Countries across the globe have started recalibrating their foreign policy priorities ahead of a second Donald Trump administration in the US and the unpredictability that stems from his statements, many of which are controversial. This rebooting is manifested more in the Indo-Pacific region as there are many hotspots, necessitating the countries in the region to reposition their priorities. The region that is destined to hog the limelight is the South China Sea. This is seen as a major flashpoint as there are many Asian countries which have contesting claims to the areas that fall within their Exclusive Economic Zones.

In contrast, China claims its sovereignty almost in its entirety. There lies the danger as Beijing’s muscle-flexing threats and activities have unnerved the smaller Asian claimant nations. As an insurance to such possible escalation of tensions and potential conflict, Vietnamese Communist Party chief To Lam chief visited Malaysia in late November 2024 during which both sides pledged to deepen their cooperation on the South China Sea amid rising maritime tensions between Beijing and Manila. Both sides upgraded diplomatic ties and elevated bilateral ties to a comprehensive strategic partnership in a clear step towards easing tensions over the competing territorial claims in the waterway. The move also signals an accelerating realignment of power in South-east Asia.

This could lead to a more united front from claimant countries in the overarching maritime dispute with China. Analysts speculate that Trump’s return signals stormier waters for Beijing in the South China Sea. Beijing has alleged that the US-Philippine task force is fanning the flames in the South China Sea. As tensions continue to rise in the area, Beijing calls for friendly talks, which in effect means that others must accept its terms. China’s envoy has told the Association for South East Asian Nations that alliances with the US mar peace and stability. The agreement between Vietnam and Malaysia makes the latter the first Asean member state to become a top-tier diplomatic partner with Vietnam, a status it shares with China.

In the joint statement, both sides pledged to work together to “maintain peace, security, stability, safety, and freedom of navigation” in the South China Sea, as well as “peaceful resolution of disputes without resorting to threats of use of force”. They also “reaffirmed the importance for all parties concerned to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities and to refrain from undertaking activities that could escalate tension which in turn could affect peace and stability in the South China Sea”. At the joint press conference, Lam reiterated the call for restraint by “all relevant parties” and committed to the early adoption of a “substantive and effective” South China Sea Code of Conduct (COC). The code should be in line with international law, including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

The COC is an important document that should prescribe the parameters for all claimants to follow and which can eliminate the room for any conflict. Unfortunately, even though ne – gotiations for a COC started in the 1990s, it remains elusive. Despite Asean and China having agreed in 2023 to conclude talks by 2026, the members remain divided ~ including on whether it should be legally binding. What has led to the slow progress of the negotiations for a COC is that there are differences among the Asean member states and China. This lack of unity among the member states, including over competing claims with each other, and the role of China has contributed to the slow pace of progress. Interestingly, despite the diplomatic upgrde between Kuala Lumpur and Hanoi, there are reports that Malaysia lodged a rare protest over Vietnam’s alleged expansion of a South China Sea reef in the Spratly Islands that is claimed by both countries.

Interestingly, the claims by four members of the Asean bloc ~ Malaysia, Vietnam, the Philippines and Brunei ~ overlap with China’s expensive assertions of territorial rights over much of the waterways. There is another dimension behind the Malaysia-Vietnam upgrade. Vietnam may be backing Malaysia because Malaysia is going to assume the Asean chair in 2025, which Vietnam may be seeing as an opportunity to push the maritime issue in concluding the legally binding COC as soon as possible. The timing of the understanding between the two countries is equally important. There are concerns that when Trump returns to the White House in January 2025, he may not be willing to stand by the Asean members on the South China Sea issue and therefore there is an urgent realisation to secure a binding COC as the best option.

Be that as it may be, the Malaysia-Vietnam upgrade sends a strong signal of shared priorities as both sides recognise that a fragmented Asean only benefits those who wish to dominate the South China Sea. The move to lift Malaysia to the top tier of Vietnam’s partnerships ~ an eight-strong group that also includes the US, Russia, India, Japan and France ~ fits well into Hanoi’s broader diplomatic strategy. The Malaysia-Vietnam up – grade is likely to be trend-setter for other members of the Asean bloc to follow, to scale up their relationships. Having built a strong partnership with Malaysia, Hanoi is likely to forge stronger bonds with Indonesia, Singapore and the Philippines, thereby quietly weaving a network of partnerships that could help South-east Asian nations better coordinate their approach to maritime disputes.

Though no immediate impact on the South China Sea dynamics may be expected following the growing coordination between claimant states, the momentum for a more cohesive regional response could be a move in the right direction. Given the on-going fights between the Philippines with China over the South China Sea, the Philippines might feel encouraged to deepen its own partnership in light of Malaysia’s Asean chairmanship in 2025 and feel emboldened for a resolute response to deal with Beijing. Lam is more assertive on the South China Sea issue than his predecessor Nguyen Phu Trong, who died in July at the age of 80. Since he came to power in August 2024, Lam has tried to cultivate Vietnam for an understanding on maritime issues.

Lam visited Bach Long Vi Island in the Gulf of Tonkin in mid-November and stressed the island’s strategic importance to Vietnam’s national security and sovereignty. This was obviously aimed at Beijing. China is best advised to consider the sensitivities of the South-east Asian nations with interests in the South China Sea and craft its policies accordingly.

(The writer is former Senior Fellow at MP-IDSA and PMML, New Delhi. He is also a former ICCR Chair Professor at Reitaku University, Japan)