It was a security dilemma that shaped India’s nuanced stance with regard to Indo-China. Elucidating on the dilemma in the region, Jawaharlal Nehru said, “In order to prevent the other from being the aggressor, you become the aggressor yourself. It is a most extraordinary situation and that was the position in regard to the Indo-China States because each of the major countries was afraid lest the other take advantage of the Indo-China States against it.” It was against this backdrop that India was of the view that “the only solution was that both Powers should agree to leave the Indo-China States by themselves and alone, by and large and not to try to line them up with their own group because the moment one group tried to increase its influence or its pressure, or brought the area under its sphere of influence as it has been euphemistically called in the past, immediately the other power got going to introduce itself and the conflict began again, call it a cold war or call it what you like.”

India’s commitment to the region and Vietnam in particular was quite evident. Nehru was not quite happy about the outcome of the Geneva Agreement. He said, “The outcome of the Geneva Agreement is interpreted in various ways, and the Agreement, I must say, was drafted in such a hurry that it can be interpreted in various ways…” He, however, clarified that he had no issue with regard to the Agreement in general, but with regard to certain provisions on Laos in particular. Having said this he added, “I do not want to say whose fault it is but we have a certain responsibility in trying to resolve those difficulties. To point out or name people at fault does not help in resolving a difficulty, but what I want this House to bear in mind is this, that because of certain developments in the Far East, in South East Asia, the whole atmosphere has changed there, that is, it has hardened the fear of war or for one person gaining an advantage over another or for any one country over another.” Thus it is evident that India’s approach to the region was in sync with the policy of Nonalignment, which India advocated and practiced and continues to practice now. The birth of Vietnam echoed in the portals of Indian Parliament.

A closer analysis of the debates and discussions on Vietnam in both Houses of Parliament suggests that not only there is consistency and continuity of approach, there was also all-party consensus with regard to India’s engagement with Vietnam. It can be affirmed that Vietnam is the only country on which there is unanimity of views cutting across party lines in the Indian Parliament. Like all wars, the Sino-Vietnamese war of February-March 1979 did not start all of a sudden. The war marked the culmination of months of strained relations between the two neighbouring countries. Both knew that such a war would break out. This was evident from their war propaganda, war preparedness and hectic diplomatic maneuvers. The “Chinese self defence counterattack” into Vietnam on 17 February resonated in India and found its echo in Parliament.

The President of India in his address to Parliament on 19 February 1979 said, “We are gravely concerned at the latest developments on the Sino-Vietnamese border which carry the potential to endanger international peace and stability. Fighting should end immediately and, as a first step, Chinese forces should withdraw from Vietnam.” As the House was adjourned after the Presidential Address there was no discussion on the issue that day. When the House met on 21 February, the issue was raised while External Affairs Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee was reading out the statement on his visit to China, which he cut short after the Chinese attack on Vietnam. Alluding to the internecine war in the region, he said that “the Chinese leaders expressed their view-point on the deterioration of their relations with Vietnam.

I clearly expressed my concern at the prevailing tension and stressed that each of the countries in the region must be enabled to maintain their independence and were entitled to respect for their sovereignty and territorial integrity. This required adherence to the principle of noninterference.” He cautioned that there should be no further developments which could lead to dangerous deterioration of the situation. He further said that, “it is a matter of regret that in the course of our frank exch anges, where we clearly recognized that we had differing perspectives on the international situation, the Chinese leaders did not inform me of the possibility of developments on the ChinaVietnam border.” That afternoon the House discussed the issue under the heading “Chinese invasion of Vietnam and the consequent threat to freedom of nations in Asia”.

Initiating the discussion, Mr Bedabrata Barua said, “We are meeting under the shadow of a great threat to national liberty and freedom on an occasion which affects India vitally, and Asia and the world as a whole. This is a matter of aggression by a big power against a freedomloving and brave people on the worst pretext. It is a typical Chinese act, which is an act of invasion without parallel of a few hundred thousand men of the so called Chinese Liberation Army against the liberty of the people of Vietnam.” He lamented that the people of Southeast Asia didn’t have the courage even to protest against the Chinese aggression. He regretted that the hegemony of China had not changed and in fact it had worsened. He also alluded to the growing friendship between China and the USA. He said “what China is doing today has the direct or indirect support of the United States.” He even went to the extent of saying that “it is a sort of global attempt to teach an independent nation a lesson.” Describing the Chinese attack on Vietnam as an affront to India, he regretted that it did not occur to them (the Chinese) to take India’s feelings into consideration on such a matter, when India’s foreign minister was on the soil of China.

Analyzing the strategic behavior of China, he further said, “What is important is not that the Vietnamese territories should be vacated I have no doubt that they will withdraw after making an impression as they wanted to do and after ‘teaching a lesson’ if they could. That lesson is not intended for them alone: it is intended for us also and it is intended for other nations. In case somebody has forgotten the lesson, they are trying to remind them again.” Responding to an interjection by another member as to what the government should do, he said that “the government should not have given us the impression that we are finding a new friend in the Chinese Government, that there has been a big transformation in China and now we are making up with the Chinese, that we are finding new friends-and possibly giving up old friends!” Finally he proposed that the Government should immediately call a Conference of the people of Asia.

RUP NARAYAN DAS The writer is a former senior fellow of Indian Council of Social Science Research, affiliated to Indian Institute of Public Administration, and also a former senior fellow of Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi