The Bhopal gas tragedy is no doubt the biggest industrial catastrophe of the 20th century. It happened due to the highest level of callousness and irresponsibility shown by a multinational, Union Carbide Corporation (UCC). Tales of this tragic incident which happened around midnight on 2 December 1984 and its after effects are not unknown to us.

Thanks to the media’s regular reporting on the misery of victims, denial of justice to them, long lasting effects of the poisonous methyl iso-cyanate (MIC) gas, mishandling of the case by both the Central and State governments and controversial verdicts by the judiciary, besides seminal research works on the issue, we are aware of the intricacy and complicity of the disaster.

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But then, why have we selected this topic now? The answer is simple. It is the outcry of thousands of Bhopal people for justice; it is the picture of those crippled, deformed and ailing children who have come to this world without any fault of theirs. It is the motivation one spontaneously gets from the pale faces and helpless looks of the kids born as the next generation of the Bhopal victims.

It is our conscience that makes us rise against the wrongs committed by others. In this article, we will not repeat what had happened in the past, but focus on some hard facts that may have been forgotten by people with the passage of time. The objective is to help readers recapture how the world’s worst industrial disaster was dealt with by our elected representatives. Until 1979, Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL), used to import MIC from the USA. In 1979, the federal government of the USA banned production of MIC in the country. What then could have been the alternatives for UCC?

Either to produce Carbaryl based pesticides (sold under the brand name ‘SEVIN’) by using MIC as an intermediate or through MIC-free routes as was being done by Bayer. Cost of manufacture is much less in the MIC route compared to the MICfree route. UCC chose to start producing MIC in UCIL’s factory in Bhopal. UCC took a cue from the co – mment once made for developing co – untries by Lawrence Summer, ex chief economist of World Bank ‘Let them eat pollution’. UCC knew how to make Indians eat MIC.

But then, how could they make it happen? The tragic incidents would not have occurred had UCIL followed several warnings given in advance by its employees, engineers and technicians that MICrelated accidents might occur in the factory any time for violating the norms of process parameters. In fact, due to declining demand of carbaryl-based pesticides the world over, the turnover of UCIL started declining, resulting in a fall in profit margins.

UCIL started implementing various self-devised ‘cost cutting measures’, namely, downsizing supervisory staff and skilled workers, reducing cost on regular repairs and maintenance, diluting quality control measures and loosening safety measures. The result was deviation from proper safety regulations, deterioration in the quality of valves and pipe lines, malfunctioning of safety systems, corrosion in the non-stainless steel pipelines and above all, loss of morale of employees. Despite lack in demand, the management continued with the production of MIC causing a piling up of stock.

UCIL stored the large volume of MIC in the existing storage tanks diluting safety norms of storing MIC. Normally, MIC should be stored in small steel drums. UCIL stored MIC in a large tank whose alarm system was not being checked daily. UCIL kept one manual backup system instead of the four-stage system which was essential; the flare tower and the vent gas scrubber installed for tracing escaping gas was out of service for more than four months; the refrigeration system designed to inhibit volatilization of MIC was kept idle. Besides, MIC was stored at room temperature instead of 4.50C as prescribed in the manual. These technical flaws were encouraged by the management of UCIL compromising safety measures and introducing un – proven and unsafe processes.

These flaws were management made because the management of UCIL did not give any weightage to many prior accidents which signaled the approaching fatal disaster. A few of them are: In 1976, the two trade unions protested about the increasing level of pollution within the plant; in 1981, a worker was splashed with phosgene gas causing his death 72 hours later; in January 1982, there was a phosgene leak, which affected 24 workers who were admitted to hospital; wearing protective masks was not made compulsory; in February 1982, an MIC leak affected 18 workers; in August 1982, a chemical engineer came in contact with liquid MIC resulting in burns over 30 per cent of his body; in September 1982, Raj kumar Keswani, a Bhopal journalist wrote prophetic warnings of a disaster in the local weekly ‘Rajpat’ but he was not paid any heed; in October 1982, there was a leak of MIC, methyl carbaryl chloride, chloroform and hydrochloric acid.

In an attempt to stop the leakage, a MIC supervisor suffered intensive chemical burns and two other workers were severely exposed to the gases; during 1983 and 1984 there was regular leakage of MIC, chlorine, monomethylamine, phosgene and carbon tetrachloride. Reports issued a few months before the incident by scientists within UCIL warned of the possibility of a serious accident but it was ignored. American experts who visited the plant during 1981 warned UCC of the possibility of a “runaway reaction”; local Indian authorities warned the company of problems from 1979 onwards but UCC did not care. UCC admitted in their own investigation report that most of the safety systems were not functioning at the time the accident occurred in the midnight of 2 December 1984.

The king cannot do any wrong. So, how could UCC do any wrong!! Did our Central and M.P. state government play their due role? Did they discharge their responsibilities as expected of elected governments? Did they handle such a grave situation with a human face or did they perform their duties in a perfunctory manner? To get the proper answer, one needs to revisit key landmark events before and after that fateful night of 2 December.

(The writer is Director & CEO, Sayantan Consultants Private Limited)