Geneva Conventions remain relevant
Last week marked 75 years since the adoption of the Geneva Conventions on 12 August 1949. In theory, these rules of war are universally agreed by every nation.
India‘s interest in the South China Sea is primarily due to the fact that the Sea and the Indian Ocean are strategically inter-related. India wants to have a maritime strategy along with the littoral countries of South East Asia that will deny Chinese dominance
South China Sea is a part of the Pacific Ocean and falls under the Indo-Pacific maritime region, more specifically central Indo-Pacific. The South China Sea extends from the Straits of Malacca in the south-west to the Straits of Taiwan in the north-east. This 3.5 million sq.km water body is one of the largest seas after the five oceans and is enclosed by China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, Singapore, Cambodia, Thailand and Vietnam. Over 500 million people of these littoral countries of South-east Asia live within 150 km of the South China Sea coastline. Taiwan divides the entire China Sea into two sections. The northern section is the East China Sea.
South China Sea plays an important role in the economies of these nations by providing food and employment for the coastal population. A large portion of the workforce is dependent on the marine environment. The sea is called by different names, often reflecting historical claims to hegemony over it. The South China Sea is one of the world’s busiest international sea lanes having a number of important shipping ports. Over half of the world’s merchant fleet (by tonnage) sails through its waters every year.
India is away from the South China Sea but it is not far from it. The Andaman and Nicobar chain has 572 islands, mostly uninhabited. Indira Point, the last point at Great Nicobar in the south is only 100 nautical miles from Indonesia and the Straits of Malacca, the entry points for the South China Sea. India does not have coastlines or island territories or bases in South China Sea. But India’s geographical location at the junction of the busiest international shipping lanes that criss-cross the Indian Ocean has a major impact upon formulation of her national interests.
Under the UN Convention on the Law of Sea (UNCLOS), a country falling within 200 nautical miles (370km) of its coast is its Exclusive Economic Zone. All ships bound for the Straits and onward to South China Sea have to pass through India’s EEZ either through the 10-degree channel that bisects the island or through 6-degree channel south of Indira point. That is India’s geographical importance. India is an extra-regional power that operates and impacts in the region through regular naval deployments, naval diplomacy, visits and exercise in the waters, through established and growing strategic-military partnerships with various South China Sea littoral countries, through involvement in oil exploration in these waters and through diplomatic discussions in various regional forums and with extra-regional actors. In geographical terms, India is located outside the South China Sea but in geopolitical and geoeconomic terms, India is actively participating inside the South China Sea. The Sea has become a factor in India’s strategic calculations.
The Straits of Malacca is the shortest maritime route between Persian Gulf suppliers and key Asian markets. According to US Energy Information Administration, nearly one-third of the 65 per cent of the global crude oil and other petroleum products that moved on maritime routes in 2016 transited through the Straits of Malacca, the second largest oil trade choke point in the world after the Strait of Hormuz. That was 16 million barrels per day routed to China, Japan and South Korea of which China was the largest consumer. Oil flow through the Straits was more than flows through the Panama Canal, Bosphorus, Suez Canal and Bab-el-Mandab taken together.
India rightly apprehended that Chinese control of the South China Sea for uninterrupted and unhindered flow of oil would bring Chinese maritime forces to the Straits of Malacca choke point looking out into the Indian Ocean with a point of entry into India’s territorial waters. India’s Maritime Military Strategy formulated in 2007 defined the South China Sea as a blue water area of strategic interest to India. The South China Sea is in the middle of the vast maritime stretch running from the eastern Indian Ocean to the western Pacific. Military strategists of the West defined this area as Indo-Pacific. Gradually the term gained popularity in India’s diplomatic and military parlance. Even western Pacific was considered within the range of India’s geopolitical and security interests at that time.
At the 2012 Asean-India Summit, then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh articulated, “India-ASEAN engagement began with a strong economic emphasis, but it has also become increasingly strategic in its content in which a stable, secure and prosperous Indo-Pacific region is crucial for our own progress and prosperity”. Indian Navy now operates in the western Pacific in cooperation with the United States and Japanese navies. A secure access through the intervening waters of the South China Sea becomes all the more important for India.
