes of the people of this region and evolved against the strategic and security interests of the country.

In fact, for an independent India, affairs related to the country’s north-eastern region have always been a matter of grave strategic and security concern for the entire country. The geostrategic location of the region is one of the prime reasons behind this, as it keeps the north-east always on the boil and outside the purview of mainstream national development. Secondly, the unique demography and the identity issue have kept on forming and fomenting new conflicting zones here. Thirdly, the psychological distance between the people of the region and those of the so-called mainland India is the genesis of many odds here. All these factors, put together, prove why the issues related to the north-eastern region bear special significance for the country. So also, the existing dynamics of conflicts within India, as well as the anti-India elements operational in the name of religion from across the adjourning areas of the bordering nations, prove why India should consider the threat from non-state actors and the state-sponsored terror agenda as a composite one, irrespective of different regions of the country. It is true that unlike Kashmir and the India-Pakistan border, insurgencies related to the north-eastern region of the country have been mainly ethnic and linguistic identity-based. But the menace called terrorism that has jeopardised international peace and stability provides no scope to perceive it with a fragmented approach. After all, the existing global situation does not give us the luxury to debate good or bad terrorism, unlike academic gossip. The same is true in the context of India’s north-eastern region.

Naturally, the arrest of Haris Farooqi, the head of the terror organisation, namely the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in India, and another senior cadre of the terror outfit, Anurag Singh, by the Assam Police’s Special Task Force (STF) in Dhubri district of Assam proves the point that it is foolish to consider the issue of insurgency prevailing in the north-eastern region of the country isolated from the Islamic insurgency and jihad that India and the international community have been facing so far. This is undoubtedly a significant success for the Assam STF, and credit goes to the intelligence agency that cracked the culprits and defeated the evil design of the terror outfit. The Assam STF handed over the arrested ISIS leaders to the National Investigation Agency (NIA) for further interrogation and investigation. The security officials informed the media that during the primary interrogation, the two militants revealed that they had plans to execute subversive activities in different parts of the north-eastern regions as well as some parts of the north-Bengal region, including Siliguri town. The media reports expressed apprehension that ISIS runs a terror network in the Madrasas located across the India-Bangladesh border in Assam and other Indian states. However, the time and place of the arrest of the ISIS activist bear special significance. The incident took place on the eve of India’s national general elections. Similarly, the ISIS leaders took shelter in a Muslim-dominated region of the Dhubri district of Assam, which is located adjacent to the India-Bangladesh border. All these prove that the terror outfit ISIS has a significant support base at ground level in Muslim-dominated western Assam, which shares the international border with Bangladesh.

However, the Islamic insurgency is familiar in the case of Assam and other north-eastern states. During the turbulent phase of the 1990s, the Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Assam (MULTA) was operational in the state. Similarly, other Islamic militant groups like Harkat-ul Jihad, the Islamic Liberation Army of Assam (ILAA), the Muslim Security Force of Assam (MSFA), the Muslim Security Council of Assam (MSCA), the Muslim Tiger Force (MSF), the Muslim Volunteer Force (MVU), the Revolutionary Muslim Commandos (RMC), and the United Muslim Liberation Front of Assam (UMLFA) came to light on different occasions in Assam.

As far as militancy in the context of north-eastern states is concerned, Bangladesh bears a special significance. Several northeast-based insurgent outfits have been reported to have a close connection with Bangladesh. However, in the case of Islamic terrorism, the radical elements of Bangladesh play a role in building the network, providing logistic support to sabotage India’s strategic and security interests in Assam, Meghalaya, and Tripura, and expanding reach in different parts of mainland India using north-east and west Bengal as transit points. Apart from Jamaat-ul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), Bangladesh’s Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI-B) plays a vital role. HUJI-B is a prominent Islamic militant organisation that operates from Pakistan and Bangladesh simultaneously, and the organisation is reported to have intimate relations with other Islamic terror organisations, including Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad, and even Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. However, ISIS is leading the charge today, which has already compelled international powers, including the United States, to succumb on several occasions. Naturally, the presence of ISIS in Assam shows a concern of a higher magnitude, and there is every possibility of its nexus with the Islamic militant outfits operational in today’s Bangladesh.

All these put a big question mark on the security of the country’s eastern frontier. Apart from the north-eastern states, West Bengal and those parts of Bihar bordering Bangladesh can be the new germinating grounds for ISIS. Naturally, the point that needs to be reviewed is India’s relationship with Bangladesh. No doubt, the existing India-Bangladesh relationship looks productive, apparently. The existing Bangladesh regime is said to be pro-India. But on the ground, reality shows the opposite picture. It seems there is a parallel regime propagating radicalism in Bangladesh, particularly across the India-Bangladesh international border. New Delhi must convince Dhaka to dismantle the terror network in Bangladesh.

Similarly, there should be comprehensive efforts to enhance border security between India and Bangladesh. The arrest of ISIS chief Haris Farooqi and his comrade Anurag Singh in Assam is undoubtedly a wake-up call for India. The need of the hour is better coordination between the central and state governments, as well as different agencies, to face the new challenge in a befitting manner considering the changing dynamics of the threat in the north-east. But is this possible during the ongoing battle of the ballots? It is unlikely, and that is what spells misfortune for the nation.

The writer is an independent contributor.