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India and Vietnam~I

The Prime Minister of Vietnam Pham Minh Chinh visited India and met Prime Minister Narendra Modi on 1 August. Modi iterated that Vietnam is a powerful pillar of India’s Act East policy.

India and Vietnam~I

Prime Minister of Vietnam Pham Minh Chinh visited India and met Prime Minister Narendra Modi (Photo:ANI)

The Prime Minister of Vietnam Pham Minh Chinh visited India and met Prime Minister Narendra Modi on 1 August. Modi iterated that Vietnam is a powerful pillar of India’s Act East policy. Though the event was mentioned in the media, there was not much comment or analysis. India shares civilizational and cultural linkages with Vietnam. People of India hold Vietnam and Vietnamese people in very high esteem for their tenacity and heroic struggle against imperialism and colonialism.

The strategic bonding between India and Vietnam can be seen through the prism of India’s protracted struggle against colonialism and imperialism. There is a very high degree of empathy, notwithstanding ideological differences. Vietnamese leaders like Ho Chi Minh and General Giap are household names to people of India who grew up during the tumultuous years of Vietnam’s protracted struggle. The aim of this article is to put the relationship in the historical perspective. Even prior to her Independence, India had been paying careful attention to the developments in Indo-China in which Vietnam occupied the most critical space.

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India’s anti-colonial and anti-imperialist stance resonated in its engagement with Vietnam. India’s eagerness to engage with Indo-China can be discerned from the fact that it invited the leaders of Vietnam including the legendary Ho Chi Minh to represent the country at the Asian Relations Conference held in April 1947, ahead of Independence on 15 August. India took interest in the unfolding grim situation in IndoChina particularly the heroic fight of the Vietnamese people against French colonialism. Jawaharlal Nehru articulated India’s nuanced position in Parliament. The larger considerations were four: the communist character of the Vietminh leadership; the continued French colonial outposts in India; the emergence of communist China that bordered the communistled part of Vietnam, and the fact that at the time France was with Britain, the chief source of weapons supply to India. The Geneva Conference on Indo-China took place from 9 May to 21 July 1954, a day after the decisive defeat of the French.

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The new French Premier Mendes France realised that France could no longer hold IndoChina in bondage. Britain and USSR played the role of catalytic agents and overcame the opposition of US secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai stole the limelight at the Conference. In spite of India’s significant role, India was not invited to the Conference, which peev ed Nehru. He, however, deputed his confidant Kris hna Menon to render informal assistance to the Conference. Nehru lamented that “we didn’t stand on dignity, we just stood on the doorstep and tried to be helpful”. A significant contribution made by Zhou Enlai during the Conference was the proposal for the composition of the International Commission for Supervision and Control (ICSC) in Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. The issue had become a sticky one since the Russian Foreign Minister Molotov had raised it earlier on 14 May 1954.

India was invited to be the Chairman of the ICSC in the hope that she would be able to hold the balance. The Soviet delegation proposed four neutral nations as members, viz. Poland, Czechoslovakia, India and Pakistan. But the non-Communists were opposed to it. The British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden suggested five Colombo Plan nations, which Moscow’s interlocutor Molotov rejected. South Vietnam suggested the United Nations, which Communist China rejected. Both sides eloquently and stubbornly disagreed with each other. Until 17 July, no agreement was rea ch ed, and a solution seemed elusive. On 18 July, however, Zhou En lai proposed India, Poland and Canada as members. The proposal was accepted unanimously.

In negotiating the proposal, the Chinese delegation acted in the sense of compromise. This was obviously Zhou Enlai’s stand in Geneva, a position which the Chinese strongly urged other participants to share. The Geneva Accords were the ray of hope in the dark clouds that overshadowed the Conference. The presence of ICSC represented the interest of the international community and was a symbol, albeit a weak one, of peace. But the International Commission was soon inflicted with the atmosphere of the Cold War that prevailed between the Great Power blocs. Canada usually took a pro-Western stance while Poland adopted a pro-Soviet posture.

India’s task as the chair was unenviable. Pressure from all sides was mounted to use the Commission as a tool for one side or the other and for propaga ting the Cold War. India appointed T.N. Kaul, former Foreign Se cretary as the Chairman of ICSC. When Kaul met Nehru prior to his departure to Vietnam, the PM told Kaul about India’s close ties with the countries of Indo-China. He emphasised the fact that the people of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia were first and last, nationalists and patriots. Vietnam had resisted feudal China’s domination for more than one thousand years.

He further told Kaul that under Ho Chi Minh’s leadership, Vietnam would not submit to foreign domination. Nehru warned Kaul that India’s position as Chairman of the ICSC was important and delicate and that he hoped Kaul would discharge the onerous responsibilities impartially, in accordance with the letter and spirit of the Geneva Accords. India welcomed the birth of Vietnam as an aspect of the resurgence of Asia and also the Geneva Accords. Participating in a discussion on the Demands for Grants of the Ministry of External Affairs on 31 March 1955, ahead of the Bandung Conference, Nehru said, “it had become a regular practice for the affairs of Asia to be determined by certain great powers in Europe or sometimes in America, and the fact that people of Asia might have any views about those subjects was not considered a matter of very great importance.

It is true that some importance is attached to those views now ,because they cannot be ignored; nevertheless, it seems to be the high privilege of countries outside Asia to carry the burden of Asia on their shoulders, and repeatedly things happen and decisions are made affecting Asia in which Asia has little say.” India viewed the birth and liberation of Vietnam in the larger context of freedom and peace for the people of Asia and Africa. Nehru added, “.. Freedom for them (people of Asia) is much more important than to those who have been used to freedom for a long time. Therefore, there is the passionate desire for peace and opportunity for progress in these countries and that is a common bond.”

(The writer is a former senior fellow of Indian Council of Social Science Research, affiliated to Indian Institute of Public Administration, and also a former senior fellow of Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi)

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