While Muslims describe themselves as the followers of Prophet Muhammad, the holy Quran describes a Muslim as someone who submits themselves to the will of the one Lord who created the heavens and earth and is the master of the day of the judgement. The divisions and sub-divisions into various sects like Sunni (Deobandi, Barelvi, Hanafi etc.), Shia (Twelver, Zaidiyya, Alawite, Ismali etc.) or Sufi (Chisti, Naqsbandi, Mawlawi etc.) are also divisions that are borne to subsequent times, leaderships, underlying tribal affiliations, regions and circumstances that disunite the Ummah (Islamic world) from within.

These internal faultlines and fissures are so deep that the hatred within is often more bitter than with those who are outside the Ummah. The brutal persecution of Yazidis in Iraq, Ahmediyas in Pakistan, Hazaras in Afghanistan, or the Baharana Shias in Saudi Arabia, are some examples of the seemingly irreconcilable sentiments, within.

Advertisement

All these divides have led to internal intrigues and power struggles wherever there is majoritarianism ~ e.g., Saudi Arabia or Iran ~ or desperate hanging on to power by minority sects or tribes to the disillusionment of the larger majority denomination or tribe e.g., Bahrain. The picture gets further muddied when the already existing mess of sectarian divisions within the Ummah gets further fractured into realms of region, tribes, or familial-dynastic perpetuations. In an already bloodied and weaponised environment of constant unrest, it sets the scene for constant power struggles, violent purges and genocidal instincts.

Saddam Hussein had stuffed all his vantage posts with cosectarian Sunnis and also added an additional filter of regionalism to the admixture, by ensuring that all sensitive posts were given to Tikritis (Sunnis from the township of Tikrit) e.g., leadership roles in the Baath Party, government offices, Secret Police and the Army. This disproportionate leverage, flex and usurpation caused much envy, especially to the riv – al (and majority Shiite Iraqis) who took a particular interest in ‘dismantling’ the Tikrit cadre specifically. Post the fall of Saddam Hussein, the mayhem owing to revenge killings were laser-guided at the exact power structure that once composed Saddam’s administration. Sunnis from Tikrit had to pay a price. Similarly, yet another dictator, Libyan Muammar Gaddafi, was a master manipulator of inter-tribe equations.

From open coercion, matrimonial alliances, bestowing privileges and to even striking tactical deals, he commanded complete control over a disparate populace. His own tribe, Al-Gaddafi, was just one of the 20 odd tribes in the country, especially around the coastal city of Syrte, which was to be the metaphorical equivalent to Saddam’s ‘Tikrit’, as the power epicenter. He could buy loyalties or simply crush them, because he controlled the coffers ~ but when that revenue stream was calculatedly disrupted and denied, the rival tribes sensed an opportunity to get even, and ultimately Gaddafi was crushed by his own countrymen. The disproportionate patronage and bias to the detriment of ‘others’, was his undoing.

Now, as war-torn Syria reconciles to a future without the looming presence of the Assad family who ruled since 1971 (Hafiz Al-Assad became President in 1971, then succeeded by his son, Bashar Al-Assad in 2000, till they were ousted in 2024). A tense situation prevails as yet another situation of ‘undoing the past’ by the new ruling forces ensues. Like in the case of a clique or coterie in the form of co-tribes in Iraq or Libya, the ruling clique in Syria assumed an even more polarising dimension of sectarianism. Assads are minority Alawite Shias (comprising 12 per cent of Syria’s population, numbering betw – een 2-3 million). Statistically, any assertion by such a minority deno – m ination puts them in the cross – hairs of a predominantly larger Su nni populace (estimated at 80 per cent) ~ and that was amongst the principal causes of the larger Syrian civil war.

Such a sectarian landscape naturally led Assad to bank on co-sectarian Iran, and militias like Hezbollah, but also put him in the direct line of fire with Sunni supremacist groups like Al Qaida, ISIL, Al Nusra et al. Today, Syria has been run over by Ahmed Hussein alSharaa, also called Abu Mohammad al-Julani, a one-time Al Qaida operative whose group goes by the name Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham. Initially, on taking over, he did profess a refreshingly moderate view of himself and his cadres to mollify apprehensions of revenge killings and more bloodshed, as history was instructive, otherwise.

Many outsiders who were already tired of unending violence were taken in by Sharaa’s promises that obviously militated with his past when his group was infamous for having committed brutal atrocities against Syrian minorities like Druze, Alawites, Christians and Shias. An insight on Sharaa by yet another side of Abu Al-Bagdadi (leader of ISIL), “cunning person, two-faced, who glows when he hears his name mentioned on satellite channels”, was ignored. History seemingly repeats itself. Within months of his official takeover, promises on international channels notwithstanding, and insincere postures to the contrary, his group is in the news for attempting to “purify the country” i.e., indulge in bra – z en revenge killings (especially targeting Shia Alawites). Reports suggest deaths of thousands killed in “widespread field executions”.

Many are still somehow justifying the recent killings to the excesses committed in the times of Assad, as basically the circle of violence continues unabated. Sharaa has promised to act against those who perpetrated violence, but by now there are few takers for his commitment. It is a familiar turn of events in the killing fields of the Middle East where the ‘might is right’ formula rules. Unfortunately, as it is Shiite Alawites who are currently persecuted there wouldn’t be much pressure from the rich Arab (predominantly Sunni) countries, Israel (as it has its own beef with Iran), or even by the United States. If anything, rote lip service to address the situation by Sharaa will satisfy the public conscience of onlookers, even as the common Alawite who may or may not have supported the Assad family, will continue getting hounded and targeted. This is exactly what Shias did to minority Sunnis in Iraq (where Sunnis under Saddam Hussein ruled), and this is exactly what Sunnis are now doing to Alawite Shias in neighbouring Syria (where Alawite Shias under Assad ruled). Iraq, Libya and now Syria, all follow a pattern.

(The writer is Lt Gen PVSM, AVSM (Retd), and former Lt Governor of Andaman & Nicobar Islands and Puducherry)