It is not being shouted from the rooftops in Beijing but for those listening carefully the whispers are audible ~ China seems to be on its way to building a global alliance system of its own after 70 years of a policy of pragmatism premised on a desire to avoid entanglements that alliances generate.

The USA has had in place a network of alliances that have been the central pillar of its foreign policy for decades. The assumption made by many commentators is that China, which aspires to equal and eventually surpass America, is following suit after years of claiming it had a view of international relations distinct from that of the US-led West.

Beijing has, in recent years, upgraded its strategic partnerships and expanded military exchanges and joint exercises with countries including Russia, Pakistan, and Iran. But, as Patricia M. Kim writing recently in Foreign Affairs points out, these partnerships are still a far cry from US alliances which involve mutual defence clauses, extensive troop-basing agreements, and joint military capabilities.

An underreported fact is that China has only one formal ally ~ North Korea, with which it shares a mutual defence treaty ~ though it has multiple ‘official partnerships’ including the one with Pakistan. On the next rung of ties are South-east Asian nations including Myanmar, Cambodia, Vietnam, Thailand, and Laos as well as states further afield such as Egypt, Brazil, and New Zealand.

Kim iterates that Beijing has also invested great energy into building Chineseled multilateral mechanisms such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the Forum on ChinaAfrica Cooperation, and the China-Arab  States Cooperation Forum.

Conventional thinking is that China has avoided building a traditional network of allies thus far for reasons ranging from long-standing ideological inclinations to hard-headed strategic calculations as it has, since the inception of the Communist state, sought to portray itself as a leader of the developing world and a proponent of the principles of non-interference and anti-imperialism. But that’s only half the story. For, despite China’s strenuous efforts to convince the world that it favours ‘win-win cooperation’ over traditional power politics to assuage fears about the country’s rise, it is dealing with a trust deficit with even friendly countries.

The reasons are not far to seek. Sans client-states North Korea and Pakistan, nearly all countries, except Russia with strategic interests in play, which have deepened ties with China have done so primarily for economic reasons. The essentially expansionist worldview of the Chinese establishment including its territorial claims has left neighbours wary and other countries across the globe unimpressed by what is often perceived as Chinese domination.

Till China reforms its founding ideological principles ~ for which the Communist Party of China will have to transform to a social democratic party which accepts multi-party elections based on universal adult franchise ~ Beijing’s plans to play the alliance game are likely to come a cropper.