Liberal democracy is based on the primacy of the individual; yet in the context of representative democracies, there is no alternative to group affiliation for meaningful expression of individual needs, aspirations and fulfillment. In the post-World War II period, the democratic pluralist view asserts that in the context of advanced capitalism, the basic contradictions of the industrial revolution have been resolved and that an overwhelming number of people through group affiliations satisfactorily take part in the decision-making process. Inequality and size are taken care of by a rough parity and special attributes of groups. The advantages and disadvantages are balanced by various attributes of society and government by what is called ‘Whitehall Pluralism’.

A radical critique of this democratic pluralist view emerges in C Wright Mills’ Power Elite (1956) and Herbert Marcuse’s One Dimensional Man (1964). Accepting the fact that there is no better alternative to liberal democracy, the American Left is trying to plug the loopholes of democracy and actualise it for those in the margins or are unrepresented. The objectives of the new social movements are participatory democracy and identity politics. These lack the social democratic experience of Western Europe, and their primary concern is America’s capitalist democracy.

The central issues that the Leftists of the US champion are wrong politically, such as reproductive rights, equal pay, affordable health care, abolition of patriarchy, and action on climate change. The basic problem with identity politics is that its constituency is restricted to the upper middle class both in terms of membership and appeal. It is delinked from serious and immediate economic and structural issues thrown up by globalisation and the rapid technological changes in the manufacturing and mining sectors. This has rendered hundreds of thousands out of employment, disturbed their social status, family life, and the future of the next generation.

Helen Lewis states that instead of attributing Trump’s victory to identity politics, it needs to be stressed that the tokenism of contemporary feminism that Hillary Clinton champions was less mindful of white Americans and “male Americans”. There was an explicit identification with Afro-Americans, and a sizeable number of white Americans and Hispanics preferred to vote Trump rather than Clinton. In her reckoning, identity politics like neo-liberalism “has become a bogeyman, as dumpster for anything that people don’t like but don’t care to articulate more fully”.

Politics in the US is dominated by identity politics. Clinton’s campaign for women is overstressed and her other planks for blue-collar workers, jobs, plans for education have not been effective because of her gender-centric campaign and publicity. Lewis significantly mentions that identity politics has been evident in the US for quite some time, and Trump cannot be blamed for its revival. David Brooks “blames identity politics for not really analysing the cause of the rise of ethnic populism” one that is totally ignored by proponents of identity politics. The crucial problems are: (1) disappearance and decimation of jobs as a consequence of phenomenal leaps in technology, automation and globalisation; (2) tearing of the social fabric; (3) redefinition of the nation-states by mass migration; and (4) rejection of the post-World War II order as a means to ensure peace.

Identity politics views these problems casually and is incapable of providing an answer. In the heyday of post-materialism, these postures were accepted uncritically; but now when even in advanced capitalism contradictions and cracks are visible, such politics is increasingly losing its relevance. As Lewis remarks, both the planks of Trump — (a) building a wall between Mexico and USA to stop illegal migration; and (b) making America great again — are not part of identity politics. She has argued that “the selling a candidate as an unreconstructed alpha male is not identity politics”.

Prof Mark Lilla of Columbia University is categorical that identity politics is detrimental to progressive ideas, the reason being that such politics detaches progressives from the larger nation. He writes: “The fixation on diversity in our schools and not in the press has produced a generation of liberals and progressives narcissistically unaware of conditions outside their self-defined groups and indifferent to the task of reaching out to Americans in every walk of life”. The proponents of identity politics cannot provide a coherent view of action to meet the multiple challenges in such a situation. The suspicion of average Americans towards the Washington establishment and the accessories is understandable.

John Gray thinks that Trump has been able to demolish the dynastic politics of the Clintons and Bushs. His victory is appreciable because he won against the well-established media and spending much less money than his opponents both in his own party and the democrats. Gray writes that the popular rejection of the established elite is because of their collective incompetence both in domestic and international politics. He adds: “Those who talk of a triumph of racism and misogyny point to aspects of Trump’s campaign that were real enough. Yet it is impossible to imagine these familiar disorders propelling him to power without the decades of neglect and disdain displayed in both main parties for those Americans who have been consistent losers from globalisation”.

In such a situation voting for Trump is not an irrational act of the voters. Gray has pointed out that “the hysteria that surrounds Trump’s victory stems in large part from a refusal by his opponents to admit their part in bring it about”. Making the contrast between the two upsets, he comments that “for the US presidency, economic deprivation and despair trumped the politics of gender, culture and race”. The traditional political vocabulary fails to address the issues of bread and butter, concentrating on gender and the like which, without incorporating the masses, appear suspicious and divisive.

Trump has demonstrated that his appeal for American nationalism resonates much louder than Clinton’s phony planks of gender and other equalities, as her background of privileges lacks the needed sincerity of an authentic American voice. In a way, Trump’s victory reassures the return of programmatic politics in a society which is essentially apolitical and individualistic. But even in such an order the desirable change can only crystallize politically as the fragmented social movements today lack the grassroot support that the civil rights movement had. As Brooks writes, “the central challenge is to rebuild a functioning polity and to modernize a binding American idea”.

The basic problem with identity politics is that substantive change can only be brought about by the political process, spearheaded by a leader or a political party. The turning points in contemporary American history have been initiated by political parties. And the examples are the New Deal, the Great Society programme, the containment theory and practice and the Reagan revolution. In spite of the inherent weaknesses of the American political parties, they are better organised and disciplined, qualities that the fragmented social movements cannot match. The major weakness of identity politics is that it is spearheaded by a small group of people with similar outlook and without accepting the basic fact that in the present-day cosmopolitanism, every single individual has multiple identities within a defined nation-state. This calls for a new national agenda, acceptance of what Habermas called constitutional citizenship with a brand of capitalism that has a humane face and which incorporates but is not divisive.

The myth that the American economic heritage is built on economic liberty and laissez faire internationalism is broken by the fact that Alexander Hamilton is the first major theorist of American protectionism which the US follows. The Trump victory vindicates what Montesquieu had said long ago, specifically that there are no accidents in history but only cause and effect.

The writer is former Professor of Political Science, University of Delhi.