In comprehending the present conflict between Russia and Ukraine, the post-communist scenario of the 1990s evolution provides interesting insights. When the Soviet Union collapsed many of its republics became independent nations. They included the Central Asian republics, the Baltic states, Georgia and Ukraine.

Ukraine occupies a large European landmass, equal to France. But in sharp contrast to many other European nations, Ukraine’s demographics are problematic and are the root cause of the present conflict. East and south of the country comprise mainly ethnic Russians whereas the west and the central portion are mostly Ukrainian. Despite a large degree of similarities, there are minor differences which got magnified with the introduction of an open electoral process in 1991. The great divide between the Ukrainians and ethnic Russians became manifest and could not be bridged by rough parity and a workable power-sharing arrangement.

Added to this ethnic division, the Russian-dominated south with fertile soil and high degree of industrialisation, accounted for 85 per cent of Ukraine’s GDP. Slowly the electoral process became a tussle between the ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians. The entire country, including President Zelenskyy, spoke Russian but with this ethnic divide the linguistic unity was broken and there was an attempt to impose the Ukrainian language on the entire nation, including those where Russians were the overwhelming majority.

The division took a serious turn after the election results of 2013. Viktor Yanukovych became the President with the support of ethnic Russians, but he was careful about following a balancing role, not hurting Ukrainian sentiments with a two-track policy. He pursued a policy of rough parity both with the affluent European Union as also with Russia which was Ukraine’s largest trading partner. The western Ukrainians were keen to join the EU but the Russians of the east, south and Crimea wanted a more pro-Russian approach.

The balancing act of Yanukovych was taken seriously by the Revolution of Dignity popularly known as the Maidan Revolution in 2014. It was planned, designed, and supported by the USA and pro-Ukrainian NGOs like the Open Society and many others linked to the World Economic Forum. There were no genuine and legitimate reasons for the coup as a truly elected government was overthrown and a proWestern leader Petro Poroshenko was declared the new President. He wanted closer links with the West and a break with Russia.

Yanukovych fled the country, and the Russians were worried as they had a large naval base in Sevastopol, the only warm water port for Russia, and the fear of a future NATO base prompted Russian annexation of Crimea. The fate of the Ukrainian Russians was also a serious concern and Vladimir Putin was committed to protect their basic interests. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, 30 million Russians lost Russian citizenship and became citizens of breakaway republics such as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine. Putin’s priority was this substantive population as Russia is the largest nation in the world and has large natural resources. Crimea is 95 per cent ethnic Russians and was annexed after the Maidan coup.

The Western strategists were frustrated as they thought that by a single stroke, Ukraine would be part of the West and that Nato ships would control the North Sea which would have a crippling effect on the Russian economy. The West imposed a series of sanctions on Russia, which created great obstacles as by then Russia had greatly integrated with Western financial institutions. Within Ukraine, corruption was rampant, and the oligarchs divided the nation into their spheres of influence. Russia also had substantial numbers of oligarchs but with a marked difference. In Russia these powerful people were bound by law and were prohibited from controlling the political arena. A unified Russia emerged under Vladimir Putin restoring his own popularity and authority with a legitimate central authority. Prosperity followed and in 2007 Putin announced the end of the unipolar world. He charged that unipolarity was unfair and arrogant. He drew the red line for Nato expansion which included Ukraine and Georgia. He announced the reentry of Russia as a great power and included both China and India as the new emerging powers who wanted a more equitable order.

The Russian dominated areas of Ukraine wanted to join Russia and the Ukrainian army sent its men to put down the secessionist movement. An indigenous militia emerged and with assistance from Russia surprisingly was winning the war of attrition with the Ukrainian army that included a number of neoNazis. It was a huge setback for the West and both France and Germany initiated a peace deal, the Minsk 1 and Minsk 2 agreements which were signed in 2014 and approved by the UN security council. It was agreed to give more autonomy to the Donbas area, and restore Russian language and culture, leading to the signing of a ceasefire.

