The Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC), Admiral Sunil Lanba, recently released the new military doctrine in the presence of the other two service chiefs. This doctrine proposes joint training, a unified command and control structure and a triservice approach for modernisation. It also mentions a framework for joint operations across all domains, land, air, sea, space and cyber space.

The doctrine would remain a piece of paper, unless the government implements major changes in ‘management of defence’, pending since the Kargil conflict. Implementing joint warfare in its true sense would imply total integration of the three services HQs and the Ministry of Defence (MoD). This has been held up mainly due to regional and historical reasons.

Pakistan has had regular coups and the deep state maintains its stranglehold over the political leadership, proved again when the army spokesperson rejected the PMO’s formal orders in a tweet on Dawn newspaper’s report. In Myanmar, the military junta continues to be in total control while the army plays a dominant role in Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lankan politics. Hence doubts remain in the eyes of the Indian polity. These have been compounded by the bureaucracy and some illinformed strategic thinkers claiming that the Indian military cannot be trusted, as thoughts of coup always exist in minds of its apex leadership. Most politicians find military leadership daunting due to the uniform and continuing disdain in attitude and behaviour. The mere presence of five unarmed army personnel at a toll tax plaza, near the state secretariat in Kolkata, had the chief minister screaming about a coup in the state.

This distrust is also historical as pre-independence, the military was an instrument in British hands for supressing the freedom struggle. Hence immediately on attaining independence, the government scrapped the office of the Commander in Chief, an equivalent to the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), and made the services independent. Distrust only built further on both sides with the military take-over in Pakistan. The political leadership which had participated in the freedom struggle considered the military a legacy of the British era and the military maintained a disdain for politicians. This mindset has resulted in immense delays in bringing about essential reforms in management of defence as also involving the military as part of any apex body tasked with national security strategy, planning and implementation. Post the recent Sukma ambush of the CRPF, all meetings of the Home Ministry should have had representatives from the army due to their experience in handling such adverse environments. Further, the military should have been part of any committee tasked to investigate causes for the lapse and suggesting remedial action. However, attendees were bureaucrats or Indian Police Service officers, with almost no experience of either the environment nor thoughts of remedial measures which could be adopted.

The fact that the army has been ignored at this crucial juncture, especially when an incident has occurred with a security force in an insurgencyaffected area indicates the gap which still exists in the minds of the polity and bureaucracy. There are reports that the CRPF would finally induct army officers, possibly those who have finished their terms of engagement to lead their battalions in counter-insurgency operations.

Despite numerous promises and statements made by the Prime Minister and former Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar, the CDS has still to be appointed, the MoD and the service headquarters have yet to be amalgamated and hence the military has miles to go before it becomes a joint force in operations, planning and procurement, despite claims made in the new doctrine.

This is one government which does not need to seek political consensus as it has the requisite majority; yet it hesitates. The perception in the polity and top bureaucracy, that a divided military ensures safety to democracy and enables easier control has still to change. This lop-sided view harms national security and pushes the military back in enhancing joint capabilities. The polity fails to realize that all future wars would only succeed if they are jointly planned and conducted. This myopic view must change, if the full potential of the military has to be exploited.

With no incident since independence even remotely hinting at such thoughts, the latent fear refuses to die down. Most writings against the appointment of a CDS and integration of the services have been by retired bureaucrats or armchair strategists. The major reason for regular raising of the issue is possibly not solely the fear of a coup, but the aspect of control over the military, civil or political. Realistically, the national leadership irrespective of the party or coalition in power has been unable to garner either the courage or support from its allies in bringing about this essential change. The UPA government throughout its ten-year tenure continued to maintain that it was seeking a consensus on the issue.

By ensuring that the MoD remains divorced from the three-service headquarters, the government reduces the military’s involvement in decision making. Most governments have failed to realise that the military is the only service where everyone commences from the bottoms up with no lateral intake. Hence anyone not having served in it would only possess knowledge partaken from literature or discussions.

This does not imply that the nation adopts the model or avenue chosen by Donald Trump where most of his senior advisors are retired or serving military officers. While wrong in many ways, however, Trump easily won approval of the Senate and the nation in making these appointments. It also does not imply that serving and retired military personnel in India are the only experts in strategic security planning, but they would always make capable advisors. At the same time, changes in ‘management of defence’ must be ushered in, as early as of yesterday, ensuring better integration of the full combat potential of the three services. We face increasing security challenges and seek more bangs for the buck in days of rising financial curtailments.

The writer is a retired Major-General of the Indian Army.