Germany’s fears are valid. An overwhelming, spiralling energy crisis, swirling into recession is envisaged. The idea of nuclearization in its own neighbourhood is present and its position as the most prolific economic state in the European Union is endangered.

All these are enough to heighten fears and insecurities. Russia will not win, and Ukraine cannot lose. Germany, caught in a crisis not of its own making, has to find a way to regain stability and order and of course economic growth

In fact, the Russian invasion has taken a turn to further aggression. The Russians are firing missiles at the Ukraine grids to deprive them of power. They have also shelled Kherson, targeting infrastructure. On the other side, the European Union to show solidarity with Ukraine, has provided 348 million in aid; and 2.5 billion to support the Ukraine armed forces.

The primary concern is that the Russian invasion of Ukraine has had a major disruptive effect on global markets leading to a sharp increase in world prices for key commodities, in particular fuel, which has led to a historically high price rise for energy and fertilisers in 2021.

The Russian invasion was unexpected. Launched in an absolutely cavalier manner, it took the global community by surprise. The motivation for President Vladimir Putin was to show his might and desire to be an emperor.

Earlier, it had happened with the annexation of Crimea. And then began the game in Ukraine, where Russia poses the greatest challenge to the European Union’s strategic and foreign policy agenda. Russia showing a determinedly aggressive front behooves the European Union to set up a framework of foreign and defence policy strategies and the vision of how to address relations with Russia.

Distrust came about in 1991 with the fall of the Soviet Union. Dominant narratives from Brussels and Moscow differed significantly of course. A compromise to the Russian invasion could have been negotiated earlier but now the time seems to have passed.

At least for the time being. The Mariupol bombing and the attack on Kyiv seem to have done that. Yet negotiation actually seems the only way out. The European Union has to take cognizance of the changing parameters especially of the military dimension of European Union-Russian relations.

Faults lie with the European Union too. Having seen the NATO propensity of inducting former satellite states of former Soviet Union, they have antagonised the Russians in two ways. Firstly, the situation regarding Russian invasion of Ukraine encouraged Sweden and Finland to sign the Accession Protocols process to join NATO.

Interesting that Sweden and Finland had not joined the military alliance even at the height of the Cold War. However, the attack on Ukraine jolted them into seeking NATO membership for their own security and national well-being.

Secondly, Ukraine itself wanted to hasten membership of both NATO (March 2014) and the European Union. This provoked an enraged Putin and Russia’s top leadership into launching further aggression against Ukraine.

Even earlier Putin had objected to what he called luring of states in the Russian sphere of influence towards the European Union for membership. It was a red rag to the bull. He took it as aggression, and an affront. To say the least, he used this as excuse for a full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Not to forget that earlier on 18 March 2014, he had taken over Crimea without too much of protest and declared it Russian territory. One has to understand that the European Union began more as an economic entity to reach rapid economic growth and politically became a link between the West i.e., United States and United Kingdom, and the East.

Russia, the conglomerate, thought it was more like the Europeans ethnically and though a Communist state with hard ideas and the diktat of the politburo, would still want to trade. Those who trade do not fight.

While the world knows this is untrue it became the source of dependency of Germany on Russia especially for gas, energy, and oil. Oil for pipes was the underwritten trade. Russians then did not have the technology to see it through.

The Germans did. Technology was given and paid for with oil supplied by Russia. So, in about 197, a deal was reached, despite ideological differences. It is not just Germany’s problems that are at stake in the contemporary changes in the world order, but the epiphenomenon that nations cannot go to war to change democratic structures and create a new world order. Germany’s fears are valid.

An overwhelming, spiraling energy crisis, swirling into recession is envisaged. The idea of nuclearization in its own neighbourhood is present and its position as the most prolific economic state in the European Union is endangered.

All these are enough to heighten fears and insecurities. Russia will not win and Ukraine cannot lose. Germany caught in a crisis not of its own making has to find a way to regain stability and order and of course economic growth.

Already Germany is pushing back with alternate energy sources to make itself self-sufficient. In conclusion, it should be considered as to what impact this situation will have on India and how India needs to work with Germany and the European Union to manage the fallout from our collective dependencies on a ‘rogue’ Russia.

India, having been a supporter of Russia, but a pacifist, is caught between a rock and a hard place, so to speak. India will have to walk the diplomatic tightrope to avoid ruining relations with its supporter, Russia.

Secondly, India as a nation will need to persuade Russia to dial back its nuclearization threats. Thirdly, India will need to manage the tumultuous change in the geo-political dynamics in international politics with regards to the global economy, unemployment, fear of recession, inflation, rising energy and food prices. India now more than before, needs to up its game in being more self-sufficient on the one hand, and exploring and strengthening alternative sources from the West to reduce its dependence on Russia.

For instance, while India is the world’s biggest importer of edible oils spending tens of billions of dollars a year on imports including from Ukraine and Russia, can it potentially cut out dependence on Russia and add to its import bills?

India’s desire to diversify its supply of weapons and develop its own defense industry has resulted in declining Russian arms deliveries to India in recent years. Also, considering Russia’s closer ties to China, India needs to strengthen its diplomatic relations with Germany and the European Union.

The world itself needs to change course. The pandemic, the invasion of Ukraine by Russia, the climate change phenomenon, and the threat of nuclearization along with other factors has changed the semantics of international politics.

Indian foreign policy needs to re-invent its goal posts.