In the old and new Great Game, Afghanistan has held a central position. Peter Hopkirk, in his path-breaking book The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia, chronicled the 19th-century geopolitical chessboard involving Britain and Russia. To prevent an armed conflict between British India and the Russian empire, both powers decided to declare Afghanistan as a buffer state ~ until the end of the Cold War reshaped Central, South, and West Asian dynamics. Following the complete US withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021, and the re-assumption of power by the Taliban, the conflict-ridden country plunged into a legitimacy crisis, reflecting a coercive order in which political pluralism and emancipation of women became major casualties.

Now, almost four years down the road, the United States, under the new Trump administration, is again to re-establish its influence in Afghanistan by seeking control of the strategic Bagram air base. For the first time after August 2021, a high-powered US delegation led by veteran Afghanistan expert Zalmay Khalilzad visited Kabul in March, ostensibly to negotiate the release of a detained American tourist, George Glezmann. Taking advantage of that opportunity, Khalilzad and US hostage envoy Adam Boehler held talks with Afghanistan’s Foreign Minister and other Taliban officials. According to reports, the Taliban’s Foreign Ministry stated that Mr Glezmann’s release was “on humanitarian grounds” and “a goodwill gesture”, while US Secretary of State Marco Rubio called the deal a “positive and constructive step”.

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Qatar facilitated the American delegation’s visit to Kabul and mediated Glezmann’s rele – ase. In a post on X, Afgha nistan’s Foreign Ministry added that the deal showed “Afgha nistan’s readiness to genuinely engage all sides, particularly the United States of America, on the basis of mutual respect and interests”. Why is there a relative thaw in the US-Taliban relations? Will the Taliban regime hand over Bagram air base to the United States?

What are the implications of this recent shift for Pakistan and the wider region? President Trump had earlier criticised the Biden administration’s chaotic military withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021, calling it incompetent and claiming that it compromised US national security interests, particularly by leaving around 80 billion dollars of weapons and abandoning Bagram air base. After resuming power in January 2025, President Trump now resolves to regain influence in Afghanistan without the use of hard power.

The nature of the projected deal between the Trump administration and the Taliban, and whether Washington will extend diplomatic recognition to Kabul, remains to be seen. It is pertinent to mention that while India, Russia, China, Iran and Pakistan maintain low-key de facto ties with the Taliban, Kabul still lacks diplomatic and political legitimacy.

Unlike Presidents Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani, who ruled Afghanistan for two decades with the US-Nato support and at least a semblance of democracy, the Taliban’s interim government rejects political pluralism, democracy and exclusive mode of governance. By barring girls and women from education and depriving half the population of their legitimate human rights, the Taliban have reverted to policies like their previous regime from 1996-2001. Even then, some countries, including the United States, are attempting to re-engage with Kabul to protect their strategic and economic interests.

This signals a new phase of the Great Game in Afghanistan, reflective of a 200-year history of invasions, interventions, and occupations by Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States. The new Great Game can be analysed from three angles. First, Afghanistan is infamous as a geopolitical trap that lures a potential aggressor, and once the country is occupied by a foreign power, it launches resistance. History has witnessed Britain, the Soviet Union and the US, all experiencing this fate. Foreign occupation has never been possible without local support, and it is well known that Afghan loyalty can be bought. After 9/11, millions of dollars were used to buy the loyalty of Afghan tribal chiefs who deserted the Taliban leading to its collapse.

This time, the new Great Game is employing a similar strategy as Trump seeks control of Afghanistan, particularly its strategic Bagram airbase, by offering carrots to the Taliban. In the coming weeks, increased American involvement in Afghanistan is expected via soft power: aid, investments and diplomacy. Second, Trump’s core objective in reclaiming the Bagram airbase is to gain strategic leverage over Iran and Pakistan. Notably, it was from Bagram airbase that US Navy SEALs sneaked into Abbottabad, Pakistan, on 2 May 2011, to get hold of global terrorist Osama bin Laden. In the wake of Khalilzad’s mission to Kabul, alarmist conspiracy theories also suggest that the US may use Bagram as a base to intervene in Pakistan if political instability threatens its nuclear arsenal, to ensure that it does not reach Islamist forces.

While these claims can be rejected, the timing of America’s demand for Bagram base from the Taliban is significant. Since long, questions have been raised about the safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons in case there is an internal uphea – val. Pakistan’s nuclear control and command hierarchy has ruled out any threats to the safety and security of its nuclear arsenal. The Taliban government’s reaction to the US demand for Bagram airbase for strategic use remains to be seen.

The Taliban regime in Kabul is firmly in position and has an anti-Pakistan stance. The Taliban may allow Washington to take control of Bagram air base. In return, the US may help end the Taliban’s diplomatic isolation and possibly hand over the $80 billion worth of weapons left behind during the 2021 withdrawal as a gift to Kabul. Additionally, the US might offer maintenance for these advanced weapons, thereby augmenting the Taliban’s military power. Third, the resurgence of the new Great Game in Afghanistan is now a reality and also poses challenges to its neighbour Pakistan in days to come. However India has reasonably good relations with the Taliban government in Afghanistan, and is also improving them further.

(The writer has been a senior IAS officer of the Punjab cadre and can be contacted at Kaushikiaspunjab@gmail.com)