The once in five-year phenomenon of the National Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party began on 16 October. The National Party Congress is a significant event as the Chinese Government declares its most significant policies in these special sessions. However, this session holds greater significance due to President Xi Jinping’s quest to clinch a historic third term as the President of Peoples’ Republic of China for himself. There have been signals in the past which point in this direction, for example, there is no heir apparent of President Xi, or any leader of the younger generation that he has groomed to succeed him like presidents had done before him. It is worth mentioning that in the recent past, the once-in-ten-year transition of power in the Chinese government had become the hallmark of continuity and change in the leadership.

Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s had started this tradition when he stepped away. After him, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao followed suit and left the top post after two tenures. It is this trend that President Xi seeks to upend. Along with the historic third term for President Xi, the Politburo, the highest decision-making body, will also undergo decadal transition. Premier Li Keqiang has already announced that he will not continue. His successor will also become clear in the coming days. The Politburo Standing Committee, the Chinese answer to the Cabinet system, with its seven members, will see a reshuffle due to the retirement of some of its members because they have turned.

This is known as the Seven up Eight down rule. It has been argued by many that President Xi would like to see his close confidants as Politburo Standing Committee members to ensure his grip on the nerve centre of Chinese politics, and in this light the 20th National Party Congress will be even more significant. This Congress will be significant at the level of set precedence and principles as well. If President Xi is allowed to stay on, he will only be the second leader after Chairman Mao to have lasted longer than two terms. His extension will bring about the systemic changes in the Chinese polity, which has existed on a consensual basis since Deng Xiaoping. In many ways it will jeopardise the peaceful change of guard and the rules governing it. Mr Xi’s extended term will also be viewed as a mandate for his ‘rejuvenation’ plans for China and the crescendo of nationalism.

On the one hand, it will bolster President Xi’s power and agenda, on the other it may take China down the path from Party Rule to Personal Rule, a situation that existed before 1976. The indications of this change were visible even earlier. The Sixth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China held in November 2021 had endorsed President Xi’s thought through an ‘Authoritative resolution’. This resolution placed President Xi in the league of Mao and Deng, effectively taking him ahead of his contemporaries. President Xi was also called the ‘helmsman’ of China in this session, a term which was only used for Chairman Mao. For many it was a signal that Mr Xi would seek to become the Chairman of the Communist Party of China, a place held by Mao for his lifetime.

These shifting political headwinds in China are being closely viewed by other countries including India. Under President Xi, the Chinese approach to dealing with international issues has changed. From a cautious state, China has become proactive in international relations. In part, it has to do with the economic and military might of China which has propelled it into the top two positions of the world order along with the USA; this shift came with President Xi’s leadership. The greater centralization of power in his own hands and reforms in the Chinese Defence forces have become instrumental in the greater power projection of China at home and abroad.

The rumblings in the Asia Pacific in the past decade since Mr Xi’s accession is no coincidence; they should be viewed against the background of rising Chinese power. Therefore, the countries in the Asia Pacific, especially the USA, Japan and Australia will be looking closely towards Mr Xi’s ascent into the third term. Asian politics in recent years has moved towards confrontation and containment of China and in this scenario a ‘rejuvenated’ Mr Xi will cause disruptions of his own. On his part, President Xi will seek to re-launch China into global prominence, after the years of Covid ravages and economic crisis at home and diplomatic setbacks abroad.

The Belt and Road Initiative was launched to reap the benefits of Chinese economic power, and to extend Chinese influence far and wide. However, the intended benefits of this flagship initiative of President Xi have not accrued and instead it has led to debt burdens on host countries such as Sri Lanka, Maldives, and Djibouti. The resistance to Chinese financial policies in the host countries has put a shade of doubt on the Chinese capacity to become a global leader. Experts have termed it as the Chinese Kindleberger Trap. The recent Global Security Initiative launched by China seeks to claim the central position for it in the aftermath of strategic backlash from Western countries led by the USA. In the light of events in Europe, it can be argued that in the foreseeable future the Western world would try to keep China, along with Russia, at bay.

This will be the big challenge for President Xi, should he win the third term. In his bid to relaunch China into international diplomatic circles, Mr Xi may try to increase Chinese clout in multilateral forums like WTO, UNHCR, BRICS and others. Will Western countries allow Chinese ‘wolf-warrior’ diplomacy to take centre stage, or keep China at bay? In all probability, India will try not to ruffle Chinese feathers notwithstanding the differences between the two on the issues of security, trade and supply chains shifting towards India. Apple and Foxconn are a case in point where industries leaving China are relocating in India. The Government of India, so far, has opted for a pragmatic diplomatic posture while keeping equidistance between the Western world and the China-Russia duo.

The reasons for Indian reticence are logical and a sign of mature diplomacy without a knee-jerk reaction to global events. It can be argued that it is in India’s interest to deal with other countries on a case-to-case basis, keeping Indian interests in mind. Though Indo-China relations are far from normal; however, the proximity of neighbours cannot be denied, and India needs to function in this territory. It can be argued that Indian decisions are conditioned by these challenging scenarios that should be appreciated for their complexities. President Xi’s third term will certainly have a bearing on Indo-Chinese relations and the evolution of Asian politics in the near future.

A version of this story appears in the print edition of the October 19 , 2022, issue.