Instead of implementing the treaties, fortification continued in the areas bordering the new autonomous regions. Former French President Francois Hollande and ex-German Chancellor Angela Merkel have acknowledged now that the Minsk agreements were a ploy and never intended to be implemented. Western powers with massive aid tried to build a powerful Ukrainian army in which the neo-Nazis were allowed to play a pivotal role. Many Russians, including hundreds of children, died by the continuous shelling. It was genocide, but the West ignored it and wanted a centralised Ukrainian state to silence Ukrainian Russians and to pressurise Russia to return Crimea to Ukraine.

But where the West made a grievous error was that Russia of 2021 is not the Russia of 2014. Learning from the sanctions of 2014 to have a more diversified and self-sufficient economy, Russia built alternative mechanisms for conducting trade and commerce. A parallel messaging system, credit card companies and a new payment system also emerged. A massive modernization of the armed forces and equipment was undertaken to enable Russia to endure a prolonged war, if it became necessary. A rough parity was achieved during the deterrence period of the Cold War and Russia now had more efficient weapons which enabled them to endure the war of attrition in Ukraine.

There were fears of ethnic cleansing of the Russian majority areas by a more organized and brutal Ukrainian army. In response to this, Russia launched the special military operation. It was a limited action plan and Putin, a moderate, rejected the extremist demand of a massive action. His moderation came out of strategic considerations and most importantly because ethnic Ukrainians were also Slavs. The Istanbul Conference held in March 2022 was an opportunity to settle the issues of neutrality and autonomy for the Russians but the Ukrainian government, because of the pressure from the West, withdrew from it.

With its failure to achieve an agreement, the Russians were convinced that like the earlier Minsk agreements, the West could not be trusted. The Russian strategy changed to planning a long war of attrition by appointing Beacon as the new commander, as he fought and won an impressive victory for the Russians in Syria. The 300,000 reservists were introduced into the battle. Apart from that, 100,000 army personnel were stationed in Belarus, to be moved to the war zone quickly. Nato apparently was caught napping as it did not anticipate a long war. It is not territory but destruction of the Ukrainian army which is important for the Russians.

Despite a larger realization that the Ukrainians have no reasonable chance of pushing back the Russians who have already incorporated Russian-speaking areas with Russia (which means 20 per cent of Ukrainian territory), there are peace initiatives from important think tanks like the Rand Corporation. The overall estimates are that the Russians have lost 20,000 troops compared to 157,000 Ukrainian deaths, which is a ratio of 1 to 8. The depletion of the Ukrainian army is serious as Russia has mobilised 6.5 lakh troops which the Ukrainians cannot match.

The Nato lament about the rights of small nations seems hollow as it dismembered Yugoslavia, attacked Iraq on the false pretext that it possessed weapons of mass destruction, followed by Libya and Syria. Seymour Hersh’s account demonstrates the US and Norwegian involvement in the destruction of Nord Stream 2 grossly violating the interests of the most important Nato member in Europe, Germany. The Western plan was to bring about regime change in Moscow and not finding a feasible and enduring solution to the Ukrainian problem.

Two important bases of Russia’s resurgence as a great power, by the Primakov doctrine that titled the balance in the Ukrainian war, are a huge arsenal of nuclear weapons which act as a deterrent and the veto power it possesses as a permanent member in the Security Council. Its initiation and expansion of BRICs and other international organisations helped it to circumvent the sanctions.

Unipolarity has run its course and the lesson of the Ukrainian war is the inevitable movement towards multipolarity and replacement of a rule based international order which without a clear narration twisted to advance Western economic interests. This would have to be replaced by a universal treaty under the UN. The increased military assistance to Ukraine will only prolong that country’s agony just as it was in the case of Vietnam in the 1960s and 70s. A new world order is emerging with new centres of power. The war in Ukraine will accelerate this irreversible process.

(The writer is a retired Professor of Political Science, University of Delhi)