It is disconcerting that the Election Commission of India (ECI), the mainstay of free and fair elections, is suffering from a credibility crisis. On the one hand, the public trust in the ECI is dipping. The CSDS-Lokniti pre-poll survey 2024, revealed a two-fold slump in public trust in ECI compared with the 2019 figure. While 58 per cent of respondents reposed varying degrees of trust, 22 per cent expressed their overall deprecation. On the other hand, controversies and insinuations are tainting the integrity and approval of the ECI. The opposition political parties allege that the ECI succumbed to the diktats and pressure of the executive and functioned at the behest of the ruling government.

A politically motivated demand for a Supreme Court monitored election has also surfaced. The attributed academic epithets inter alia include ‘mouthpiece of the government,’ ‘biased referee,’ ‘political player,’ and subservient authority. Not being a given, the trustworthiness of the ECI hinges on its transparent, fair and impartial role consequent upon unencumbered and autonomous decision-making. It has to be noted that the constitutional provisions for fixed tenure, preordained domain and difficult removal method are prerequisites, but such safeguards are not enough for the ECI.

The autonomous expanse of the ECI is also associated with the support or scheming of the ruling executive, particularly when it is intrinsically vulnerable to the pulls and pressure of the executive appointment of the election commissioner, power to rescind the post of commissioner, finance, personnel including security forces and administrative collaboration. Accordingly, the credibility of the ECI has effectively oscillated regardless of a similar sort of legal ordination. Given the political opportunity, the ruling executives have sought to constrict the leeway in a way that the ECI does not thrive as an assertive, autonomous and empowered institution and have tried to exert discreet pressure and partisan influence on the decision and role of the ECI, more downrightly through the appointment of pliant election commissioners.

TN Seshan, former Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) unequivocally observed that the executive attempts to subjugate the ECI, pays scant respect to the constitutional status of the commission and prevents the ECI from taking charge during elections. SY Quraishi, another CEC, also endorsed that the ECI has failed to establish an arm’s length distance from the government. Perceptible is the fact that the influence and pressure on and the credibility of the ECI have varied in terms of the nature of the prevailing political configuration and the inclination or machination of the ruling governments. The operational latitude and the public credence in the ECI have historically revolved around two broad political trajectories.

The fragile and indecisive executives ~ as obtained under coalition governments between 1989 and 2014 ~ could precipitate an assertive and entrepreneurial commission while the partisan pressures tended to have escalated all along the rule of a stable and dominant executive, steered by either a single party (Congress) or a coalition where one party commanded absolute majority (BJP during 2014- 2024). Throughout the rule of fragile coalition governments, the executive powers remained dispersed, and each constituent was fixated on extracting its ‘pound of flesh’, making the executive inherently weak. Given the political uncertainty and vulnerability as well as the penchant of the coalition partners to make the ECI strong for their political interests, the ECI could relatively be more authoritative.

Atypical leeway, institutionalisation of electoral reforms and notable public trust, thus the celebrated epoch for the ECI, can be observed in this era. The ECI could even confront the executive. When the Vajpayee government decided in January 2004 to appoint Cabinet Secretary TR Prasad as the next CEC by superseding the senior-most incumbent, the election commissioners threatened to resign en masse. The government had to withdraw the move and appoint TR Krishnamurty as the CEC. The Vajpayee government’s other move to appoint two additional commissioners, taking the total to five members, could not also succeed. Against the resistance of the state government, the ECI also succeeded in securing public officials’ compliance with its instructions during election times and retaining its power to remove officials for the duration of elections.

When the Gujarat government resigned in 2002 and put forth the demand for a snap poll, the ECI held its ground, underscored the inconvenient conditions and more importantly, contended that the commission is the sole arbiter on fixing the timing of the poll. The ECI took up initiatives for cleansing and improving the electoral process, like the introduction of EVM, vulnerability mapping, digitisation of voter lists, preventive arrest of potential troublemakers, election observers, ‘candidate affidavit’ disclosing economic assets and criminal background and multiphase elections. The overarching credibility of the ECI in this phase is arguably summed by the observation of Seshan: I (ECI) am not the horse to be controlled by the jockey (government).

However, the role and credibility of the ECI during the course of domineering executives are somewhat contrasting in degree. Under Congress-led executives, the ECI enjoy ed only muted auto nomy, the executive used to dictate, de cide or vet the electoral guidelines, practices, schedule of elections, etc., and the castigation was that the ECI had then been absorbed into the Congress system. Yet, the constrictions were not blatant, as the elections returned the same party until 1967. The regulations and procedures concerning transparency and accountability could be formulated and entrenched during this period with the tacit support of the government.

Despite subdued autonomy and incidences of violence, and malpractices that began to proliferate with the advent of competitive elections after the 4th general elections, the ECI was perceived to have conducted elections by and large freely and fairly. The 1977 general elections with the motto of ‘vote without fear’ earned universal appreciation and bolstered its credibility. However, during the phase of strong executive helmed by the BJP-led coalition, the overall role and credibility of the ECI took a downturn in relative terms. Perceived bias, prejudice, partisan action and inaction, controversy and criticism against the decision and role of the ECI were phenomenal.

Unprecedented levels of abusive innuendoes, hate speech, religious hatred, anti-Muslim epithets, misuse of military symbols in election messaging and egregious infractions of the Model Code of Conduct vitiated the electioneering process, particularly during the 2019 and 2024 general elections and the 2020 Delhi assembly election. The ECI purportedly displayed double standards. When it kept the complaints lodged against the BJP’s top brasses in abeyance for over a month and glossed over six consecutive warnings of the Supreme Court, and when the Court eventually threatened to summon the CEC, only then did the ECI hold its full bench meeting and issue clean chit to all the alleged offences.

Following the BJP’s complaint, the ECI banned the ‘Ghar Ghar Guarantee’ outreach progr a mme of the Congress, attributing it to bribery, while it did not find fault with the much-publicised ‘Modi’s Guarantee Card’ that promised, inter alia, free rations for the next five years, free treatment, houses and electricity for the poor. The delay in the release of the final voters’ turnout data and constituency-wise total number of registered voters and number of votes polled, with the ECI insisting it is not statutorily bound to publicly release such datasets, raised suspicions about the probable manipulation of votes.

Moreover, the rep or ted massive discrepancies between the number of votes polled and the number of votes counted for the 2024 general election are potentially explosive allegations. Arguably more apocalyptic is the statutory stamp on the executive’s prerogative over the appointment of election commissioners. For the appointment process, the Act, 2023, envisages the Search Committee to be composed and controlled exclusively by the government and the Selection Committee with a clinching majority of the ruling executive. With the sanctification of the omnipotence of the ruling executive, passé is the warning of the Supreme Court that it is imperative to shield the appointment of the election commissioners and to insulate the office from executive interference.

When the autonomy, thus credence, of the ECI is contingent upon the political disposition, the propitious political terrain after the 2024 general elections has the potential to facilitate a turnaround for the ECI. With the reincarnation of a coalition government surviving on the support of partners, the political vulnerability is likely to ease partisan pressure and offer the ECI a window to rise, like a phoe nix, from the ashes, provided it devoutly strives to reclaim its auto nomous role and streamlines the equitable electoral ecosystem that is indispensable for sustaining democratic vibes and ethos.

(The writer is former Associate Professor of Political Science, Tufanganj College, Tufanganj, Cooch Behar, West Bengal and can be reached at amalcob@rediffmail.com)