The South China Sea has emerged as a flashpoint as several countries have claims to certain portions of this maritime space. While some Southeast Asian countries make claims to the oceanic space in the South China Sea that falls within their respective Exclusive Economic Zones, China makes a claim on almost its entirety. China’s muscle-flexing behaviour to assert its claims carries the seeds of a potential conflagration. By doing this, China is violating the globally accepted rules-based order and is thus a concern for maintaining regional peace.

China has territorial disputes with a number of Southeast Asian countries, the most prominent of these being with the Philippines. As the Philippines is an alliance partner of the USA, American officials throughout 2024 have been privately and publicly signalling to their Chinese counterparts that the North American nation is firmly committed to upholding its alliance commitments. The message is intended as a warning not to test the limits of American tolerance towards Chinese attempts to obstruct access to the Second Thomas Shoal, a submerged reef in the South China Sea where a grounded Philippines vessel, the Sierra Madre, serves as an outpost for Filipino soldiers. The disputes stemming over competing claims have been intensifying, thereby raising concerns about an outbreak of war and thus a threat to regional stability.

In response to the escalations, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia have reinforced their presence in the contested waters as the US steps up its intervention. Chinese maritime expert Wu Shicun, who heads the state-funded National Institute for South China Sea Studies and spent years researching the South China Sea, its history and geography as well as the regional disputes over this strategic waterway, defends China’s claims and bla m es Philippines for having been the first country to violate Beijing’s rights in the South China Sea in the 1970s, when China was in the grip of the Cultural Revolution. Wu Shicun accuses then President Ferdinand Marcos Sr of sending the military to take over a number of islands, including Feixin (Flat) Island and Zhongye (Thitu) Island.

Wu further observes that Beijing and Taipei did not respond then militarily, allowing Manila in 1971 to gain control of more islands and reefs. Wu rubbishes as erroneous the arbitration by the international arbitral tribunal in The Hague which in July 2016 backed Manila and ruled Beijing’s claims had no basis under international law. It was a landmark victory for the Philippines, which filed the case. The Philippines was forced to approach the Hague court when Beijing closed all options for the dialogue. Beijing has rejected the ruling. Beijing ought to be aware that the Philippines is a US treaty ally and that the latter would intervene in defence of its treaty partner if a war breaks out over the South China Sea. In fact, the possibility of war cannot be ruled out.

For example, when on 17 June 2024, the Chinese coast guard seized firearms from Filipino sailors at Renai Jiao during a confrontation, a trigger could have accidentally been pulled leading to an armed conflict. That the 17 June incident between Chinese and Philippine vessels did not escalate into outright armed conflict is due to some restraint and a whole lot of luck. The world had come dangerously close to a full-scale conflict on the issue of South China Sea but it was averted because of restraint exercised by both sides. As per international law that qualifies for sovereign immunity status, the boarding and seizure of Philippine Navy boats could have been construed as an act of war.

Had the Sierra Madre ~ still a commissioned navy vessel despite being grounded and disused since 1999 been boarded in the heated frenzy, the situation could have easily escalated out of control and potentially triggered the Mutual Defence Treaty between the Philippines and the US. In the end good sense prevailed and a major escalation was prevented. The Mutual Defense Treaty was not invoked in large part because Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr had set the bar pretty high at the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2024 where he had mentioned categorically that if any Filipino participants, civilian or otherwise, would have been killed, he would consider that the red line was crossed. While Beijing is unsure what the red lines would be, Manila has assiduously avoided invocation of the treaty in order not to escalate tensions further.

The provocation did not stop with the 17 June incident. The Philippines and China clashed in the disputed waters of the South China Sea on 25 August over what Manila said was a resupply mission for fishermen, the latest in a series of sea and air confrontations in the strategic waterway. The incident overshadowed efforts by both nations to rebuild trust and better manage disputes after months of confrontation. Though the possibility of the US being drawn into a direct conflict could be a certainty, it remains to be seen if Washington would be willing to be engaged in a direct conflict with China for the Philippines, as such a situation could get out of control and would inevitably draw other countries in as well.

A conflict would dramatically impact on regional security and also leave a debilitating effect on the economies of several Asian countries and also on the world economy. If this is the scenario, can a new consensus be explored in which the rival claimants work together to demilitarise the South China Sea? As a code of conduct has remained elusive for considerable time, other agreements may be explored to slowly demilitarise the South China Sea. For example, every claimant could offer an island to develop civilian facilities including scientific stations and environmental research centres to monitor sea levels and restore coral reefs.

Military deployment on those islands and reefs must stop as a first step. And, China ought to be the first to agree to this idea by providing an island for the idea offered. Given China’s behaviour, that could be a difficult proposition. But the idea can be explored in the larger interests of regional security.

(The writer is former Senior Fellow at Pradhanmantri Memorial Museum and Library, Ministry of Culture, Government of India, New Delhi)