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Ukraine and After~I

The entire period of eight years was used by the leading Nato powers to strengthen the Ukrainian defence forces and fight the Russian-speaking separatists while denying their basic rights to pursue their language, culture, and political participation.

Ukraine and After~I

Photo: IANS

It is often argued that the Biden administration’s overwhelming support to Ukraine in its conflict with Russia, is a reflection of Woodrow Wilson’s idealistic trait in US foreign policy to support the extension of democracy and human rights as a prime value. But in this assertion what is forgotten is that President Wilson also championed self-determination which should have been seriously considered as, after the coup in 2014, there was no attempt to implement the Minsk agreements I and II which provided a reasonable power sharing arrangement between majority Ukrainians and Russians who constituted 30 per cent of the population of Ukraine.

Instead, the pro-Nazi elements were encouraged and intimately integrated into the power structure with a veto which made any proper democratic functioning practically impossible. Between 2014 and 2022 the Ukrainian army was trained by Nato members to be a strong professional army to meet the challenge of the Russian-speaking separatists who were supported by Russia. Another important fact is that when the Minsk agreements were signed, the Russian-supported separatists were winning and the ceasefire allowed breathing space to the Ukrainians.

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But there was no visible attempt at important reforms like tackling endemic corruption, persistence of the weak party system and no serious attempt to implement rule of law. The entire period of eight years was used by the leading Nato powers to strengthen the Ukrainian defence forces and fight the Russian-speaking separatists while denying their basic rights to pursue their language, culture, and political participation.

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The pro-Russian political parties were harassed and have now been banned in the wake of the present conflict. In the initial period the security concerns of Russia were ignored and the issues of the Russian minority bypassed. The casualness of the Biden Administration created a situation where a well-equipped and Nato-trained army of 600,000 is facing a humiliating defeat at the hands of the Russian military numbering 200,000.

Even a well thought out strategy of providing military aid was not worked out well leading to a situation where the Ukrainian army is short of ammunition and the replacement promises were only for the equipment destroyed by the Russians. More attention was directed to the West’s adversarial relations with Russia and humiliate it. The New York Times recently commented that there was no clear picture of a Ukrainian war strategy.

Scott Ritter categorically states that Ukraine has lost the war. But the question remains why the severe sanctions imposed on Russia did not elicit the desired result of either pushing back Russians to their borders or to bring about, as Biden said, a regime change in Moscow. On the contrary, Russia’s gamble of payment of its oil and gas in rubles worked, earning it $800 million in a day more than the revenue earned last year.

The Ruble has emerged as a strong currency now; one dollar equals 55 rubles. Russia is worried about its overvaluation. The war has led to a phenomenal rise in prices of food and fuel all over the world including Nato countries with Russia being affected marginally. The Economist in 2014 remarked about the small size of the Russian economy comparing it to Spain, thus underestimating Russian strength which is the major reason that the Western sanctions did not yield the desired result or Russia’s economic collapse.

The real income in PPP terms is overlooked as the focus is only on the formal exchange rate ratio. In fact, in terms of productivity, per capita income and welfare measures, it compares more favourably with Germany than Spain. The problem of assessing the economic strength of a country is that the proportion of the service sector is grossly overvalued. If one concentrates on commodities and industrial production, Russia is more like Japan, with a share of world trade of 5 or 6 per cent.

In the category of basic needs of food and energy, Russia’s share of world trade is 15 per cent. Though Russia is not the largest producer of oil but it is its largest exporter as in wheat, nickel and many other rare earth minerals. By PPP measures, China overtook the USA and the EU six years ago and has become the lynchpin of the global economy. The developing world now exports more manufactured goods than agricultural products. Population wise, the West has 13 per cent, Russia and China have 20 per cent and the rest, the non-aligned, two thirds. Neutral countries like Saudi Arabia and India look to their respective national priorities.

For instance, India is enjoying discounted oil supply from Russia below the market price. The “unfriendly countries” of the West are paying much more for oil and gas. The withdrawal of Swift facilities is facilitating the de-pollarisation process and the US objective is to export at a much higher price liquified natural gas to Europe. To make European security Atlantist and even conceiving an Asian NATO is to promote US interests. Interestingly, in the entire process, American investment in Europe is minimal and many European countries are active participants in the Chinese BRI project. Poland and Italy are active participants but are also virulent critics of Russia. But the economic compulsions will inevitably bring them closer to the Eurasian project.

In 2018, the USA announced that the war on terror was over and henceforth the primary policy would not be to allow the rise of China and Russia. Nuclear deterrence was not continued and all arms control treaties are not being renewed forcing the Eurasian block to spend more on defence. But what has happened is that the cold war enmities between Russia and China are forgotten and their relationship has become closer. One prime reason for their friendship as Gonzebo Liza II comments is the trust deficit that Russia has against the West.

It means that Russia will have a decisive victory and then only any peace talks would be possible. The Nato expectation that Russia would be bogged down in a war within Ukraine did not happen, and Russian oil revenues increased with soaring oil prices leading to a sale of $96 billion, highest in the last two years. The USA-led Nato overestimated the strength of the Ukrainian armed forces and did not have any plan to reverse or stop the war. For Russia, it is a mission to be completed with neutrality and denazification of Ukraine, liberation of Donetsk, expansion of security and securing water resources for Crimea. War for Russia is a means, in the Clausewitz sense, of achieving certain goals which are well defined: (1) Ukraine will not join Nato; (2) redefining Europe’s security architecture and (3) to maintain Nato boundaries at the 1997 level.

 

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