On 13 January (Saturday), close to 20 million Taiwanese shall vote to elect their next President. The final choice of voters for the person who shall remain President for the next four years will have an impact on regional and even global stability as relations between Taiwan and China are a major geopolitical flashpoint amid superpower rivalry between China and the United States, one of Taiwan’s most important allies.

The frontrunner is William Lai Ching-te of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), seen as more independenceleaning, while his closest rival is Hou Yu-ih of the Kuomintang (KMT), which is seen as more Beijing-friendly. There is a third candidate, that of the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), Ko Wen-je. A survey released on 28 December found that Lai had 40 per cent support, Hou 28.8 per cent and Ko 17.6 per cent. The foreign policy issue is likely to be a major determinant on the election outcome. The Asian behemoth China sees Taiwan as part of its territory and wants the island to be unified with the mainland. China has not abjured the possible use of force to make this happen. Taiwanese politics and foreign policy broadly hover around what kind of policies a political party prefers to keep on the table.

The election outcome is likely to emerge based on this consideration. In order to bring the island into submission, China has used both military and economic pressure, though it has refrained from large-scale military activity. That does not mean that Beijing has given up that option. In mid-December, China accused Taiwan of violating a trade agreement between the two sides and announced the end of tariff cuts on some chemical imports from the island. On 27 December Beijing threatened more trade sanctions if the DPP “stubbornly” adhered to supporting independence.

How will the three candidates likely conduct Taiwan’s foreign policy and cross-strait relations if elected? What could be the best-case and worst-case scenarios for the island under each of them? Since foreign policy and cross-strait relations are possible key determinants in the voting pattern, a key issue that remains hidden and unexplained is how the people identify themselves and see themselves as Taiwanese? A survey revealed that there could be consensus in dealing with China, yet there are differences shaping the voting pattern. Propaganda is always active in China, brainwashing the people that Taiwan is one of their territories.

This indoctrination has permeated through most Chinese people and they believe Taiwan ought to be controlled from Beijing. On the other hand, Taiwanese people learnt from their textbooks about the island’s history, geography and society, and the way they were defined as a people. That has shaped the mind of most Taiwanese. Therefore, most voters are likely to identify themselves as Taiwanese when they vote on 13 January. However, history does influence in some way, which is why the KMT seeks closer relations with China even today. Each presidential candidate represents a different way forward and foreign policy outlook. Their stances have repercussions for regional and global stability. The ruling DPP candidate William Lai calls himself a “practical worker for Taiwan independence”.

His running mate for vice-president is seen as a troublemaker and separatist by China. The opposition Kuomintang’s (KMT) Hou Yu-ih is expected to continue the party’s traditional preference for close ties with China. The position of TPP on cross-strait relations is less known and likely to voice a middle path. Though the DPP candidate’s victory seems to be certain, it might be instructive to mention the issue of identity politics which emerged as a factor during the election.

The issue of defining who is a true Taiwanese and who is a Taiwanese-Chinese emerged as fodder for misinformation and personal attacks on candidates. The truth is that more than 62 per cent of adults in Taiwan identify themselves as Taiwanese, compared to only 2.5 per cent who identify themselves as Chinese. This is according to an annual survey that the Election Study Center of Taiwan’s National Chengchi University has conducted since 1992. Around 30 per cent identify themselves as Taiwanese-Chinese.

People with this dual identity see themselves as Taiwanese who are successors of Chinese culture, rather than a Chinese nation. That refers to the traditional folk beliefs and customs and use of traditional Chinese script that continue in Taiwan. However, as many as 80 per cent of young university students identify themselves as Taiwanese, 20 per cent above the national average. One could see a sharp decline in Chinese identification after Taiwan’s first direct presidential election in 1996 ~ a fourway contest in which the Kuomintang’s (KMT) Lee Teng-hui emerged victorious and went on to accelerate Taiwan’s democratic transition.

Lee was Taiwan’s first islander (benshengren) president. While Taiwan’s mainlanders (waishengren) descend from migrants who fled mainland China after the KMT was defeated at the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949, islanders trace their roots further back in history. The islander-mainlander divide has been a fault-line in Taiwanese identity and history, most notably in the 28 February incident in 1947, when the KMT government led by mainlanders violently suppressed an uprising by islanders.

In the years since, Taiwanese identification has emerged as an issue in every presidential election. In 2014, Ma’s KMT-led administration tried to push the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement through parliament without a clause-by-clause review. Sunflower Movement protestors occupied the Legislative Yuan to oppose the move, and Taiwanese identification crossed the 60 per cent mark for the first time that year. Five years later, Taiwanese identification hit an all-time high of more than 64 per cent during the 2019 antiextradition law protests in Hong Kong.

Thus the identity issue continues to be central to Taiwanese politics. National identity stands alone as the primary factor shaping politics over the past quarter century. Though the majority identify as Taiwanese in 2024, the distinction between islander and mainlander Taiwanese remains salient.

Though each presidential candidate represents a different way forward for Taiwanese identity understood through the prism of Taiwan’s relationship with China, if the DPP’s William Lai Ching-te wins, cross-strait relations are likely to remain the same as they have been under incumbent president Tsai Ingwen, with a possibility of more tension. William Lai shall have a huge task in dealing with foreign policy and cross-strait relations, particularly the frostiness and friction with Beijing.

(The writer is former Senior Fellow at Pradhanmantri Memorial Museum and Library (PMML), New Delhi. Earlier he was ICCR Chair Professor at Reitaku University, Japan, and Senior Fellow at the MP-IDSA, New Delhi)