When US President Joe Biden hosts Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol at Camp David in a couple of days, mutual bliss points are likely to be achieved. At least on paper. After all, an internationalist American president, a South Korean leader with foreign policy ambitions beyond the Korean Peninsula, and a Japanese prime minister firm on doubling down on Tokyo’s proactive security policy present a unique opportunity for trilateral cooperation, write foreign policy scholars Andrew Yeo, Mireya Solís, and Hanna Foreman. The forthcoming summit comes at what has been described as a ‘now-or-never’ moment in relations among the three partners. It is also America’s window of opportunity in North/East Asia as the relentless rise of China threatens its interests and those of its closest allies in the region.

Missile grandstanding by North Korea and deep concerns about Chinese military capabilities and intentions have sparked renewed attempts in Washington to get Seoul and Tokyo on the same page as it would add even more heft to an undeniably weighty trilateral alliance. But the fly in the ointment is the historical baggage of Japan-South Korea relations, especially as domestic politics tend to thrive on it in both nations and often prevents the three countries from successfully coordinating their strategies. Mr Biden’s desire to advance the trilateral relationship reflects his broader approach to geostrategic competition: Building US power by strengthening institutions and alliances. The American-Japanese-South Korean relationship has muscle because it is built around two technologically advanced US partners that possess formidable defence capabilities and together host around 100 permanent US military bases and approximately 80,000 US troops. But lack of coordinated action in the face of an increasingly belligerent Beijing has meant that trilateral cooperation has been sub-optimal. Indeed, as the experts point out, it has moved in fits and starts over the last three decades, accelerating during heightened periods of North Korean threats and often stumbling whenever relations between South Korea and Japan started to deteriorate. In 2021, the resumption of Pyongyang’s provocations, including a long-range cruise missile test, galvanised the Biden Administration to push for more trilateral meetings; officials from the three countries met ten times in 2021. But tensions continued to linger between the two Asian allies of the USA. Today, though, regional and domestic level alignments have prompted the Biden Administration to attempt to solidify trilateral cooperation. The idea, it appears, is to build on the momentum generated by President Yoon’s decision to prioritise Japan-South Korea ties despite weak domestic support, and by Mr Kishida’s pragmatic approach to Korean affairs. Washington’s desire to beef up its Asian alliances is a positive development for the region and, if successful, would contribute to strategic stability. Of course, as the accompanying comment explains, it also risks further provocations from North Korea, acting for and on behalf of China, and for itself.