The March 22 attacks in Moscow have raised the spectre of international terrorism. While these terror strikes were claimed by the Islamic State, Russia suspects a Ukrainian hand in the attacks. If the Islamic State is indeed involved, it shows that the terror outfit has not only regained its capacity in Afghanistan, but also to hit targets as far as Moscow. The Moscow attack took place a little over two months after the twin bombings in the Iranian city of Kerman which killed 100 people and wounded 300 others.

Earlier, in September 2022, two Russian embassy staff in Kabul were among six people killed when a suicide bomber detonated explosives near the entrance of the embassy, in a blast that injured at least ten others. In another attack in Kandahar, Taliban’s traditional stronghold and political headquarters, IS-K bombers killed at least three people and injured more than a dozen civilians. Years after losing its stronghold in the Levant, the Islamic State is making a comeback.

Geo-political rivalries and regional tensions are providing space to acts of catastrophic terror attacks far removed from active battlefronts onto population centres. Incidentally, these attacks also come at a time when inter-state wars are on rise. Would this suggest that we are on the cusp of another wave of terrorism by IS-K jihadists and its other affiliates from within Afghanistan? As they say, terrorism never dies, it only mutates into another form. Nearly a fortnight after the terror attack in Moscow, the question remains how will Russia respond. The Russians see the attack as yet another attempt aimed at destabilising Russia.

Much of it will depend on who was behind the attack – whether the Islamic State acted on its own or some other actor prompted this attack to embarrass the Russian State? Either way, the Russians would have to act. However, if Kyiv is involved, Moscow will be tempted to intensify its war effort. In the meantime, four terrorists have been apprehended. Interestingly, they were arrested on the highway leading to Kyiv when they could have easily melted into Moscow’s neighbourhood. There is also some evidence to suggest that these terrorists of Tajik ethnicity were recruited in Turkey, and that the Ukrainian embassy staff members in Istanbul were involved.

Even if Russia were to acknowledge that IS-K jihadists were involved, Moscow is likely to apportion some blame on Kyiv. Moscow is also accusing the West of its involvement. The arms transfers to Ukraine, training of Ukrainian troops in the UK and EU countries, and intelligence support to target Russia; all of these are good reasons for Russia to suspect. For instance, the impending transfer of the Taurus air-launched cruise missiles to Ukraine, which Germany has thus far refused, adds to the controversy. Experts argue that induction of Taurus missiles, which are capable of hunting down high-value targets, could well be a game-changer to break the current impasse along the battlefront.

Beyond these arms transfers to Ukraine, the West’s discretion is under question. With France threatening to send troops to Ukraine, and Finland and Sweden joining the NATO alliance, none of these actions might sound wise, as it leads to increased tensions. Moscow’s retribution seems to have already begun. Russia launched a series of missile attacks on the Ukrainian capital. Russia also attacked Lviv, with one missile reportedly entering Polish territory. Under pressure, Russia might well be tempted to shore up its impending summer offensive with all resources at its disposal.

The Islamic State has long considered Russia as its adversary. It has targeted Russia for several reasons. First, its historical enmity with Moscow relates to interventions in Chechnya and Afghanistan. Second, Russia’s long-standing partnership with regimes opposed by the Islamic State, like Syria and Iran. Third, Russia’s growing cooperation with the Taliban. And fourth, such high-profile attacks, like the one in Moscow, provide much publicity for its global reach and inspire its supporters, in the form of increased recruitment, funding and influence across the jihadi spectrum. Since last year, the Islamic State has been linked to many attacks in Iran and Russia.

Kamran Bokhari, an expert in Eurasian Security at Washington DC explains several interesting nuances of these recent attacks. Notably and in most cases, the jihadists hail from the Central Asian States neighbouring Russia. These bordering states are susceptible to the instability stemming from Afghanistan. Next, with their fluency in the Russian language, they find easy employment in Russia. Their native dialects also help them to navigate through Afghanistan to Iran and Turkey, and onwards to Russia. Lastly, the timing of attacks is important. These attacks have come at a time when both countries are embroiled in major conflicts.

The attacks in Iran took place when its proxies were busy targeting Israel. And the attacks in Russia occurred when its army is at war with Ukraine. Earlier last year, the Russian-led military bloc CSTO had hinted of an increase in the network of training camps and IS fighters in regions bordering Afghanistan. In that light, the ISK attack in Moscow does not come as a surprise. The Americans and the Iranians have claimed to have tipped off the Russians on the impending attacks. Moscow, however, remained sceptical.

Ever since the Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan, the regional landscape has shifted. Experts have remained sceptical about Taliban’s promise to combat IS-K and sever ties with Al Qaeda. While, the Taliban have repeatedly declared success in fighting IS-K and denied any links with Al Qaeda, their claims are suspect. The recent suicide bombing in the heartland of the Taliban, and the Moscow operation under the very nose of the Kremlin, have demonstrated ISK’s reach and capability.

The IS-K remains strong despite its rivalry with the Taliban. IS-K core elements include many Afghan Taliban cadres who wanted a more extremist version of Islam. In order to strengthen its regime, the Taliban let Pakistani Taliban (TTP) cadres into Afghanistan. TTP has waged violent actions against the Pakistani government for years along similar lines as the Afghan Taliban. There is often a tendency to view IS-K, ISIS, Al Qaeda, and the Taliban as separate entities. In essence, they all share a common commitment.

Meanwhile, the Taliban have remained loyal to AlQaeda, which has established active cells in Afghanistan. Some twenty plus terror outfits with over 23,000 fighters have operating bases in Afghanistan. IS-K alone has 6,000 members, a steep rise from 2,000 reported last year. TTP has an equal number of fighters. Sizeable cadres of AQIS, ETIM, and other smaller terror groups reside in Afghanistan. The continued presence of these terror outfits in Afghanistan and recurring transnational attacks should unite the regional actors and major powers to cooperate in combating terrorism.

However, prevailing regional and global rivalries impede this collaboration, thus allowing IS-K, Al Qaeda and the Taliban plenty of space to flourish. Even at the cost of sounding Utopian, the need to collectively deter and defeat wanton acts of terror in a fraying world order cannot be ignored. Three aspects are important. First, international and regional forums need to pledge support to coalesce intelligence efforts to combat international terrorism. Second, when necessary, states must share information about an imminent attack with vulnerable nations. Each state has a duty to warn, an obligation that might even extend to potential adversaries.

Third, maintaining a principled contact with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan makes sense in order to discern the trends and indicators. As they say, there is no substitute for last-mile intelligence, not even the muchhyped AI-enabled intelligence platforms of today. In our context, the stakes are even higher and require constant vigil. The Moscow attack should act as a grim reminder. Even a well-policed state like Russia can be vulnerable to the planning and sophistication of IS attacks. India’s proximity to Afghanistan and internal tensions in an election year can be compelling factors. Moreover, Jihadist threats to India’s security have to be looked at through the Pakistani prism.

The writer, a retired Lieutenant General of the Indian Army, has served multiple tenures during peak militancy years in North Kashmir.