It stands to reason that if Germany follows through on the narrative it is shaping in Berlin and amplifying in partner nations ~ that it is seeking to reduce trade over-dependence on an absolutist China which it sees as backing an aggressive Russia on its doorstep ~ it will need to seek new markets for trade and investment.

India, with its massive market size and the demographic advantage of a young population with a median age of just 29, has the potential to emerge as a relevant partner for Germany. To this end, an area of concerted effort by both sides could be promoting business ties between Indian states and German landers (states) which are well-funded and have their own strengths in industry and banking, as former Indian Ambassador to Germany Gurjit Singh has emphasised.

Former Indian Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale too has recently written on Germany Inc. turning bearish on China and bullish on India. Given the strong civil society influence in Germany which emphasises the separation of government and non-government initiatives, however, it needs to be recognised that it is the business communities of both countries which would be the most potent force for closer ties, with governments acting as enablers and/or facilitators.

India’s growing green footprint and its commitment to its Intended Nationally Determined Contributions at Paris and Glasgow means it can no longer be classified as an outlier on trade and climate issues, which has been a past hurdle in Indo-German relations.

Germany’s influence in the European Union, a player of significance for India in economic terms with a Free Trade Agreement on the horizon, is important too. In June 2022, the EU relaunched negotiations with India after a gap of eight years for an FTA, and launched separate negotiations for an Investment Protection Agreement and an Agreement on Geographical Indications (GIs). But even in the best of circumstances, all these efforts coming to fruition would imply an incremental enhancement of economic ties between India and Germany over a period of time.

Such an arc, if that’s how it plays out, while welcome, would explicitly not be a gamechanger.

The transformative potential of the Indo-German relationship lies in a closer alignment of their respective strategic approaches and, within that framework, a carefully designed collaborative effort to engage with ~ and invest in ~ Africa to secure a rare earth elements supply chain. Africa is estimated to have an abundance of rare earths but lacks exploration and extraction capabilities.

German capital and green tech know-how augmented by an Indian-African workforce could be the key driver for Africa to replace China as the world’s source of rare earths over the next decade. It would provide employment avenues for India’s young population both at the skilled and semi-skilled levels, remittances from a new geography will come into play, and the attended opportunities for trade and commerce would grow. Africa would benefit as its own youth bulge would become productive.

Also, environmentally sensitive and sustainable extraction/processing of rare earth elements as opposed to rapacious Chinese mining techniques would ensure green growth for the continent. And Germany, if it is serious about ending its economic overdependence on China, may actually be in a position to do so.

Beijing, though, can hardly be expected to roll over. It has spent two decades wooing Africa and inveigling itself into important countries’ economic and strategic spheres. So, all the running will have to be done by Delhi and Berlin working in tandem. Despite India’s leading role in the Non-Aligned Movement through the second half of the 20th century which, conventional wisdom holds, helped it foster close relationships with multiple African post-colonial nations, China with its deep pockets has taken over the leadership of a significant section of the Global South, particularly in Africa, with relative ease. India has a chance to make amends for de-prioritising Africa in its post-Cold War foreign policy and Germany could deploy its abundant capital in Africa for its own long-term economic and strategic interests.

To take the long view, Delhi would need to start factoring into the proposed Indo-German strategic matrix the alternative scenarios which could come to pass going forward. Would not the threat posed to India by China, in conjunction with the danger to Germany from the Russo-Chinese “no-limits” strategic relationship, become acute if the Sino-Russian axis metamorphosizes into a military alliance as a Eurasian version of the erstwhile Warsaw Pact? (Such an outcome, dismissed outright until even a few years ago, is today increasingly part of the strategic conversation in major global capitals.)

Alternatively, what are the factors that would come into play in a putative post-Putin Russia, and how would they impact Moscow’s relationship with China, India, and Germany? Additionally, could France, given its strategic and commercial interests in the Western Indian Ocean and Francophone Africa, be persuaded to be a participant in the Indo-German ‘Africa Project’? America, still the world’s preeminent power, appears to have emerged from the highly disruptive Donald Trump interregnum focussed on engaging with the world anew.

So will Washington, which is now speaking the language of consultation, coordination, and collaboration with its partners worldwide, back a joint IndoGerman effort without seeking to subsume it into the US’ own Africa policy? These are not questions susceptible to easy answers.

But then that’s the thing about geostrategic churn ~ one never knows what may emerge as a result. Establishing India’s priorities rather than focussing on its needs, which may be endless, is critical to crafting an innovative and mutually profitable engagement with Germany

(The writer is a Fellow at the Pahle India Foundation)