Despite some distractions brought about by the ongoing hostilities in Ukraine and Gaza, recent developments indicate that the global geopolitical spotlight on the Indo-Pacific remains solid. Escalating tensions in the South China Sea, compounded by intensifying US-China geostrategic competition, are bound to have a profound effect on security and stability in the IndoPacific, which has emerged as a ‘new, expanded theatre of power competition’ in the recent past, highlighting the remarkable shifts in the world’s centre of gravity from west to east.

The Indo-Pacific is a contested geo-strategic construct, imagining the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean Region as one contiguous area. This comparatively new terminology for a historically thriving region is in fact quite symptomatic of the changing geopolitical architecture and shifting global power politics, recognising the growing importance of India and the Indian Ocean. Amid rising maritime tensions with China, the Philippines challenged China on May 20 to open Scarborough Shoal to international scrutiny, alleging that China is destroying the marine environment around the shoal.

The Scarborough Shoal is a triangular reef encircling a resource-rich lagoon. The Philippines has been repeatedly accusing China of blocking its shipping vessels in and around the Scarborough Shoal. China’s Coast Guard had set up a barrier near the Scarborough Shoal, blocking Filipino fishermen from getting closer to the reef, which was fully accessible until China effectively seized it in 2012. However, the Philippine Coast Guards later dismantled this, causing heightened tension between the two. The most recent incident occurred on April 30, when the Chinese Coast Guard water-cannoned two Philippine patrol vessels as they tried to approach the waters near the Scarborough Shoal, locally known as Bajo De Masinloc, in the South China Sea.

Previously, on March 23, the Chinese coast guards reportedly fired water cannons at a Filipino supply ship, leaving three troops injured. Over the past few years, the behaviour of Chinese coast guards has become increasingly confrontational in the South China Sea. The Philippine President, though, sought to avoid direct military confrontation but insisted on continuing with its non-violent resistance to Chinese pressure by maintaining a presence in Philippine waters. It is worth noting that despite the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s (PCA) sweeping ruling in favour of the Philippines in 2016, China continues to claim sovereignty over the vast majority of the South China Sea, including land parcels, using its so-called “ninedash line,” a Ushaped nine-dash line etched on the Chinese map in the 1940s by a Chinese geographer named Yang Huairen to assert control over the region’s waterways, islands, and resources based on perceived historic rights, which conflicts with the claims of neighbouring countries, including the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, Brunei, Malaysia, and Taiwan.

They have recently experienced aggressive encroachment into portions of their exclusive economic zones (EEZ) by Chinese fishing and maritime lawenforcement vessels, resulting in frequent run-ins and deteriorating relations between China and the countries surrounding the contentious sea. In its ruling the PCA rejected Beijing’s claim of sovereignty over 90 per cent of the South China Sea, saying such claims had no basis under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The PCA also ruled that Beijing’s activities within the Philippines’ EEZ, such as illegal fishing and artificial island construction, not only infringed on Manila’s sovereign rights but also caused “irreparable harm” to the marine environment of the South China Sea.

There are several submerged features in the South China Sea that fall within the Philippines’ EEZ that have been occupied by China, and which have been converted into military bases by heaping upon them thousands of tons of sand and concrete. Amid Beijing’s increasingly aggressive behaviour in the South China Sea, especially harassment of Philippine patrols and resupply missions, US Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin hosted a meeting of the Defence Ministers of the “Squad,” which include Japan, the United States, Australia, and the Philippines, on May 2, in Hawaii, also home to the headquarters of the US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM). They had met for the first time in June 2023 on the side-lines of the Shangri-La security dialogue in Singapore.

The “Squad” members share similar threats and concerns over China’s increasing assertiveness in the South China Sea. The Hawaii meeting underlined their commitment to “advance a shared vision for a free, open, secure, and prosperous Indo-Pacific.” It must be noted that states like the United States, Japan, India, and Australia have crafted their IndoPacific strategies under the banner of “Free and Open IndoPacific” (FOIP) as a counter narrative directed against a potential Sino-centric reorganisation or restructuring of the region. Initially, the Philippines tried to play down its tensions with China despite having got a favourable ruling from the PCA.

However, under Marcos Jr, who assumed power in June 2022 as President, Manila has not only started asserting its rights over the disputed waters, but has also started publicly denouncing and publicising China’s actions, along with strengthening defence and strategic ties with Washington, which has always been looking for credible allies to counter rising China in the region. In February, Marcos Jr. provided four new locations for American military sites in the Philippines under the Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement (EDCA). In April, the Philippines held a joint maritime exercise with the US, Japan, and Australia within its EEZ, demonstrating their commitment “to strengthen regional and international cooperation in support of a FOIP.”

The increasing defence cooperation with the US and joining security groupings like the “Squad” have emboldened the Philippines in its disputes with China. The significant rise in China’s economic and military prowess for over a decade has changed the geopolitical architecture and global power politics of the Indo-Pacific. China’s assertive tone on Taiwan, maritime disputes with the Philippines, efforts to reclaim land in the South China Sea by physically increasing the size of islands or creating new artificial islands altogether in disputed waters, and their unprecedented militarization have caused immense unease and concern not only in the countries of the region, but also in other stakeholders and important strategic players, including the US.

While China considers the Indo-Pacific to be its strategic backyard, other players like the United States, Japan, India, and Australia contest this and promote the idea of the region being open for all. The great power contestation in the Indo-Pacific can best be explained as China’s quest to dominate global trade and reshape the global order; the US bid to contain assertive China; India’s aspiration for a greater role as an emerging power; Japan’s plan to regain lost influence; and Australia capitalising on its role as a balancing power.

However, all the major players in the Indo-Pacific must be mindful of the risks that their actions pose to the region and the world. They must be ready for negotiated solutions without compromising their interests or undermining their security, as any miscalculation or coercion could deteriorate the situation further, adversely affecting international peace and security.

(The writer is Professor and Head, Department of Strategic and Security Studies, Aligarh Muslim University)