Unorthodox operations have been an integral part of military warfare. Concomitant to conventional operations, the unconventional/guerrilla operations or shall I say “out of the box” kind of missions had been planned and executed by various countries in the past. Unfolding historical annals, the first such instance that comes to mind is laying “the Chakra Vyuh” (a kind of battle formation) from the Mahabharata.

The famous Chariot War between Egypt and Turkey, popularly known as the “Battle of Kadesh” was fought in 1274 BCE. The Hittites Army (Turkey) in a wily fox response fed the wrong intelligence through planted agents, trapped and succeeded in routing a sizable column of the Ramesses (Egypt). Now, let us fast forward the timeline from BCE to CE and history is replete with a number of successful unconventional operations. The great Shiva ji has been acknowledged as the pioneer of guerrilla warfare; he evolved a concept called the “Shiv Sutra” or “Ganimi Kawa” (in Marathi – stealth operations) encompassing the cumulative manifestation of the “hit and run strategy” and cutting off the supply lines of the enemy.

Up north, this concept was hugely pursued in Punjab by various armed Sikh groups, who during broad daylight used to attack the retreating Muslim invaders, to not only inflict massive losses but also to retrieve the booty and the loot they were carrying along with them. Coming closer, during the last two centennials, unconventional operations perhaps were tried during the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902), wherein the Boers, instead of giving a direct fight to 180,000 strong British Expeditioners took to the hills and launched a series of successful hit-andrun attacks and ambushes for two years. Later, greatly influenced by this success, it was tried during the Second World War.

In one such action in June 1940, the British Forces – the Number 11 Independent Company launched – Op COLLAR- a special mission under Major Ronnie Tod to raid a coastal establishment off the French Coast. Ironically, bereft of any designated title, such military maneuvers were still being conducted under various garbs such as raids, ambushes or guerilla war. However, in 1941, Col DW Clarke, a protagonist of the Boer Guerilla Militia, taking a cue from the Latin word “Commendare” (meaning commend or entrust) and a Dutch word “Kommando” (implying command or order) coined the “Commando” for special mission units and redefined their role as, “troops or units trained and organised as Shock troops, particularly for Hit and Run raids”.

Later, this word was added to the dictionary and described it as “a Soldier specially trained to make attacks on enemy areas that are very dangerous or difficult to attack”. While World War II was on, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, who was greatly influenced by this novel concept, ordered the raising of Commando units. By the end of the war, it had become a potent force of 25,000 and rechristened as the 3 Commando Brigade comprising the Royal Marine Para Regiments, the Special Air Service (SAS) and the Special Boat Service (SBS). In 1984, Maurice Jugwell, a veteran of the British Special Military Operations yet again revamped Commando Operations as “small scale, clandestine, covert or overt operations of unorthodox and high risk nature to achieve the military objectives.”

Post World War II, other countries too went in for raising commando units. In 1952, the US raised the 10th Special Forces (SF) Group under the Psychological Warfare Division. Colloquially known as “Green Berets”, and subsequently emboldened with the raising of other units such as the 1st SF Operational Detachment (Delta Force), the Navy, Air and Land Teams (SEAL), the Naval Specialist warfare Development Group (DEVGRU), the Army Rangers, the Marine Raiders and so on. Incidentally, the US preferred the designation of SF to Commando, based on the logic that commando operations were of tactical nature while the SF operations had wider scope with strategic ramifications. Two operations successfully accomplished by our Armed Forces could be used as examples to buttress the American argument – first, postUri, the retaliatory operation across the Line of Control (LOC) by our SF Para Units in September 2016 and second, the 2019 air strike at Balakot.

The former could be termed as a commando operation while the latter was of wider scope having long term implications. Barring the mobile Strike Unit comprising four battalions of Gurkha Rifles, there is no evidence of any commando/SF units of the Indian Army which had participated in World War II. Similarly, no such operations were carried out during the 1947-48 Indo-Pak conflict in J&K and the 1962 Sino-Indian war. Interestingly, the genesis of commando operations has a fortuitous background. During the 1965 War, in order to speed up operations, Major Megh Singh, an Infanteer, posted in HQ Western Command, volunteered to infiltrate and operate behind the enemy’s defences.

Sensing his courage and confidence, General Harbakash Singh, the then Western Army Commander and “a maverick General’, got impressed with this novel initiative and gave him the goahead. Thus an ad hoc outfit – the Meghdoot Force, named after the Major was born and deployed in the Poonch Sector. It successfully captured the tactically crucial areas of Neza Pir and Ari Dhok posts that facilitated our advance and led to establishing the vital Uri-Poonch Link. Eventually, the Meghdoot Force was acknowledged as the “AvantGarde” force and Major Megh Singh as the “Au Fait” of Commando Operations in the Indian Armed Forces. A momentous development followed, when in 1966 it attained official recognition and was reorganised as the first Commando Unit of the Indian Army as 9 PARA (Commando), with Lt Col Megh Singh as its first Commanding Officer (CO).

In order to further enhance our capabilities, in the following year it was carved up to raise the second Unit – the 10 PARA (Commando). Realising the importance of such operations as also to enhance the operational capabilities of the Infantry, though not authorised, the infantry battalions had also started raising commando platoons for special mission tasks. Incidentally these platoons proved their mettle in Unit/ Formation level operations during the 1971 War and the subsequent operations. In 1978 the Indian army formally added 1 PARA Battalion and re-labeled the three Units as the Special Force (sobriquet of Commando) Battalions. This led to conversion of more Para Units into this fold.

In order to make them professionally more dexterous and a cohesive organisation, the HQ Special Forces (SF) was created in July 1987. Later, the Army SF were blessed with two siblings – the Naval Marine Commandos (MARCOS) in 1987 followed by Air Force GARUD Commandos in 2004. In between, the Infantry Commando Platoons were redesignated as Ghatak (lethal, killer). Militarily, the Commando concept is synonymous and tenable with the Armed Forces, but one gets disgustedly surprised by the rat race amongst the non-military organisations to borrow the title “Commando”. There is a misplaced belief that merely sporting a maroon beret and the black fatigues would make one a Commando.

With the exception of the Special Action Groups (SAGs) of the National Security Guard (NSG) and the Special Frontier Force (SFF), this misnomer has not only led to dilution of this elite concept but also pushed an unabated race amongst various agencies. Prevailing geo-political unrest, particularly the Russo- Ukraine War, the military actions in the Black Sea and the Middle East have underscored the importance of a small force debilitating the larger conventional force. However, with a view to meeting on-going and future challenges, they need to be correspondingly better equipped and more mobile so as to be regionally and globally available in a given time.

Our threat perceptions hinge around hostile neighbours who have repeatedly conveyed their resolve to pursue the policy of terrorism and keeping the borders alive. Although the Naxalites’ hegemony is fast shrinking, they still remain a cogent threat. The political developments in Maldives have complicated our maritime challenges. In order to strengthen our SF capabilities, there is a need to enhance and integrate all SF resources under one command. In fact, this point was mooted in the early 1990s but was not pursued. And now, under the prevailing security challenges, it needs serious consideration. (The writer is a retired Colonel of the Indian Army.)