In my articles published in these columns on 24 and 25 July, I had mentioned that the Pacific Islands have emerged as the theatre of greatpower contestation where countries such as the US, China, India and Australia are spreading their influence and leaving their strategic footprints. The submission dwelt on India’s outreach to the Pacific Islands region. The main driver of such initiatives is China whose intentions are under suspicion while the response of other nations committed to protect peace and stability and pursue policies is in accordance with global norms and respects the sovereignty of all stakeholders.

The response is just a counter strategy so that the existing equilibrium is not unduly disturbed. Like India, Japan too has activated its diplomacy to engage with the Pacific Island nations. In its outreach, Japan hosted the 10th Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting (PALM10) in Tokyo from 16 to 18 July and invited 18 Pacific Island countries to discuss a host of issues. These leaders last met in person six years ago. The event takes place once every three years but the last meeting was held virtually due to Covid-19. The main areas of Japan’s focus are in defining maritime law and disaster relief, and to redouble its efforts to improve the capabilities of the Pacific island countries. This is because the South Pacific region has been increasingly lashed by destructive tropical cyclones as the surface temperature of the oceans rises due to global warming. Japan too has a history of typhoons and tsunamis as well as earthquakes and has therefore developed robust infrastructure to cope with such challenges.

Japan is therefore in a position to come to the help of the Pacific island nations in mitigating disaster situations as well as in boosting economic development. There is a different angle to Japan’s Pacific engagement. This is the China factor. For China, the Pacific region forms part of the Second Island Chain, a defence line that China is seeking to establish to prevent the US Navy from approaching Taiwan in the event of an emergency. This strategic consideration is driving China to deepen ties with countries in the region. To increase its leverage, Chinese strategy has been to provide massive amounts of aid on liberal terms, thereby increasing the dependence of these small and poor island nations on it. Most of the terms of aid disbursement are heavily tilted in favour of China and they also lack transparency. The larger objective of China is to increase its military influence in the region and over these small island nations.

China considers Taiwan as a part of its territory and wants to integrate it with the mainland by peaceful means and if necessary by the use of force. That is not easy and in the present context an unrealisable dream. However the series of intimidations by way of repeated violation of Taiwan’s air space by overflying jets and issuance of constant threats always carry risks of miscalculation with unintended consequences. Other stakeholders take cognizance of such a possibility and prepare their own preventive strategy accordingly. China’s other strategy has been to diplomatically isolate Taiwan by encouraging smaller and poor nations in the South Pacific and Africa to switch allegiance from Taiwan to Beijing by economic inducements which these poor nations find difficult to refuse.

For example, in 2019 Solomon Islands and Kiribati severed ties with Taiwan and established diplomatic relations with China. Nauru followed suit in January 2024. In April 2024, China signed a security agreement with the Solomon Islands which allows Beijing to station military forces in that country. This was followed by an online meeting with the foreign ministers from the Pacific island countries where Chinese President Xi Jinping called the PICs to join China in building an “even closer China-PICS community with a shared future”. It is well known that China has been aggressively building man-made islands in the South China Sea and establishing military facilities on them. China has been adopting the same strategy in the South Pacific islands by constructing information and communications facilities and militarising ports and other facilities.

The security environment will see a dramatic change if Beijing is allowed to complete its projects in South Pacific islands. Securing the sea lanes is of vital importance for sea-faring countries as tonnes of cargo transit through international waters. Therefore maritime security is of utmost importance for all sea faring nations. Since the South Pacific includes vital sea lanes that tie together Asia, the US, Australia and India, these maritime nations find relevance in the concept of a free and open IndoPacific (FOIP). The larger objective for collaboration is to prevent China from further expanding its influence in the South Pacific. The US too has decided to take counter measures. In February 2023, it announced it would open an embassy in the Solomon Islands after a 30-year absence.

This decision comes as Washington seeks to boost diplomatic relations in the Pacific as a counter to China. The US hopes that its embassy in Honiara will serve as a key platform that would enable it to develop its Indo-Pacific strategy based on shared values of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.

The US signed on 22 May 2023 a Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) with Papua New Guinea that allowed joint use of PNG’s naval bases and ports, thus representing a natural progression in the decades of defence cooperation between the US and the PNG. The US also signed an Agreement Concerning Counter Illicit Transactional Maritime Activity Operations. As a responsible stakeholder, Japan too has been supporting the Pacific island countries by despatching its Self-Defence Force and Coast Guard personnel with a view to assist in improving their capabilities in areas such as maritime law and disaster relief. In fact there is a need to redouble such assistance by Japan.

(The writer is a former Senior Fellow at Pradhanmantri Memorial Museum and Library, Ministry of Culture, New Delhi)