Bangladeshis since independence are split between those who trust in the solidarity of the Muslim ummah, for whom the break with the Hindu majority in 1947 was more significant than liberation from Pakistan in 1971, and liberal Bengalis who believe their identity with the spiritual, linguistic and cultural ties of West Bengal and India are more important than faith. Eventually the latter will reassert themselves and a revived Awami League, by that or another name under new leadership, will play a role in this, but as after any revolution, this process will take time until stability and political process reassert themselves. Meanwhile the question is how Indian policy recalibrates itself.

A war of words between Bangladesh and India started soon after Hasina’s departure and threatens to spiral out of control following protests and counter protests over ill-treatment of Hindu minorities in Bangladesh when the Citizenship Amendment Act (2019) has come back to bite India. The latest exchanges were about the arrest of a Hindu monk, which inspired protests in India from Hindu organisations and politicians, and the vandalism of the Bangladesh consulate premises in Agartala although Iskcon follower Chinmoy Das, like 19th century Don Pacifico, is an unlikely rallying point for Hindu nationalists. Crimes against Hindus are endemic with any political upheaval in Bangladesh, religion being a flimsy cover for property-grabbing by the Muslim majority.

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India seems to have assumed from the outset that the incoming Yunus authority would be hostile, and Bangladesh that India would be unsympathetic. A flurry of rhetoric and misinformation emanated from both sides. In India, state-centre conflicts are played out with TMC accusing New Delhi of allowing Islamic militants to slip across the border to destabilise the state. Indian media suggested that USA was behind the ‘regime change’ that ousted Hasina, which if true, makes a travesty of the ‘comprehensive global strategic relationship’ that is supposed to exist with India. Indian insinuations spread that Yunus is in thrall to Washington, which is interested in a military base on St Martin’s Island. Indian spokesmen pointed to Bangladeshi crimes against the Hindu minority, repeating American criticism of breaches of minority rights in Bangladesh.

That New Delhi considered the interim authority in Bangladesh to lack legitimacy was widely suggested. Alarm was expressed about the belittling of Bangladesh’s father of the nation Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and the establishment of closer ties between Bangladesh and Pakistan. For New Delhi, the main concern would be Bangladesh becoming a launch pad for extremism by Islamist forces and Pakistani intelligence services. The popular viewpoint in Bangladesh is that the diverse economic, trade, transit and security arrangements between Hasina and Indian leaders have been to India’s benefit with little value to Bangladesh. Border killings of Bangladeshis are referenced, and the absence of river-sharing agreements on Teesta and Feni. With the major Ganga Waters Treaty due to expire in 2026, as matters stand, a new agreement would be extremely problematic. Bangladesh spokesmen reiterated that it is committed to ensuring the safety and security of Bangladeshis, irrespective of faith, religion and ethnicity, and that this was an internal matter.

The old debate is revived about Ziaur Rahman or Mujib announcing independence in 1971, apparently a backlash against the decade and more of Mujib’s personality cult promoted by the Awami League. Dhaka has strongly objected to misrepresentations in the Indian media and the Bangladesh International Crimes Tribunal has sought the extradition of Hasina to face judicial process for crimes against humanity and genocide. Notwithstanding a bilateral Extradition Treaty of 2013 amended 2016, New Delhi will clearly decline to comply. Yunus has stated, “Just as we need them (India) in our interest, they need us in their interest. So, we have to forget certain transient matters … The main thing is to maintain good relations. We have to use everything in our power to advance towards that.” And the words of Indian foreign secretary Misri in Dhaka that “India desires a positive, constructive, and mutually beneficial relationship with Bangladesh ….people-centric and people oriented relationship” reflected in development projects that have been carried out “on the ground in Bangladesh[and] the mutually beneficial engagement on …trade, commerce, connectivity, power, water and energy, development cooperation, consular cooperation and cultural cooperation” deserve noting as a statement of Indian policy and intent. On a positive note, on 26 December a ship with 25,000 mt of parboiled rice from India free of duty arrived at Chittagong.

Dhaka plans to buy 175,000 mt more, and 100 000 mt rice to check food prices in Bangladesh. In early January Bangladesh released 95 Indian fishermen who had intruded into its waters and India reciprocated by releasing 90 in its custody. This narrative leads to certain aspects that remain in question. Given our ‘Neighbourhood First’ objective, it is regrettable that with the exception of Bhutan, India’s relations with others are in a state of disquiet. There is irony in Indian appeals for minority rights abroad when similar accusations are levelled against India by human rights groups. Given India’s investment in Hasina’s regime over a decade and a half, some caution is understandable, but was Indian policy as enunciated by Misri officially conveyed to Yunus and the Bangladesh Foreign Office earlier than Misri’s visit?

Why was an official visit from New Delhi to Dhaka delayed for four months? Has there been any Indian offer to assist the Yunus administration to stabilize the situation? Was the level of foreign secretary appropriate to re-establish connections with an important neighbour? Was the much-travelled foreign minister or another cabinet member not considered for this important mission? These questions will be answered implicitly or explicitly in the course of time, but the need of the hour in bilateral ties is patience and prudence which in both countries is presently in short supply. Bilateral ties will remain uneasy for a certain period, which calls for dialing down the rhetoric and misinformation that serves no purpose other than to inflame passions.

(The writers are, respectively, a student of politics, religion and partition history’s aftermath, and India’s former foreign secretary)