Recently Chinese President Xi Jinping highlighted the fact that in the Korean War (1950-53) China defeated US imperialism, the only occasion when they went to war. In fact, during the Cold War, the Korean War was a defining moment in the conflict between the US and the erstwhile Soviet Union though the manpower and the strategy were overwhelmingly Chinese.

The background to the conflict was provided by the fact that the World War II alliance between the Allied powers and the erstwhile Soviet Union was a marriage of convenience when both realised that without a common front, they might lose the battle against the Axis powers. The Allied victory was certain even before the War ended but mutual suspicion between the two surfaced. The post War phase deepened the suspicion and distrust, especially after Churchill coined the phrase ‘Iron Curtain’.

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The period of the Cold War had begun. There were distinct phases in this War that continued till the collapse of communism and the eventual breakup of the former Soviet Union in 1989-91. With a general understanding that direct nuclear attacks were inconceivable, there were other areas of confrontation both in the context of limited wars, non-cooperation, intense ideological rivalry and formation of alliances.

Korea was under Japanese occupation since 1910 and when Japan was defeated in August 1945, there was an agreement between the USA and the former USSR to divide it into two separate zones along the 38th parallel with USSR controlling the North which has a border with it and the South to be within the protective umbrella of USA. It was supposed to be a short, temporary measure with an election to settle the issue under UN auspices. But with the intensification of the Cold War, no election was held, and the division continued.

However, in the South, a UN supervised election was held and Syngman Rhee was elected President in August 1948. In the following month, the Soviets formed their own area of control in North Korea and a communist government under Kim II Jung was installed. In 1949, both American and Russian troops withdrew without settling the issue much to the discomfort of an overwhelming number of Koreans who opposed the artificial division, imposed by two outside powers.

What brought the issue to a head was when both governments wanted to reunify and rule the entire country and when without any prior warning North Korea invaded the South on 25 June 1950. There were three probable reasons: (1) Kim II Jung took the plunge as then American Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, excluded Korea from a list of countries in the Pacific that the US would defend; (2) North Korea was encouraged by the Communist takeover of China, with which it shares the longest border, and (3) Russian instigation to avenge Stalin’s humiliation at the West Berlin blockade which he was compelled to withdraw. However, the Communists argued that the South Koreans had started the War when its troops crossed the 38th parallel.

The US administration was sanguine that Stalin spearheaded it to spread communism in Asia after the Chinese success. As a part of containment of communism exhibited earlier in Europe in Greece and Turkey, the Truman administration ordered intervention even before a UN direction which was obtained subsequently as the former USSR was boycotting the UN for its refusal to admit Communist China. In the absence of the Soviet veto, it became easy for the USA to have a force of 15 countries to aid the South Korean regime. But the fact remains that the bulk of the supply of materials and personnel were American.

The arrival was crucial as by September 1950 North Korea had captured most Korean territory including the South’s capital Seoul. The consequence of the US-led intervention was spectacular as by the end of September 1950, UN troops entered Seoul and cleared the entire South Korea of North Korean invaders. With this achievement the UN objective was met. However, Truman ordered invasion of the North ignoring Zhou Enlai’s warning that if the invasion continued, China might intervene. By the end of October 1950, UN troops captured the capital Pyongyang, two thirds of North Korea and most significantly reached the Yalu river that divides North Korea and China.

With an American fleet protecting Taiwan, China feared an invasion of the UN troops in Manchuria bordering North Korea. This fear led to a counter offensive of 300,000 troops, described as volunteers by mid-January 1951 and UN troops were driven out of North Korea and crossed the 38th parallel and captured Seoul again. The Supreme Commander Douglas MacArthur at this unexpected turn of events and splendid quick success of the Chinese pleaded to enter Manchuria to defeat communism even if nuclear weapons were to be used. But analysing the various issues, Truman relieved MacArthur from command, as a large-scale war was unthinkable. By June 1951, UN troops recaptured the entire area of South Korea and fortified the border with North Korea. There were protracted peace talks lasting two years and in July 1953, an agreement on a division was agreed along the 38th parallel which continues.