India’s interest in the South China Sea is primarily due to the fact that the Sea and the Indian Ocean are strategically inter-related. China’s oil demand is steadily increasing every year. According to one estimate, China imported about 12,000 million barrels per day in February this year. China wants to create a safe security environment around the Indian Ocean and wants to restrict role of India there. India wants to have a maritime strategy along with the littoral countries of South East Asia that will deny any pre-dominance and pre-eminence of China in the South China Sea. This is the root cause of Sino-Indian maritime rivalry.
The implementation of the policies and mode of operations are different for the two countries and depend upon geopolitical and geo-economic perspectives, maritime strength and strategy, economic and military alliances, domestic compulsions and resource allocation. A US Defence report estimates that China has the world’s largest naval fleet and is churning out new ships faster than ever. The US continues to have a technological edge but China is becoming more capable close to home. China has also the biggest merchant navy, mechanised fishing fleet, ship building industry and coast guard in the world making a Maritime Power.
India may find itself unable to block Chinese entry into the Indian Ocean, but can counter- pressure by going into China’s own maritime backyard of the South China Sea in alliance with Asean. This is a simple but potentially effective response. In the words of James Holmes, “whereas in the Indian Ocean, India operates with the primary advantage of inner lines versus China’s outer extended line; in the South China Sea the tables are reversed and it is India operating at a secondary distance versus China’s inner lines”. Though India may be at a disadvantage in a straight one-to-one confrontation with China in these waters due to China’s growing naval capability, it leaves India with an effective role as a secondary balancer in the South China Sea with others from inside and outside the area.
In a span of five days, India carried out naval exercises and conducted military drills with Vietnam (18 August) and Philippines (23 August) in South China Sea that has been witnessing growing Chinese military expansion. India and the two nations are concerned with China’s military ambition. According to press reports, “these joint evolutions conducted during the exercise included several operational manoeuvres and the participating ships of both navies were satisfied with the consolidation of interoperability achieved through these operational interactions at sea”.
On a recent visit to India, the Commander of US Indo-Pacific Command appreciated India’s stand on South China Sea and said that partnership with India was critical because India and USA were like-minded nations and shared values for a rules-based international order. The four-day Malabar war game among the Quad countries – India, the US, Australia and Japan – has just ended off the coast of Guam in the midst of China’s growing military ambition in the Indo-Pacific region. Guam is an island territory of the US in the western Pacific. The Malabar exercise took place “in the midst of growing convergence of interests in the maritime domain as well as military cooperation among the four Quad countries in the face of China’s increasing assertiveness”.
Despite the name, the Indian Ocean does not belong to India alone. India has no maritime disputes with the littoral countries of the Indian Ocean and the Bay of Bengal. India’s initiatives in maritime strategies are increasing and are highly respected. India, Sri Lanka and Maldives signed a trilateral maritime security accord in 2014. Delegations from Mauritius and Seychelles also participated as guest countries. The initiative contributed to enhancing maritime security in the Indian Ocean Region.
By the same analogy, South China Sea does not belong to China alone. There are many stakeholder countries. China claims sovereignty over all of the South China Sea that is a huge source of hydrocarbons. Vietnam, the Philippines and Brunei have counterclaims. In the South China Sea Arbitration brought before the International Court of Justice, Philippines raised certain issues against China under United Nation Convention on the Law of Sea (UNCLOS). The issues were territorial disputes. China did not participate in the arbitration. In July 2016, the special tribunal ruled in favour of the Philippines on most of the submissions. The tribunal concluded that China’s claim of historic rights over the maritime areas had no lawful effect. China rejected the ruling. It continues to make sovereign claims over the vast majority of the South China Sea. It is in the interest of all stakeholder countries to actively seek solutions to the disputes through political negotiations. Military conflict and arms race for these small countries to counter China’s influence is no solution.
India-China maritime rivalry is not inevitable. The two countries should remain keen to downplay their security dilemma at sea and seek to find common grounds for cooperation. They have common interest in keeping the sea lanes of communication open through the Indian Ocean, the South China Sea and the western Pacific. These lanes are vital to India’s trade and energy flows. So are they for China. Geo-political rivalries, land and border disputes between India and China should not overshadow trade, business and commercial activities across the seas. After withdrawal from Afghani-stan, what USA does for the Pacific Command should not also be factored into consideration. The maritime cooperation by the two Asian giants without any third-party influence should set a new standard of international relations in the Indo- Pacific.
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