The recent diplomatic dance between India and the United States, highlighted by Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Moscow, signals a complex balancing act that harkens back to historical precedents. Mr Modi’s cordial meetings with President Vladimir Putin, punctuated by warm embraces, have elicited stern warnings from US officials who caution New Delhi against taking its relationship with Washington for granted. This delicate manoeuvring reflects a broader hesitation in Indian foreign policy, reminiscent of late Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s cautious approach during the Cold War era. In the 1950s, Nehru’s reluctance to fully align with the United States against China led to significant strategic missteps. Today, Mr Modi’s India faces a similar dilemma.

The US seeks a deeper security partnership with India, envisioning a robust anti-China coalition in the Indo-Pacific. However, New Delhi remains wary of such entanglements, preferring to dictate the terms and pace of its engagement with Washington. This cautious stance is driven by a desire to maintain strategic autonomy and avoid being drawn into a binary geopolitical contest. The current state of Indo-US relations can be seen as near-ideal from New Delhi’s perspective. India benefits from US diplomatic and intelligence support, especially in its on-going border tensions with China. The partnership provides India with niche military technologies and enhances its defence capabilities without necessitating a full-scale military alliance. This arrangement allows India to leverage US support while retaining its independent foreign policy. However, this strategy is not without its drawbacks. The limited nature of the partnership may reduce the willingness of the US to engage in comprehensive technology transfers and deeper military cooperation.

Washington’s disappointment with India’s continued engagement with Russia, especially in the context of the Nato summit, underscores the fragility of this relationship. American officials’ warnings reflect growing frustration with India’s balancing act and highlight the potential risks of Delhi’s approach. The global geopolitical landscape is shifting rapidly, with the US forging deeper security ties with other regional powers through initiatives like AUKUS and enhanced defence cooperation with Japan and Australia. These developments suggest that the US is diversifying its security partnerships in the Indo-Pacific, potentially side-lining India in critical strategic calculations. This could lead to a more transactional relationship between India and the US, driven by immediate interests rather than a long-term strategic vision.

India’s reluctance to fully commit to a deeper security partnership with the US echoes Nehru’s hesitance, with similar potential consequences. While maintaining strategic autonomy is crucial, India must carefully navigate the evolving geopolitical dynamics to avoid repeating past mistakes. Of course, one difference is that in Nehru’s time, Pakistan was considered a viable entity by Washington; that position has changed. Strengthening its defence capabilities, fostering regional alliances, and engaging in pragmatic diplomacy will be the key to ensuring that India remains a pivotal player in the Indo-Pacific without compromising its core interests. The complexities of this balancing act require continuous reassessment to adapt to the changing geopolitical environment. Learning from historical precedents and remaining flexible in its strategic choices will be essential.