Elections in West Bengal have been bloody affairs. Every election is routinely marred by bloodshed as political rivalry regularly turns violent. Therefore, long before the dates of the 2024 general election were announced, central security forces descended on various parts of West Bengal to maintain peace during the election. West Bengal, however, is not among the regions torn by militancy or ethnic strife, yet elections have been infamously violent.

In the panchayat election last year, more than forty people lost their lives. The incidents of violence following the 2021 assembly election are being investigated by central investigating agency on the direction of the court. The extraordinary degree of political violence witnessed in a state mostly known for its culture and creativity, apparently defies any reasonable juxtaposition. To find the answer to what turns argumentative Bengalis into violent ones, we need to look back to its history as well as its present. Violence is nothing new in the political landscape of West Bengal. The reasons to resort to violence, however, have changed with time and contexts. In the colonial time, undivided Bengal was a fertile ground for revolutionary resistance against British rule.

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like Anushilan Samiti nurtured young revolutionaries and preached for violent overthrow of British rule in India. In their quest for independence, many Bengali leaders and young revolutionaries embraced violence as a mark of resistance against colonial power. Parallel to the violent political resistance against British colonizers, another wave of violence was also observed in Bengal which had its origin in the exploitative agrarian relationship. Poor and oppressed peasants often took arms against rich and repressive landlords. At times, political resistance and agrarian conflict emanated from the same colonial exploitation. However, in post-colonial West Bengal, the agrarian fault line became far more contentious and political in nature.

The Congress government which came to power after independence was largely seen as a party of landlords. In Bengal, they were challenged by a section of communists, who decided to take part in parliamentary democracy as representatives of farmers, agricultural workers and other marginalized groups. Another stream of the communists who believed in revolution chose violence to fight exploitation. In late 1960s, violence broke out against oppressive landlords in a nondescript Bengal village called Naxalbari and swiftly spread all over the state and beyond. The armed uprising found unlikely supporters among young, educated urban Bengalis who joined the movement against feudal oppression.

It was one of the most violent chapters in the history of the state. Hundreds of young men were killed in police encounters, many more went missing. This tragedy was poignantly captured by Mahasweta Devi in her novel Hajar Churashir Maa (No. 1084’s Mother). From resisting colonial power to fighting feudal oppression, violence as the means to a justified end had earned legitimacy among a section of the Bengali population. The enduring appeal of violence remained relevant even in the political life of the state.

Rivalry between the Congress and the communists often turned into ugly street fights. The ruling Congress ruthlessly unleashed the state machinery and party mercenaries on its political adversaries. Political violence became part of everyday life of Bengalis. In the 1970s, the Left Front, an alliance of mostly leftist parties, finally unseated the Congress, after fighting a long and bloody battle against state repression. Ideologically, the communists were not averse to violence, notwithstanding their foray into democratic politics. Many of the early communist leaders were associated with Anushilan Samiti and other revolutionary groups. Thus, violence, ideologically and practically, did not lose its charm, glory and political utility.

After coming to power, the Left Front government quickly built a strong support-base with initiatives like land reform and land redistribution. Introduction of panchayati system further expanded and consolidated that base. Panchayats, with their significant political power and economic resources, at one hand, empowered the rural Bengali populace at the grass-root level; on the other hand, it brought ‘politics’ to the everyday life of ordinary Bengali households. Politicisation of the quotidian can have a transformative impact when the existing power structure is questioned. However, in Bengal, its impact remained confined to the rise and indispensability of party-based politics.

The ruling party – particularly the Communist Party of India (Marxist) of the Left Front government – emerged as a powerful force by exploiting its deep organizational presence and firm control over panchayats. The party became so powerful that it infiltrated and influenced every aspect of Bengali life. The party became a class in itself and left an enduring impression on overall Bengali society. Firstly, social identity of ordinary Bengalis, to a considerable degree, began to be shaped by their allegiance to political parties.

All other identities – caste, religion, gender – were held subservient to it. The apparent absence of casteism and communalism in Bengal politics can also be explained by the pervasive presence of party. Secondly, the communist rule of more than three decades blurred the distinction between party and the government. Sometimes, the government was subordinated to the party. As a result, the relation between the state and its citizens underwent a transformation. The state-citizen relationship was gradually substituted by the party-clientele relationship. Thirdly, as the party-clientele relationship was driven by a fierce sense of political territoriality, the compulsion to protect the political turf would become so overpowering that political rivalry often turned into personal enmity. Literally, the personal became political in Bengal, though not in a very desirable way. What is intriguing about violent political life of Bengal is that, unlike other parts of the country, it never witnessed outright criminalization.

Bahubali culture is not that pervasive; what dominate are party-centric conflicts. At the micro level, party, being the sole purveyor of resources and services, and at times, even undue advantages; exercised disproportionate degree of control over people’s lives, especially in rural areas. Therefore, participants of these political conflicts were mainly those who had been dependent on the party for their survival and influence. During elections these supporters of the party took the mantle of violent foot soldiers. For the party, victory in elections meant unrestrained access to administrative power and absolute control over state resources. It also determined the party’s ability to dole out favours among followers and stoke fear in opponents.

As the stakes were much higher than they appeared, outcome became more important than the procedure. Successive electoral victories of the Left Front government over more than three decades not only sanctified the violent method, but also institutionalized and to some extent normalized it. Political violence, at the macro level, has been a tool of disciplining in the face of political defiance or disobedience. Things did not change much with the departure of the communists. The ruling Trinamool Congress which came to power with the slogan of bodla noi, badol chai (seek change, not revenge), failed to free the state of the vicious cycle of violence. The violent legacy that Trinamool battled against and inherited from its predecessor got far more deeply entrenched. Use of violence or threat of violence for political purpose earned the ruling party’s sanction and government’s protection at the same time.

Moreover, the seamless mingling of political power and unscrupulous economic opportunities served as further motivation to resort to violence in the zero-sum game of Bengal’s politics. To survive and thrive, both politically and economically, one needs to zealously defend the fief in every democratic contest. Thus, winning elections and staying in power becomes a mortal compulsion for which violence is the most convenient tool. To avoid violent succession battles of the monarchical system, electoral democracy was conceived as a method of peaceful transference of political power. Political parties of Bengal, however, do not seem to believe in it. Therefore, despite their apparent incompatibility, violence and elections have become inseparable companions in every festival of democracy in Bengal.

(The writer is Assistant Professor, Department of Social Work, Bankura University, West Bengal. He can be reached at hazra.nirupam @gmail.com)