Logo

Logo

Federalism at Stake?

A better and far easier solution to fill up vacant posts at Joint Secretary level exists. Under the Central Staffing Scheme, every year applications are invited from officers of AIS, officers of State Government and members of the Central Services, to fill up Deputy Secretary and above posts in the Central Government. Posts up to Director level are filled-up mostly by officers of Central Services while the IAS predominates in JS and above level posts. So, the shortage of officers at JS level can be addressed by removing the bias against non-IAS officers

Federalism at Stake?

representational image (iStock photo)

A proposed change in the All-India Service Rules (AIS) that would enable the Centre to transfer to itself any All-India Service (IAS, IPS or IFS) officer serving in any State cadre, has raised the hackles of non-BJP States, who view the proposed change as an assault on the federal structure of the nation.

The Central Government, on its part, insists that the change in AIS Rules is only to overcome the shortage of officers working with it. According to the Central Government, most States were not nominating the required 40 per cent AIS cadre strength of officers for deputation with the Centre.

Advertisement

Resultantly, Central ministries and departments were understaffed; presently, the Central Government had only 223 IAS Joint Secretaries, as against 309 officers ten years ago. There is some justification for the Centre’s stand; All-India Service officers are recruited by the Centre through the UPSC and allotted to various States but their ultimate control remains with the Department of Personnel and Training, therefore, logically, the Centre’s needs should get precedence.

Advertisement

Existing rules, too, give an upper hand to the Central Government, which can ask for any officer serving in a State cadre. In case the State demurs, the Centre can repeat its demand and the State would be obliged to comply. The new rules are more autocratic, consultation is not required; the Centre can pick any officer serving with a State, who would automatically stand relieved on the date indicated by the Centre. However, snatching officers from States is not a solution to the problem; perhaps, the Government should mull as to why the problem has arisen in the first place.

Despite a slogan of “Minimum Government-Maximum Governance,” the Government has been expanding at a fast pace. Newer ministries and departments, are always coming up; the number of ministries has increased from 45 to over 60 in the last decade, with a corresponding increase in the number of departments. Posts at the top level are proliferating, with the number of secretaries alone crossing 200.

Even at this inflated level, there is a call for increasing the size of Government, with public service experts pointing out that the US has about 668 employees per 100,000 persons, while India has only about 139; while we spend 12.74 per cent of our GDP on Government, the US spends 37.80 per cent. One can only fear the consequences if this line of thinking is adopted by the Government. But, contrary to the insinuation of the Central Government, States alone are not responsible for a sufficient number of officers not joining on Central deputation.

All-India Service Officers working in State cadres do not want to move to the Centre because, many AIS officers build fiefdoms in the States where they are posted, enjoying all creature comforts one can dream of, sprawling bungalows, a fleet of cars, admission for their children in top schools etc. Serving at the Centre is a different kettle of fish; officers have to reach in time because of biometric attendance devices, the official car may be a shared one, the retinue of servants is absent, everyone has to queue up for accommodation, and so on. No wonder, only out of favour bureaucrats consider moving to the Centre.

At the other end of the spectrum are some bureaucrats who have made Delhi their home. Called Delhi Service officers, these bureaucrats manage to ingratiate themselves with the ruling dispensation, remaining in Delhi for long periods of time. They are the ones who man most deputation posts, despite not being the best qualified persons for the job. Both phenomena are a systemic problem, largely ignored by both the Centre and the States.

The PC Hota Committee on Civil Service Reforms, in their Report, submitted in July 2004, had listed out 42 shortfalls of the Civil Services. No action on the Report was taken, though the observations of the Committee are relevant even today.

The Committee observed, inter-alia: 1) By and large the civil service in India has lost its neutral and anonymous character;

2) Increasingly, corrupt practices have become prevalent in the higher civil service;

3) A majority of civil servants are arrogant … and by and large they have lost touch with ground realities;

4) Some civil servants develop an unhealthy nexus with power brokers and do not hesitate to resort to questionable means to get good postings in India or abroad;

5) After 15 years of service, a rigorous review should be made of performance of higher civil servants to weed out the corrupt and the inefficient;

6) Article 311 of the Constitution should be amended to remove corrupt officials from service and give them an opportunity to defend themselves in a post decisional hearing only after their removal from service;

7) The Indian Administrative Service should not monopolize all key posts in the Government of India. There are a large number of talented officers in other two All India Services and the Central Services who deserve to hold key posts in Government of India under the Central Staffing Scheme or other key posts in the States, and,

8) Far too many officers of different services are promoted too quickly … there are a large number of officers of the grade of Commissioners, Principal Secretaries to Government, Additional Director Generals and Director Generals of Police. If too many top level positions in the IAS create problems of cadre management, too many senior posts in the IPS create problems of unity of command. Instead of tackling such deep-rooted problems, the amended AIS Rules would only create an additional point of friction between the States and Centre.

If the Alapan Bandyopadhyay case is any guide, misuse of the new rule cannot be ruled out. To recapitulate: Mr. Bandyopadhyay, while posted as the Chief Secretary of West Bengal, failed to attend a meeting called by the PM on 28 May 2021. Thereafter, Mr Bandyopadhyay did not comply with an order of the Union Government directing him to report to the Department of Personnel and Training on 31 May 2021, the date of his retirement. Consequently, a charge sheet was issued to Mr. Bandyopadhyay, which is being disputed at various judicial forums.

A point being raised by Mr. Bandyopadhyay is that under the extant AIS Rules his consent and the State Government’s concurrence should have been sought, which was not done. The new AIS Rules would make the officer’s consent and the State Government’s concurrence superfluous; all AIS officers would be at the immediate beck and call of the Central Government, even while serving in a State cadre.

States fear that IAS officers would thus become agents of the Central Government. This is an old bugbear, many States purposely do not take their full complement of AIS officers, the prime example being Gujarat, which did not take any IAS officer from 1992 to 1995, despite the same party being in power both in Gujarat and the Centre.

A better and far easier solution to fill up vacant posts at Joint Secretary level exists. Under the Central Staffing Scheme, every year applications are invited from officers of AIS, officers of State Government and members of the Central Services, to fill up Deputy Secretary and above posts in the Central Government. Posts up to Director level are filled-up mostly by officers of Central Services while the IAS predominates in JS and above level posts, only because the IAS wants to maintain its superiority. So, the shortage of officers at JS level can be addressed by removing the bias against non-IAS officers.

Since the cadre strength of the IAS is only 6,500 (working strength 5,200) while that of Central Services Group A is around 75,000, a much larger talent pool would be available to the Government. There would be no drop in quality; both IAS officers and Central Services Group A officers are recruited by the same examination, and the district level experience of IAS officers is not very relevant for desk-bound jobs of the Central Government.

Moreover, the same Central Services officers who are considered fit to man Director level posts are, surely, competent enough to occupy the next higher post of Joint Secretary. Thus, in the ultimate analysis, the brouhaha is about a turf war between the Centre and the States and between Services, that should co-operate. Silos have come up, causing people who are supposed to be on the same team, to work against one another. One can only hope that good sense would eventually prevail.

(The writer is a retired Principal Chief Commissioner of Income-Tax)

Advertisement