The collapse of communism and disintegration of the Soviet Union brought about a sea change in the map of East Europe which had long term implications for the security of all major powers of Europe. The post-communist Russian political leadership was favourably inclined toward the West and desired membership in both the EU and Nato. But instead, Russia continued to be perceived as a relatively undeveloped and distanced landmass from western, central and eastern Europe. 

Contrary to assurances by the Western leaders, Nato enlargement began in the mid-1990s. The Russian leadership stoutly opposed Nato’s eastward enlargement but was unable to prevent it because of its diminished power and status. When the end of the Cold War became a near certainty, the Russian leadership explicitly expressed its willingness to the continued presence of the US forces in Europe. It was a reflection of the anxiety of the re-emergence of a powerful united Germany. But at the same time, Russia detested the growth and expansion of Nato fearing an encirclement. 

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The Western leadership in the immediate aftermath was considerate and empathetic to Russia’s concern. However, the Clinton administration in the mid-1990s started to push Nato eastward. In the first phase of enlargement in 1999, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were included. The second round, in 2004, included Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. Moscow was opposed to the expansion and during Nato’s bombing of Bosnia and Serbia, Russian President Boris Yeltsin remarked “this is the first sign of what could happen when Nato comes right up to the Russian Federation’s borders”. He significantly added, “the flame of war could burst out across the whole of Europe”. But Russia, after losing superpower status, was not in a position to challenge. It was also a fact that smaller Baltic nations did not share their borders with Russia. 

Georgia and Ukraine, however, are in a different category as both share long borders with Russia. There was a concerted effort by Western powers to in- corporate Georgia and Ukraine into Nato and bring them into the western sphere. The EU also continued to expand eastward. The West openly supported a pro-democracy movement in Ukraine which led to the Orange Revolution in 2004 with the active support of Azov, the extreme right-wing Nazi formation within Ukraine. Russia considered Georgia and Ukraine’s inclusion in Nato, announced at the Budapest summit in 2008, as a violation of the red line. 

Matters came to a head when the West-supported coup in 2014 led to the ouster of Ukraine’s democratically elected pro-Russian president. Vladimir Putin acted quickly by taking control of Crimea, as Russia feared it would become a Nato naval base. He promulgated the red line stating that Russia would not accept Ukraine joining Nato. Russia invaded Georgia in August 2008 to prevent it from joining Nato. But Nato expansion continued and in 2009 both Albania and Croatia became members. The EU also continued its eastward expansion. Publicly, Nato never abandoned its policy of admitting both Georgia and Ukraine. Lavrov resented the Western attempt to create “a sphere of influence in East Europe”. 

The West continued to encourage and provide financial assistance to Ukraine and other post-Soviet nations to promote democracy. The US decided to spend $5 billion to secure Ukraine’s future. However, when Yanukovych won the presidential elections in Ukraine in February 2010, Western governments were unhappy and start- ed to openly support the Opposition. The Russian leadership began to understand quite clearly that after Ukraine the entire attention would be to topple the present Russian regime which President Biden reiterated recently in Poland.

Carl Gershman categorically wrote in the Washington Post “Ukraine’s choice to join Europe will accelerate the demise of the ideology of Russian imperialism that Putin represents”. He added, “Russians to face a choice, and Putin may find himself on the losing end not just in the near abroad but within Russia itself”. 

The crisis in Ukraine reach- ed a breaking point in November 2013 when Yanukovych rejected an economic arrangement with the EU and accepted a Russian offer of $15 billion in aid. This decision led to widespread anti-government protests in February 2014. Interestingly Western advisers immediately reached Kiev to resolve the crisis. A deal was made between Yanukovych and the Opposition which agreed to his continuation in office until fresh elections were held. But that did not work. Yanukovych had to flee to Russia the next day. 

Expectedly the new government was pro-western and anti-Russian and the cabinet had four neo-fascists including the crucial Minister of Defence. It was a coup that was backed by the USA. Victoria Nuland and John McCain participated in the anti-government protests. US Ambassador Geffrey Pyatt welcomed the toppling and proclaimed, “it was a day for history books”. Later it was revealed that the regime change was supported by Nuland who wanted Yatsenyuk to be the new premier. Subsequent revelations confirmed the US involvement in the ouster of Yanukovych. Putin’s actions were swift. He annexed Crimea and incorporated it into Russia immediately. He also made it clear that any tilt towards the West would lead to the break-up of Ukraine. John J. Mearsheimer comments that “Putin’s action should be easy to comprehend”. 