The consequences of the first major military conflict after World War II were many. A small country ~ Korea ~ lost about four million soldiers and civilians. Five million people became homeless. Even the fall of communism and reunification of Germany could not reunite the two Koreas. Suspicion between the two persists with continuous ceasefire violations and it continues to be one of the most fortified borders in the world. The brutal dynasty of North Korea continues with possession of a nuclear arsenal.

With the backing of the USA, the UN could resist the aggression and return to the pre-war situation. But it could not do anything when Truman instead of calling for a ceasefire invaded North Korea. The communist nations denounced the UN as being a tool of the capitalist countries. After the Korean War the containment theory became the cornerstone of US foreign policy, though there were many right-wing critics who thought that a golden opportunity to destroy communism in China had been missed.

The suspicion of communists led to the rise of McCarthyism within the USA and execution of the Rosenbergs for leaking nuclear secrets to the former Soviet Union which still remains controversial, and many are of the opinion that they should not have been convicted at all. The most spectacular consequence was the rise of China as a world power as it demonstrated it was capable of stalling the reunification of Korea under US tutelage. The continued denial of its UN membership looked increasingly unreasonable and was restored only in 1973 with the Nixon-Kissinger initiative. China supported the Vietcong communists and ultimately Vietnam was united under communist rule. China extended its influence in postcolonial countries.

The US continued to encircle China with several defensive agreements, first in 1951 with Australia, New Zealand and in 1954 came SEATO, with further expansion incorporating Pakistan, Thailand and Philippines. But it was only a partial success as many countries led by India remained non-aligned. For democracies, it demonstrated the inherent limitation of collective decision making and policy making process in a period of acute crisis like the decision to drop the atom bombs on Japan, and the Korean War.

In both cases, the decision was taken by a handful of people without Congressional approval. Johnson followed the same arbitrariness concerning Vietnam. This doctrine of imperial presidency and a national emergency continued till 1978. It led to the vindication of Snyder’s decision-making theory which argued with significant justification that “the acts of nation states result from more or less deliberate and conscious choice by someone at some time”. Judith N Shklar criticised it as it does not cover the routine conditions of foreign policy. But what she failed to see is that these momentous and highly exceptional situations become the turning points of history. The routine returned but only after making the necessary adjustments after the upheaval.

The post-1949 history of China is divisible into two parts. 1949 to the early 70s which reflected the break with the Soviet Union, the bloody border clashes and the destabilizing effects of cultural revolution. The US followed fiercely the containment policy and even toyed with the idea of regime change, maintaining the fictional Kuomintang as the real government of China. China was denied seats in the UN and other international organisations including the permanent membership of the security council.

By the late 1960s and early 70s, the US realized the impracticability of this policy which was exhibited by Kissinger’s and later Nixon’s visit to China in February 1972 and an article published in Foreign Affairs by Nixon. The first phase of the Chinese evolution demonstrated Chinese resilience hardened by long years of civil war and fight against Japanese aggression which was reaffirmed by halting the forces of the west in the Korean War. Drastic changes took place some of them were disastrous but some helpful in the nation building process like reaffirmation of a Confucian strong state and important advancements in human development indices.

The post Mao developments in China, the second phase that began in 1978, a new export-oriented economic model, abandoned the isolationist policy that China borrowed from the Soviet Union. The aim of the regime was transformed with an understanding that for progress and improvement in the standard of living, international trade is a prime necessity. China had the advantage of a skilled labour force and low wages but lacked capital which could only be availed by allowing foreign investment. Deng clearly understood two things: the comparative advantage of China because of the above factors and second, capital would automatically flow as China provided an assured route for higher profit. This opportunity was also seen by Nixon-Kissinger and others followed.

The February 1972 visit of Nixon to China was a turning point in contemporary history and the defining moment of his Presidency. It was the catalyst of the subsequent collapse of Soviet Communism but also the spectacular rise of China becoming a potential rival to the USA.

(The writer is a retired Professor of Political Science, University of Delhi)