Foreign policy involves complex variables and considerations, both internal and external, reflecting a future roadmap for the country. With neighbours like China and Pakistan, the security dimension is the overarching theme in defining foreign policy. Therefore, the country that manages security conversations better in a bilateral equation often manages to keep the other stumped, second-guessing and forever on its toes.

The looming shadow and inviolable diktats of the Pakistani military from the Rawalpindi GHQ play a role in shaping the seemingly contradictory and inconsistent policy positions that emanate from civilian mouths in Islamabad. The dynamics were at play when the absence of the ‘K’ word in the Ufa joint declaration by the civilian government of Pakistan was red-flagged by Pakistani Generals as a gross over-reach.

Soon the Pakistani politicians were forced into issuing an embarrassing retraction. Similarly, the unmistakable handiwork of the Chinese PLA (People’s Liberation Army) in maintaining wanton belligerence in the South China Sea, patrol-scuffles with India, cyber-attacks on US institutions, offensive missile deployment patterns, are all indicative of the role that the Chinese armed forces play in defining the country’s foreign policy.

The ostensibly consensus-driven approach of the Chinese leadership has codified verticals that ensure the permanent presence and impact of PLA-driven security/military imperatives and considerations. The PLA sensitivities are represented by none less than the ‘first among equals’ in the Chinese Politburo Standing Committee, President Xi Jinping (Commander-in-Chief of PLA), besides the prominent presence of the PLA uniformed fraternity in the more functional Council of State Security (CoSS).

The transformation of China’s traditional shyness in the international arena into a more assertive role in global affairs is reflecting the increasing visibility, brazenness and investments in PLA infrastructure, inputs and actions.

On the contrary in India, the so-called ‘siloisation’ of Defence sensitivities from the public domain dates back to independence, when India inherited a strong political culture and instinct ~ as opposed to the more militarised influence in neighbouring countries. (General Ayub Khan took over Pakistan within 11 years of independence, General Ne Win in Myanmar within 14 years of independence, and even in the newly-formed Bangladesh, coups occurred within four years of its independence).

In Delhi, Jawaharlal Nehru was the quintessential internationalist, statesman and pacifist-politician never at ease with the relevance of the Indian Armed Forces, which he unfortunately ignored as a legacy institution of the British Empire.

The People’s Republic of China’s debut in 1949 was more hard-nosed and bloody with the multitude of civilian wars by the PLA, pre-and-post independence (e.g. Cultural Revolution). This ensured the requisite ‘revolutionary’ spirit and a security paranoia of the outside world, mandating hyper-sensitivity towards the PLA and its inputs, in all subsequent foreign policies.

The Indo-China war of 1962 was the first visible casualty of the inadequacy of the security appreciation and preparedness in the Indian narrative. Prime Minister Nehru had propounded the terribly flawed ‘forward posture’ policy based on inputs from the Intelligence Bureau and was soon forced into sending long telegrams imploring John F Kennedy’s help by describing the situation as, ‘really desperate’! Post-1962, some short-term lessons were learnt. Lal Bahadur Shastri’s more martial invocation (Jai Jawan, Jai Kisan) and the sense of redemption in the 1965 Indo-Pak war were cut short by his own life. Indira Gandhi was shrewd enough to give the irrepressible Sam Maneckshaw the time, means and the wherewithal to ensure a ‘Bangladesh’, in 1971.

However, the structural construct of the Indian governance system ~ a participative form of democracy ~ has ensured societal issues like race, region, religion and language dominate the ruling minds as opposed to foreign affairs. This was left exclusively to be dealt with by civilian career bureaucrats who had no military perspective.

Even though India is emerging economically and is poised to play a more pro-active role in the global highway, the vacillating and knee-jerk approach toward the appreciation, investment and ‘inclusion’ of the voice of its armed forces has ensured a sub-optimal role for the forces in official policy-making for dealing with its irascible neighbours.

The sword-arm of the Indian executive is solely used for its kinetic efficacy and professionalism, when most other administrative arms and functionaries throw in the towel. However, the dual shame of the crying need for a desperate material overhaul of weaponry and wares, along with the parallel ignominy of repeatedly earning the tag of “the world’s largest arms importer” is reflective of the crests and troughs of security culture… despite the frequent Kargils, 26/11s, Pathankots, Pampores, etc. In Pakistan, meanwhile, the supposedly civilian-suited NSA (retired Lt Gen), ensures that the phenomenon of ‘Chinese whispers’ does not befall critical inputs sent from the Rawalpindi GHQ to the politicians in Islamabad.

Our foreign policy is chiseled by the PMO, NSA and the External Affairs Ministry. However, despite the overtly security-related dimensions inherent in subjects like cross-border firing on LOC, Balochistan, Kashmir, ISI-funded terror, CPEC, border violations by PLA, etc., the substantial and structural integration of the armed forces perspective is both indirect and woefully inadequate. The common refrain of babus and the politicos running the security imperatives comes forth in the sometimes questionable handling of terror attacks, as in Pathankot.

Even within the country, where the visible footprint of the armed forces playing a decisive role in tackling insurgencies, civilian riots, natural disasters, etc., is all-pervasive, the opinion and perspective of the forces are rarely sought or entertained. On the more strategic and all-encompassing foreign policy affairs (even though deeply security-centric), the say is even more negligible.

India is said to lack an overall strategic culture, but the armed forces have persevered with the development of their own working doctrines, roadmaps and philosophies. Yet, the abundance of this crucial perspective is underutilised and stifled. Increasingly, foreign policies across the world are interweaving, promoting and couching their respective military/security angularities in their foreign policies.

China’s geopolitical forays like CPEC or ‘One-Belt-One-Road’ are as much about prudent economics as they are about military/security dimensions. India needs to formally and structurally incorporate the ‘view from the post’, not exclusively, but in conjunction with other considerations like trade, commerce, culture, etc. We need not swerve to extreme positions of exclusive militarised perspectives as the case is to ‘include’ the military perspective and not to ‘preclude’ any other existing perspective to make our policies more holistic, robust and dynamic.

The writer is Lt Gen PVSM, AVSM (Retd) former Lt Governor of Andaman and Nicobar Island and Puducherry.