There is a proven dodginess when it comes to security matters with Pakistan. Be it the underlying intent, policies, misuse of weaponry, or even matters pertaining to the infamous nuclear proliferation saga ~ Islamabad has routinely covered itself with ignominy. But Pakistan was able to continue with its duplicitous machinations because it invariably served the ‘larger interests’ of the topical global powers that be. These included traditional ally the United States of America (which conveniently looked the other way during the genocide of 1971 or during the dark 1980s with the ‘Charlie Wilson’ affairs in Afghanistan); affluent Arab countries (under the garb of being ‘brother Muslim countries’); China (which invested in its patent ‘military-industrial complexes’ with its CPEC imperatives), and even roguish nations like North Korea and Libya (with the shady Dr AK Khan nuclear side deals etc.).

It took an unrestrained Donald Trump to call out the bluff of Pakistani ways when he slammed the broken promises and misuse of ‘aid’ by tweeting, “The United States has foolishly given Pakistan more than 33 billion dollars in aid over the last 15 years, and they have given us nothing but lies & deceit, thinking of our leaders as fools”. While there was an uproar in Pakistan over the embarrassing fact, the United States soon continued its own equation with Pakistan (despite temporary hiccups), as it needed Pakistani support in Afghanistan, amongst other geopolitical considerations. However, post the pull-out from Afghanistan the strategic stakes that allowed Pakistanis to have a ‘blank cheque’ or remain ‘unanswerable’ for their misconduct, have diminished considerably. For once, the Pakistanis need the United States more desperately than the other way round given the dire economic mess they are in.

The United States is now in a position to extract some semblance of accountability, commitments, and corrections from Pakistan. Today, serendipitously, the interests of the United States, China, Arab countries and international multilateral agencies (and even India) converge, in hoping that Pakistan is able to renege from its duplicitous past dalliances with religious extremism and terror with its latest commitment i.e. Operation Azm-i-Istehkam. It is not a new militaristic operation given the multitude that Pakistan has already undertaken (without substantial success), as it has always played a double game with terror. In the 1980s, during the Afghan mujahedin days, it diverted a lot of USSaudi ‘aid’ for non-Afghan purposes (including towards India).

In the 90s it harbored proxies in the Kashmir Valley e.g., the Hizbul Mujahideen faction, and in Afghan swathes, e.g. the warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and of course, the Taliban. In the subsequent US-led ‘War on Terror’, it patronized the Haqqani faction to the discomfiture of Washington. Misusing religion and patronising the terror industry has always been too tempting for Pakistan to resist, whatever be the publicly stated position. But perhaps for the first time, it has a real sense ~ and filled body-bags ~ to know for a fact that it has overplayed the religion card, and that terrorism and extremism are its natural by-products.

Islamabad can no longer laser-guide terror towards Afghanistan, India, or Iran. Extremism and terror eventually backfire, as playing out with the Pakistani military’s unprecedented number of fatalities. So, to that limited extent, perhaps the fight against terror by the Pakistani state was never so persuasively and startlingly poised. It could be the first time that it truly seeks international help to cleanse itself of religious extremism and terror, the murky past history notwithstanding. Traditionally, Pakistan had sourced advanced weaponry like the F-16 fighters from the United States, ostensibly towards fighting ‘terrorism’, even though it was the worst kept secret that it was for India-centric posturing (nuclear weapon carrier capability) and deployment.

Many of the armaments that were CIA secured towards fighting the Soviets/Russians in the 80s, found their way to the hands of terrorists in the Kashmir valley. Even as late as 2022, the Biden administration decided to upgrade the F-16 fleet with the implausible insistence of their exclusive use towards fighting along the Durand Line ~ unsurprisingly, this aircraft was used in the recent aerial skirmish with India, violating the terms of sale/refurbishment by the United States. However, the recent request for small arms by Pakistan has to be seen in the context of its historical and less-than-reliable commitment towards agreed usages and the fact that for once, the Pakistani military is truly under pressure to fight terrorism.

Islamabad cannot escape the fate of sniggers from Delhi that it is crying wolf yet again, as they have earned the notoriety of consistent misuse and undependability. However, what is sought this time towards Operation Azm-i-Istehkam is sophisticated small arms and communication equipment which can only be used for restrictive (anti-terror operations?) combat and does not threaten the Indo-Pak balance of power, dramatically. The plea to seek strategic ‘investment’ by the United States also has the additional element of potentially weaning Pakistan away from the exclusive clutches of the expansionist Chinese, which comes with its own pitfalls. The Americans could peg some conditions to the ‘aid’ wherein an element of pushback to the Chinese footprint is inherent.

If such a pegged deal does come about, not only does it tantamount to tackling religious extremism in favour of India, but if the same does entail lessened Chinese presence, that too would be welcomed by Delhi. The half-sincere past of the United States in the region notwithstanding, there is almost a consensus on tackling religious extremism (especially in the global terror nurseries within Pakistan) that binds Washington DC, Beijing, and Delhi.

Only from this circumstantial perspective and lay of the land, Delhi ought not to get overly worked up on the thaw and limited ‘aid’ (in terms of small arms et al) by the Americans. It is a calculated risk and consequential leap of faith that India must take in encouraging both Operation Azm-e-Istehkam, as also the return of the United States in the internal affairs of Pakistan. In any case, the future stakes and pivots that India affords the United States will remain unmatched (vis-à-vis Pakistan) and if peace and deradicalisation does return to Pakistan, India could only welcome the same.

(The writer is Lt Gen PVSM, AVSM (Retd), and former Lt Governor of Andaman & Nicobar Islands and Puducherry)