The election of Masoud Pezeshkian as Iran’s new President has sparked a flurry of discussion about the potential for change within the Islamic Republic. However, a closer examination reveals that despite his moderate stance, Mr Pezeshkian’s victory is unlikely to result in significant shifts in Iran’s entrenched policies or power structures. Mr Pezeshkian, a former health minister, campaigned on promises of opening Iran to the world and increasing freedoms for its people.

Yet, the context in which he assumes office greatly limits his ability to deliver on these pledges. The true power in Iran lies not with the President but with the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who holds ultimate authority over all state matters. Ayatollah Khamenei’s influence ensures that any President, regardless of political leanings, must operate within the confines of a system designed to maintain the status quo. The recent election saw a turnout of about 50 per cent, reflecting growing voter apathy and disillusionment. This low participation rate underscores a broader legitimacy crisis for the Iranian regime. Many Iranians, especially the youth, are increasingly frustrated with economic hardships, social restrictions, and the lack of political freedoms.

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The memory of the 2022 crackdown on protests, triggered by the death of Mahsa Amini while in police custody, still looms large. The regime’s harsh response to dissent has left a deep scar on the national psyche, contributing to the pervasive scepticism about the potential for meaningful change through the ballot box. While Mr Pezeshkian’s moderate stance offers a glimmer of hope for some, it is tempered by his clear reluctance to confront the entrenched clerical and security elites. His pragmatic approach suggests he will avoid direct challenges to the power structure that underpins the Islamic Republic. This pragmatism, while perhaps ensuring his political survival, significantly limits his capacity to implement the reforms he has promised.

Moreover, the geopolitical landscape presents additional challenges. Iran’s foreign policy, particularly its contentious nuclear programme and its support for militant groups across West Asia, is unlikely to see substantial changes under Mr Pezeshkian’s administration. These areas are tightly controlled by the Supreme Leader and the Revolutionary Guards, who are committed to maintaining a posture of resistance against Western pressure and regional adversaries. Domestically, the economic situation remains dire, exacerbated by years of mismanagement, corruption, and sanctions.

Both Mr Pezeshkian and his hardline rival, Mr Saeed Jalili, vowed to revive the economy, but the structural issues plaguing Iran’s economy are deeply rooted and cannot be resolved overnight. Without significant shifts in domestic and international policies, Mr Pezeshkian’s administration may struggle to deliver tangible improvements in the livelihoods of ordinary Iranians. So, while Mr Pezeshkian’s election as President may signal a shift towards moderation, it is unlikely to herald the transformative change that many Iranians yearn for. Instead, it represents yet another chapter in the on-going struggle between a populace desperate for reform and a regime determined to maintain its grip on power.