It was a significant security concern for Russia as Ukraine acted as a buffer between Russia and the West. Mearsheimer, rejecting the claim that it was a unilateral decision of Putin, argues that any other Russian leader would have done the same. In the US ad- ministration there was a belief as expressed by the for- mer Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, that Western action in Ukraine would not be considered by Moscow to be a threat; this was endorsed by both Barack Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry. Biden as the vice president supported the promise of the 2004 Orange Revolution even later. All of them overlooked the dangerous presence of Azov which weakened the prospects of democracy and power-sharing from within. 

Meanwhile, the new pro-Western government in Kiev signed an economic agreement with the EU that Yanukovych had rejected. The US also proclaimed that no third country had a veto over Nato enlargement. From the Swedish invasion to Hitler’s, Russia had suffered many attacks from the West, and all used the plains of Ukraine for easy access. In 1994, when Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine gave up nuclear weapons and signed the NPT the guarantors of its territorial integrity were Russia, USA and England presumably with the understanding of Russia’s security imperatives. 

The Anglosphere countries being totally dependent on the USA willingly play the role of subordinates. The larger Nato formation is no different. There is hardly any sign of an independent European foreign policy. This subservient role of Europe has further raised the concerns of the Russian leadership about Nato’s intentions. The latter was an aggressor in Yugoslavia, Iraq Libya, Syria, and Afghanistan. Stephen P. Cohen remarks the feeling of triumphalism in the USA after the Cold War was the primary cause of Nato’s expansion in East Europe. Its treatment was markedly different from its approach towards the defeated nations of Germany and Japan. It proceeded arrogantly with the assumption that Russia could not have its own security concerns. In 2019, Zelensky came to power with massive support ~ of more than 70 per cent votes. He projected himself as a candidate for peace. But his opponents, some of them heavily armed, did not allow him to proceed in that direction. There was no attempt to implement the Minsk agreement which was a reasonable one. The civil war situation that existed in Ukraine since 2013 has exploded now.

The USA played an important role in the 2014 coup in Ukraine, a country far away and of no major interest to it. But for Russia, Ukraine was of pivotal importance. Moreover, the retreat of the USA from Afghanis- tan without any plan of protecting its territorial integrity emboldened the Russians to pursue a two-state solution in Ukraine. Denazification and demilitarization of Ukraine, which increasingly became a puppet state, looked to be a reasonable solution as it was a country that was culturally divided. 

Biden’s repeated assertion for a regime change in Moscow, allegations of war crimes and even setting off a Nuremberg kind of trial looks hollow when no such action was ever contemplated in the numerous Nato-led interventions. 

In the Iraq invasion, a million Iraqi civilians died. The Guantanamo Bay prisoners were another example of the inhuman actions of Nato. Even within Nato, Turkey and Hungary have maintained their neutrality. Expecting to win against Russia or humiliating it looks far-fetched. Even before the invasion, Ukraine was a basket case. The vertical division within G-20 is an indication that the non-Western world is suspicious of the Nato action in trying to isolate Russia. 

It defies any rational calculation that a war that has destroyed much of Ukraine could easily have been avoided had Ukraine maintained neutrality and implemented the Minsk agreement. It has further entrenched the mutual suspicion between the West and the rest and in the absence of any reasonable arms limitation treaty between the USA and Russia a nuclear arms race is also likely to intensify. 

Zelensky the Ukrainian President is not a serious statesman and could not pursue the peace process that he promised mainly out of his fear that he might be eliminated by the extreme right with veto power within the government. 

The latter also maintains a battalion within the Ukrainian army. Zelensky has failed to make east Ukrainians part of the federal structure. For the West, it is a proxy war. In the process, as Richard Sakma comments, there is no honest broker to salvage the situation and it is on the battlefield that the fate of Ukraine would be decided. In the process, Europe has destroyed itself with very little left of a European peace project. The war in Ukraine would only hasten a multipolar world. 

(The writer is a retired Professor of Political Science, University of Delhi)