Prime Minister Modi signalled India’s willingness to engage with China when during an interview with Newsweek in April this year he mentioned that ‘stable and peaceful relations between India and China are important for not just our two countries but the entire region and world.’ This was responded to by China. Soon after he assumed charge as PM in June, there were a series of meetings.

External Affairs Minister Dr S Jaishankar met his Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi, once each in July and August. In September, India’s NSA, Ajit Doval, met Wang Yi in St Petersburg, Russia, on the sidelines of the BRICS+ National Security Advisers meeting. The MEA statement mentioned after this interaction, “Both sides agreed to work with urgency and redouble their efforts to realize complete disengagement in the remaining areas.” Simultaneously, there were two back-to-back WMCC (Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs) meetings.

These had never happened so frequently ever since the standoff began. The last Corps Commander level meeting was held on 19 February this year. The 31st WMCC meeting held on 29 August had for the first time said in their joint statement that the two sides would, “narrow down the differences and find early resolution of the outstanding issues. For this, they further agreed for intensified contact through diplomatic and military channels.” It gave an impression that a resolution could be on the cards prior to the BRICS+ summit scheduled in Kazan, Russia from 22 to 24 October. The belief within the Indian security establishment was that even commencement of serious discussions on resolution of one of the two remaining standoffs could result in a ModiXi summit in Kazan.

But some believe that if China resolves the standoffs, how would it justify its operations, loss of lives and expenditure. However, the euphoria ended there. No Corps Commander level meetings were proposed nor conducted. No ground solution can be resolved without military-level talks. The army chief, General Upendra Dwivedi, mentioned in a recent interaction, “The situation on the ground today is stable but it is not normal and it is sensitive,” adding, “in the entire gamut we see that trust has been the biggest casualty.” Both sides continue to maintain high force levels, doubting the intentions of the other. This will be the fifth winter with heightened deployment.

However, with existing mechanisms in place, stability continues. India desires restoration of status quo of April 2020, removal of buffer zones and recommencement to patrolling claim lines. China, on its part, has been hinting that the current deployment be considered the status quo. Lack of trust has resulted in India changing its primary threat perception from the west to the north. A number of formations responsible for operations on the western border had their roles sidestepped to the north. This has added to Chinese concerns. India began investing in developing military capabilities as also enhancing infrastructure development along the LAC.

Delhi increased its interactions with the QUAD and moved closer to the US. India also began focusing on AI (Artificial Intelligence), space, defence technologies and other emerging sectors. Today, India stands tall in preventing China from attempting any new misadventures. The Chinese attempted a similar grab at Yangtze in December 2022 resulting in a loss of face to the PLA. India has projected that any further attempt would be met by a quid pro quo, which could embarrass the Chinese. Delhi is willing to risk expansion of the conflict, knowing that PLA troops are no match for the hardened Indian soldiers. Failure on the LAC could severely dent the Chinese image.

China, which never built infrastructure for housing troops in Tibet for seventy years, is now doing so at a feverish pace. While many believe that the intent is to maintain an enlarged troop presence as a threat to India, the other view is that it fears India adopting a similar salami slicing strategy in case it gets embroiled in a conflict in the South China Sea. The Indo-China rivalry has also impacted US-China tensions. India is firmly in the US camp, which would remain a threat for China. India would also ensure that no multilateral institution, where India and China share a common platform, can turn against the US or the West.

India was the first country to oppose any attempt to bypass the US dollar in favour of the Yuan at either the SCO or the BRICS. Partnership with India also benefits other China adversaries including Japan and the Philippines. China too cannot risk enmity with India in case it seeks to regain Taiwan by force. Troops needed for both sides cannot be met with current deployment in existing theatres. Additional forces will have to be moved from one to the other. Beijing is concerned that in case it is stalled in Taiwan, India could exploit the situation. It would definitely need to normalize ties with India prior to operations elsewhere. For India, the red line is to restore the status quo of April 2020. While Russia would seek to push its anti-US agenda in conjunction with China at the forthcoming BRICS+ summit, it will be India which will tone it down.

A lot could have changed had India-China ties been on a positive trajectory. Amongst the subjects likely to be taken up in the forthcoming BRICS+ summit include ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and West Asia. Both Russia and China are pro-Palestine, while India stands neutral. Other major subjects of interest would be an alternate system of payments to the US dollar, building an institution to challenge the IMF, and also inducting more members. In every case, India’s views may not be in tune with China and it cannot be bypassed. BRICS+ may be an institution in global demand but ongoing rivalry between India and China will have an impact.

If BRICS has to grow, there has to be symmetry between the two largest economies in the group, India and China. As was visible in the recently concluded SCO, India was the only opponent to China’s BRI (Belt Road Initiative). In case Indo-China disagreements continue, the impact would also be felt in the BRICS. Thus far, neither side has proposed a bilateral indicating that the status quo in ties would remain.

(The writer is a retired Major-General of the Indian Army.)