The overriding principles in the Camp David document were to secure “a free and open Indo-Pacific based on a respect for international law, shared norms, and common values”. It also opposed “any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion”. It was a veiled jab at China. In the great power competition, as Sino-US ties have plummeted to a new low, both Japan and South Korea as allies of the US were caught in the cross-fire and had to make critical choices. Both these countries had to strike a balance with China as China is a key trade partner while at the same time working out an understanding with their mutual ally Washington.

Japan has disputes with China over the Senkaku Islands and is also concerned over Beijing’s aggressive postures on many issues in the region. Japan’s discomfort is understandable. Japan was therefore compelled to take a more aggressive stance and endorsed the US initiatives to impose controls on the export of critical semiconductors to China as part of a bid to curb Beijing’s access to advanced technology which it could use for military purposes.

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This has not stopped Japan from looking for other ways to stabilise ties with China as further deterioration would be against Japan’s interests. Like Japan, South Korea has its own vulnerabilities. Being aware that South Korea is the world’s No.2 producer of chips and one of China’s biggest partners in the industry, it has strategically avoided joining the US export controls to avoid antagonising Beijing. Yet, it has issued its own first Indo-Pacific Strategy, which aligns with the US vision of maintaining the rules-based international order. When Yoon remarked about opposing China’s threat of using force to change the status quo in Taiwan, this sparked an angry reaction in Beijing. Thus, Yoon is navigating through troubled waters.

Notwithstanding their own vulnerabilities in dealing with China, and despite some misgivings about explicitly naming China, both Japan and South Korea were not shy of crafting a clear subtle message together with the US that they will not sit idly by should Beijing actively increase its economic and maritime aggressions. Biden did mention that the summit was not about China but Beijing understandably was unconvinced. Beijing continues to view the summit as another move led by the US with the support of its allies to contain, encircle and suppress China. Beijing has accused the US of hosting the Camp David summit in an attempt to create a mini-Nato in Asia, which the three countries deny. Though this trilateral cooperation is far from a formal alliance, it opens the door for the three to get as close to that as would be palatable.

The agreement to establish a hotline is for sharing information and coordination of responses to challenges, provocations and threats affecting their collective interest and security. However uncertainties remain for the future. Yoon has three more years in office. Kishida’s successor could have a different world view. Biden’s re-election is uncertain. What would be the future of the Camp David outcome if an ultra-leftist succeeds Yoon in South Korea and an ultra-rightwing politician succeeds Kishida or if someone like the mercurial Donald Trump returns to office in the US, is a scenario that is difficult to predict. Even in the present situation if a crisis erupts, the responses of both Japan and South Korea are not likely to be the same.

For example, if there is an attack from China on Japan, South Korea’s response might not be aligned with that of the US. Japan might view things similarly if South Korea comes under attack from North Korea. In any such operational situation in the future and if such a situation unfolds, the frailties of US diplomacy would have been exposed. Does such a scenario expose the vulnerability and hollowness of US diplomacy?

Critics say that the American attempts of military encirclement run the risk of further destabilising the region. Writing in the South China Morning Post, Alex Lo is not so kind on the way Biden is conducting his diplomacy in Asia. While he notes that the rapprochement reached between the two Asian allies may be a big score for Washington, he also notes that there is a steady denouement of Yoon’s popularity at home where critics say he conceded too much by compromising on the issue of Japan’s wartime crimes and got too little in return.

Lo doubts if the current euphoria would last long. While the US has formal military treaty obligations to defend its allies ~ Japan and South Korea ~ if either comes under attack by any external power, it remains unclear if similar thinking would be in place if Taiwan comes under Chinese attack. This strategic ambiguity would expose the vulnerabilities of both Japan and South Korea if a conflict breaks out in the Taiwan Strait.

The Camp David summit did not address this issue but made only vague commitments. If one looks at a big military picture in the Pacific, one cannot miss that the US has roughly 750 military bases and facilities in at least 80 countries as of 2021. These exclude black sites, and hidden or non-permanent operational bases. Of these, 120 US bases and other facilities are in Japan, followed by Germany with 119 and South Korea with 73.

The US also maintains bases and facilities in other areas of the Indo-Pacific region such as in the Philippines, Australia, Palau in Micronesia and Papua New Guinea. With such extensive military presence in Asia and beyond, the US is already a formidable power in the Indo-Pacific. Does it mean that the talk of a China threat is an over-hyped topic?

This is certainly not so. What has come under the scanner is the manner of operation of China’s diplomacy and blatant disrespect for global law. To be accepted in the global community, it is desirable that China revisits its manners of conducting diplomacy and shuns its aggressive stances on a host of bilateral, regional and global issues so that it could be seen as a benign and not a threatening power. Therein lies hope for peace in the world.

(The writer is former Senior Fellow at MP-IDSA and PMML, both at New Delh)