At a time when the India-USA relationship has been transformed from estranged democracies to engaged democracies and now elevated further to global strategic partnership during the visit of President Trump to India last month, it is propitious to recall the seminal contributions of Sudhir Ghosh, a distinguished member of Parliament of the hallowed years and close confidant of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in forging strategic ties with the USA immediately after Chinese attack on India in 1962.

This recollection is entirely based on his enduring work, Gandhi’s Emissary, originally published in 1967 and republished in 2008. This excellent memoir has also traction in view of the 150th birth anniversary of Mahatma Gandhi, with whom Ghosh also worked (see photograph). The compass of this article is, however, limited to his role as harbinger of IndoUS relations, when Indian foreign policy was dominated by neutrality and Panchsheel – the offshoot of the cold war. After the debacle of the border war of 1962 when Nehru was crestfallen and anguished, Ghosh in a memorandum submitted to the Prime Minister in January 1963, proposed a diplomatic arrangement between India on the one hand and a group of democratic countries on the other (including the USA, Canada, Britain, Australia and New Zealand) that these countries agree to supply the military equipment necessary for enlarging the Indian Army and Air Force. One can discern the streaks of the idea of the Quad and the Indo-Pacific partnership in the strategic edifice proposed by Ghosh some sixty years ago, not to mention what Gokhale said ‘what Bengal thinks today, India will think tomorrow’. In this memorandum, Ghosh didn’t propose any kind of military involvement such as existed between Pakistan and the USA, with American military installations located in Pakistan territory, nor did he envisage any kind of military pact like SEATO or CENTO. What he suggested was an exchange of simple letters between Prime Minister of India and heads of the government in the USA, Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. In response Nehru replied to Ghosh that his proposal “…is almost tantamount to military alliance” and “that it will be bad for India as well as from the point of view of world peace”. Subsequently, Ghosh discussed the matter further with Nehru.

Having regretted his inability to endorse the proposal, Nehru, however, acceded to his request to visit both USSR and USA to canvass support for India to deal with the challenges emanating from China. Ghosh paid three visits to Moscow and Washington during 1963- 64. First, he visited Moscow and then proceeded to United States, where he interacted individually with more than forty key men in the US Senate, the House of Representatives, and the American Administration over a month in March 1963. Finally, he had a talk with President Kennedy himself. He found the month-long interaction with the US lawmakers quite an experience. Members of the powerful US Senate Foreign Relations Committee had a joint discussion with him on India-China relations at a luncheon on 4 March 1963. After the lunch he was given a seat on the Senate floor to sit with the Senators and watch the proceedings. He was pleasantly surprised to find the whole House officially welcoming him into their midst. Drawing the attention of the Senators to the presence of Ghosh, Senator Humphrey introduced him as one of the distinguished and able leaders of the Parliament of India and a true friend of democracy and freedom, and a gentleman who enjoys the friendship of many Americans and many members of the body. Soon after, Ghosh was given a standing ovation. Senator Sparkman said that he had the pleasure of knowing Mr. Ghosh ever since 1952 when he first met him on a trip to India. He found him to be an active, alert, patriotic Indian, and a very fine and dear friend of the West. Senator Cooper joined other Senators in welcoming Ghosh. Ghosh also met members of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Some of his friends amongst the Senators suggested that he must see President Kennedy, whom he had already met, before he left for India. He discussed the matter with his friend Senator John Sherman Cooper who offered to write a letter to President Kennedy proposing an appointment with Ghosh.

The State Department, however, advised against the proposed meeting. He gave up the hope of meeting President Kennedy and went to see Mr McGeorge Bundy at the White House on 27 March 1963 before returning to India. Bundy was impressed with Ghosh and strongly felt that he must see Kennedy before he left for India. Thus, he hurriedly arranged a meeting with the President the next day. Ghosh reasoned with the President that he did not understand the logic of the American argument that the United States could not get too deeply involved in the raising of India’s military power to deal with the situation created by Communist China until there was a Kashmir settlement between India and Pakistan. He pleaded that whatever military assistance the President decided to give or not to give India to resist China was a question that should be settled on its merits. He didn’t see its connection with the settlement or absence of a settlement of the Kashmir problem. Thus, Ghosh was successful in convincing President Kennedy of the defence needs of India to deal with India’s security dilemma with its northern neighbour. His outreach to the US Congress and US Administration was certainly the precursor to the present bonhomie between two of the world’s largest democracies.

Drawing a lesson from the outreach of Ghosh, as an erudite and articulate member of Parliament, to the members of the US Congress and Administration, it is time that the government encouraged informed and intelligent members of Parliament cutting across party lines to act as interlocutors and to engage and educate members of important foreign legislatures like the US Congress, the British Parliament, and the European Parliament.