Elon Musk, the US tech billionaire in an opened page article published in the Welt am Sonntag newspaper on 29 December extended his support to Germany’s far-right political outfit Alternative für Deutschland (AfD). This came after his post on his social network X that “only the AfD can save Germany”. He regarded the AfD as “the last spark of hope for the country experiencing ‘economic and cultural collapse’, for reviving the German economy and preventing a loss of identity through a “controlled immigration policy”.

In the article written in German, he praised AfD’s approach to reducing government regulation, lowering taxes and deregulating the market. The AfD is polling at 19 per cent, second to the centre-right alliance of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and Bavaria’s Christian Social Union (CSU), at about 30 per cent. The AfD is in a position to frustrate Germany’s mainstream political alliances, be that of centre-right or centre-left. The latter have vowed not to seek support from AfD at the national level.

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The German media was outraged by Musk’s comments perceiving it as unprecedented interference. Friedrich Merz, the CDU leader and a candidate for chancellor in Germany’s legislative election slated on 23 February 2025 remarked “I can’t remember a comparable case of interference in the election campaign of a friendly country in the history of the Western democracies”. He described Musk’s comments as “intrusive and pretentious”. Lars Klingbeil, chairman of the Social Democrats (SPD) blamed Musk for wanting to “plunge Germany into chaos” and compared him to Vladimir Putin, the Russian President.

Esken, co-leader of Scholz’s Social Democrats (SPD) commented, “In Elon Musk’s world, democracy and workers’ rights are obstacles to more profit. We say quite clearly: Our democracy is defensible and it cannot be bought”. Mika Beuster, the chairman of the Deutscher Journalisten Verband (DJV) cautioned editorial offices not to become spokespersons for autocrats and their friends. Musk justified the expression of his views about Germany because of his sizable investments there.

In 2024, he praised Giorgia Meloni, the Italian prime minister. He has promised support and donation to Nigel Farage’s anti-immigrant and right-wing populist Reform UK party. He gave US $250 million for Donald Trump’s election in the US and is named the co-head of a department that would cut down government spending and the federal workforce. Musk’s role in extending support to AfD raises some important ethical points as it reminds us of the notorious doctrine of limited sovereignty invented by Leonid Brezhnev to justify the Soviet era interventions in the satellite communist countries of Eastern Europe. In the aftermath of the Second World War, Germany and Japan emerged as stable democracies combining political stability with consensual politics and impressive economic achievements.

In Germany there were pockets of resentment at Konrad Adenauer’s pronounced Western tilt but the subsequent happenings intensified the Cold War in which Germany became a key area of conflict and his popularity skyrocketed. Ever since that period Germany earned the respect of being Europe’s one of the stablest democracies and an economic powerhouse accentuated further by German reunification in 1989. However, in the September 2024 elections some important provinces, Saxony and Thuringia of erstwhile East Germany exhibited a deep fault line between the eastern and the western regions bringing out deep cleavages in their political cultures.

Mistrust and differences manifested, raising serious concerns about its destabilising effect on the entire German political process and a faulting economy. More importantly it threatens the prediction of Willy Brandt, former West German Chancellor and the main architect of the 1974 Helsinki agreement of a détente between the two blocs. Brandt hoped that reunification would culminate in a situation of “what belongs together to grow together”. In 1989, the wide differences and economic gap between the two were as deep as between a developed North and an undeveloped South. It was magnificently dealt with by Helmut Kohl’s planning, declaring parity between the two Deutsche Marks. The basic assumption was that with an East German take off both the economies would achieve rough parity leading to the emergence of a unifying civic culture.

The rise of the far-right political outfit, AfD with a plank of anti-immigration was considered to be a fringe element reflecting continued economic disparity but was not in a position to threaten the national consensus. However, capturing power in two important provinces defies economic logic when with growing prosperity, many are moving from western to the eastern parts. The difference in unemployment between the two regions is insignificant as faster economic growth has attracted massive investments from reputed brands like Tesla and Intel. The level of immigration in eastern Germany is lowest. Despite this, there is significant alienation with one-fifth of the population feeling that they are left behind in comparison to those in the western region.

A pronounced sub-cultural difference between the western and eastern regions is evident. The number is still small and by itself is not in a position to disturb the present political equilibrium but the election result confirms that in the five eastern states a significant number supports these fringe elements ensuring a comfortable majority for the AfD. In an extremely insightful analysis of this phenomenon sociologist, Steffen Mau suggests in his book Ungleich vereint: Warum der Osten anders bleibt (Unequally Different: Why the East Remains Different) published in 2019 that this is not merely a quest for catching up which it has by and large already achieved but an assertion of its own distinct identity, a pronounced urban-rural divide, which is a decisive one in eastern Germany. The latter is monolithic, lacking “the lattice of civil society groups found across western Germany, from Churches to unions to clubs”.

“The AfD called for a second “Wende”, according to David Border, “another go at the revolution of 1989-90 – which shows how little this has to do with nostalgia for the socialist era. It is instead shaped by a feeling of being “second class citizens” – in AfD rhetoric framed as all the more unjust because of what it called the favourable treatment of immigrants. “Left-behind” resentment is further heightened by Germans’ own migration patterns, as the pull of the cities thins out the younger population in small eastern towns”.

With a massive grass roots organizational structure focusing on anti-immigration and espousing a more parochial culture which is at variance with the Western Germans, the AfD proclaims a secluded and racial identity like Viktor Orbán’s attempt in Hungary. It is a severe critique of multiculturalism proclaiming cultural and racial authenticity. Incidentally this is side-tracking the larger economic issues and rise of China and East Asia making serious inroads into Germany’s traditional automobile and chemical industries

The writers are retired Professors of Political Science, University of Delhi