In his remarkable book, Backstage: The Story Behind Indias High Growth Years (Rupa, 2020), Montek Singh Ahluwalia makes a telling reference to the long process before the Goods and Services Tax (GST) came into effect in 2017. It has taken about thirteen years since the Kelkar Committee, set up by the Vajpayee Government, recommended a shift to GST in 2004. Widely perceived to be a gamechanger, P Chidambaram announced the intention to move to GST in 2006 and based on the recommendations of Asim Dasgupta Committee, a Constitution Amendment Bill was introduced by Pranab Mukherjee in 2011.

But it was severely opposed by the BJP, especially by a few Chief Ministers on grounds that ‘it would hurt the interests of states and limit the sovereignty of the state…’ The Bill lapsed. After BJP came to power, the Amendment was passed in 2016 and operationalised the next year. It has since been criticised on implementation and other issue pertaining to design. Evidently, this is not an exception or a unique case. It may be interesting to know why it happens and what should be the learning experience from such cases? Any parliamentary legislation depends upon the arithmetic of seats and the role played by the Opposition, complicated and delayed further if consent of the states is needed.

Principled opposition to a move by the ruling dispensation is understandable and often desirable, but such opposition should be broadly consistent. Adopting widely different positions, while in Opposition or in power, may not serve the best of public interest. Unfortunately, such inconsistencies in approach have been quite common in Indian polity. It should be noted that there is an element of inexorability in the decision-making process which is largely shaped by the bureaucracy. Governance being a continuum and bureaucracy meant to maintain that continuity, change of party in power does not generally affect public life in a significant manner, at least in the short to medium term.

In most cases, the political leadership pushes certain programmes with vigour, sometimes with modification, slows down and abandons a few others. In other words, it prioritises them, based on party compulsions and other imperatives. Hence, there are frequent flip-flops on substantive measures that take time to fully mature. Second, the performance of the government can be assessed by certain well defined parameters and is liable to be questioned. Every stable regime from Nehru’s time to the present will be remembered for certain noteworthy achievements; but there are not many established parameters by which the Opposition performance can be measured.

Here lies an asymmetry in which the government i.e., the executive ,remains answerable to the legislature, judiciary, constitutional watchdogs, the media and the public, but the Opposition to virtually none The Opposition’s performance is often judged by its success in creating hurdles in the process, delaying or stalling government initiatives. Therefore, there may be a need for a broad understanding to be reached between the ruling and opposing parties on the proposed programmes / legislations based on a graded scale of no opposition, milopposition and total opposition. That would help the government to strategise its priorities and the opposition formations to focus on their gameplan.

Third, it is relatively easy for economic and social policies to be framed ~ in areas covered under the Union or State lists ~ by competent civil servants, economists and other experts, under a favourable political climate. Such decisions are often taken at the executive level. Many of the big-bang reforms of the Narasimha Rao and Vajpayee governments were driven by the executive alone. Major institutions like the Planning Commission and its successor avatar, the NITI Aayog, were set up by the executive and their functioning was not impeded by any lack of legislation. However, it is more difficult to push programmes covered under the Concurrent List or the Centrally Sponsored Schemes where the funding is shared between the Union and the states concerned, with their implementation taking place at the state level.

Bringing all the states on board and adopting the legislative route, where inevitable, adds to the complexity of the process. But this is where most of the action lies, as in crucial areas like education, health, rural development and poverty alleviation. Fourth, even in the domain of the executive, where decisions are taken primarily through the civil servants and the ministers, based on expert advice and consultation with the stake holders, there exist areas of potential conflict, especially during the implementation phase. Simplistically speaking, policy formulation is the prerogative of the Cabinet/Ministers concerned, and its implementation that of the civil servants.

In reality, however, policies (including legislation) are mainly crafted by the higher bureaucracy and approved by the political leadership, based on party manifestoes .Undue political interference is generally minimal at this stage. However, once the policy (or legislation) is sought to be implemented at the field-level, local politicians and party supporters, masquerading as public representatives, seek to continuously interfere. Although their main interest often lies in transfer and posting of favoured officials or in tendering and contracting of works or in selecting beneficiaries for a scheme, their relentless pursuit demoralises senior officials and, not infrequently, acts as a brake to development initiatives.

Ill-trained and unmotivated officials at the cutting-edge level, and indifferent senior officials with little control or supervision over their subordinates ,add to the administrative disorder we see all around. Hence, the common lament that the policy is good but the implementation has been rather poor. Such being the complexity and time consuming nature of the way policies are framed and executed, parties in power often tend to pick ideas that can be immediately accomplished. Distribution of freebies, renaming of roads and institutions, construction of statues and such populist measures are amongst such examples. An alert public should be conscious of the intrinsic worth of such actions.

However, making systemic changes and sharpening the tools that would facilitate sustainable transformation require the political leadership to possess an acute understanding of the governance process and a statesmanlike long-term vision. The government has to show resolve with compassion, the Opposition has to be critical yet constructive, and the public adequately informed and rational. Unless a synergy is developed between these three, enriched and speedy decision making will continue to be difficult.

(The writer is a retired IAS officer)