The Israel-Hamas conflict has once again thrust the United States into the spotlight in West Asia, prompting questions about its strategic intentions and the potential for military involvement. This has consequences that could resonate far beyond the region. After a decade of tapering down its military presence in West Asia, the USA has returned with a show of force. The deployment of two aircraft-carrier strike groups, fighter squadrons, air-defence systems and aid to Israel signal a renewed commitment to safeguard American interests and protect an ally. However, the uncomfortable reality is that deterrence may fail, leading to a cascade of unforeseen consequences.

The escalating series of attacks on American interests in Iraq and Syria, allegedly orchestrated by Iranian proxy forces, underscores the fragility of the current situation. While such attacks have been fairly common in recent years, the breach of an informal truce heightens concerns. America’s leaders have responded with fierce verbal warnings, emphasising their determination to defend personnel and security swiftly and decisively. But what happens if words prove insufficient? The United States possesses a range of options for military action, from intelligence-gathering to defensive and, if necessary, offensive measures. Intelligence collection is already underway, with carriers serving as massive information platforms. The presence of electronic-warfare planes, early-warning aircraft, helicopters and drones enables the continuous monitoring of the region, supporting American and allied decision-making. Defensive actions are easier to justify to the American public.

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These include intercepting missiles targeting allies, as seen in the recent interception of missiles fired from Yemen. Moreover, the USA is bolstering Israel’s Iron Dome air-defence system, sending additional batteries to augment its capabilities. Offensive action is a more controversial and consequential step, one that American leaders are eager to avoid but may be compelled to take if deterrence fails. Retaliatory strikes against attackers of American forces are easier to justify, as demonstrated by previous actions against Iranian-backed militias in Iraq and Syria. However, offensive actions that extend beyond protecting American lives are unpopular in the country. If taken, they could lead to a deeper West Asia conflict with far-reaching consequences. Should Israel’s air defences falter, America might be drawn into strikes against Hezbollah positions in Lebanon.

The ladder of escalation becomes steeper as the stakes rise, creating a web of complexity. In the midst of these uncertainties, experts agree on one thing. It is that Iran likely does not desire a direct war with the United States. Maintaining the element of surprise and preserving Hezbollah as an asset are central to Iran’s strategy. The USA will probably avoid direct attacks on Iran itself unless Iran enters the conflict directly. The precarious nature of deterrence lies in its ambiguity, for if the red lines of those to be deterred remain unclear, the potential for missteps and unintended escalation grows. As we watch these developments unfold, it is crucial to remember that while deploying a show of force, the USA hopes it will never have to use it.