There seems to be euphoria in diplomatic and media circles after the meetings of Prime Minister Narendra Modi with Xi Jinping, President of the People’s Republic of China, on the sidelines of 16th Brics Summit at Kazan on 23 October 2024. The agreement for complete disengagement and resolution of issues that arose in 2020 in the India-China border areas is being widely welcomed as India underscored the importance of properly handling differences and disputes, not allowing them to disturb peace and tranquility.

Reading between the lines of diplomatic statements emphasizing ‘the management of peace and tranquility in border areas and to explore a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable solution to the boundary question’, what has gone completely missing is Tibet. The focus now is on stability, rebuilding bilateral relations, and as the Indian Foreign Secretary briefed the media, “to boost communication and cooperation between their countries and resolve conflicts to help improve ties that were damaged by a deadly military clash in 2020.” At the United Nations, around the same time as the Brics Summit, on 22 October 2024, James Larsen, Australia’s Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the United Nations, delivered a joint statement on behalf of a coalition of 15 countries, expressing serious concern over grave human rights violations in East Turkistan and Tibet, and calling for urgent action from China. The statement was presented during the general discussion on human rights at the 79th session of the United Nations General Assembly’s Third Committee.

Representing Australia, alongside 14 other countries including Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Japan, Lithuania, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States, Ambassador Larsen highlighted grave concerns based on evidence gathered by the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and other UN bodies. The assessment, released two years ago, described these violations as potentially amounting to crimes against humanity. It is significant to note that India was not part of the 15-nation coalition stating its concerns over human rights abuses in Tibet. The Tibetan Government in Exile website has detailed the erosion of cultural, educational and religious rights and freedom in Tibet; arbitrary detentions for the peaceful expression of political views, restrictions on travel, forced labour, and the forced separation of children from families in boarding schools. Ambassador Larsen noted that despite repeated international calls for transparency, China has dismissed these concerns and labeled the OHCHR’s assessment as “illegal and void” during its Universal Periodic Review adoption in July 2024. China has yet to undertake a comprehensive human rights review of its policies in Xinjiang, with its problematic legal framework on national security and counterterrorism remaining unchanged, according to an OHCHR statement from August 2024. The 15 nations called on China to uphold its international human rights obligations and fully implement the recommendations from the OHCHR and other UN mechanisms.

The Tibetan Government in Exile, also referred to as the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA) has been proactively conducting its public diplomacy across the world. Sikyong Penpa Tsering, in a vision document of the CTA released on 10 April 2023, said, “Our work as representatives of the Tibetan people and in securing the future of Tibet is more timely and crucial than ever (before). The PRC (People’s Republic of China) has increased its efforts to destroy Tibetan culture and identity through the imposition of draconian measures. The PRC government has coerced our children into colonial boarding schools and imposed a ban on teaching all subjects in the Tibetan language. Our monasteries are increasingly controlled by Beijing, and even our tradition of reincarnation is politicised. In the name of maintaining national security and stability, with the existing control by the permanent work teams stationed down to the village level, Tibetans are subjected to intrusive state security through constant surveillance by the PRC using artificial intelligence and grid management system.”

Given the paradigm shift in geopolitics and the international system post-Covid, Ukraine crisis and particularly with the escalation of sporadic tension between different nations, Sikyong Penpa Tsering emphasized “Tibet’s strategic importance increasingly matters because of its geographical position and historical role as a buffer zone between China and India. Moreover, rivers originating from Tibet’s mountains feed the rivers of ten nations downstream that provide water to a population of about 2 billion people. Due to the number of glaciers and permafrost on the Tibetan plateau, Tibet is also called ‘Asia’s Water Tower’ and the ‘World’s Third Pole’.

Spiritually and culturally, the Tibetan people’s steadfast belief in the Buddhist principles of non-violence and compassion under the leadership of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, even in the face of brutal attacks serves as an inspiration for the violence-ridden world.” The vision document highlights the two fundamental missions of the CTA which are inextricably linked: “Mobilising Tibetans and our allies to reopen the Sino-Tibetan dialogue to seek genuine auto nomy for the Tibe tan people and to develop a sustainable Tibetan community in exile. Both missions en sure the survival of our identity and contribute to the furtherance of our cause.” While 2024 ma rks the 70th anniversary of the famous Panchsheel Agreement of 1954, it was in 2004 to commemorate its 50th golden anniversary that the Indian Ministry of External Affairs published a document simply titled ‘Panchsheel’.

It declared that Panchsheel, or the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, were first formally enunciated in the Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet region of China and India signed on 29 April 1954, which stated, in its preamble, that the two Governments “have resolved to enter into the present Agreement based on the following principles: Mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, Mutual non-aggression, Mutual non-interference, Equality and mutual benefit, and Peaceful co-existence.” Two months later, during the visit of Premier Zhou Enlai to India, he and Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru issued a joint statement on 28 June 1954 that elaborated their vision of Panch sheel as the framework not only for relations between the two countries but also for their relations with all other countries, so that a solid foundation could be laid for peace and security in the world.

Panch sheel, as envisioned by its creators, gave substance to the voice of newly established countries who were seeking the space to consolidate their hard-won independence, as it provided an alternative ideology dedicated to peace and development of all as the basis for international interaction, whether bilateral or multilateral. At that time, the two Prime Ministers also expressed the hope in the Joint Statement that the adoption of Panchsheel “will also help in creating an area of peace which as circumstances permit can be enlarged thus lessening the chances of war and strengthening the cause of peace all over the world.” The treaty of 1954 provided for withdrawal of all Indian influence from Tibet. Wrote S Gopal in Volume II of Pt Nehru’s biography: “Nehru had no regret about this, for it embarrassed him to lay claim to the succession of an imperial power which had pushed its way into Tibet.

Anxious to make the agreement purely non-political, the Chinese at first resisted mention of the Five Principles which they themselves had elaborated, but ultimately agreed to it as a concession. India was keen on the inclusion of these principles as explicit reference to mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, and mutual non-aggression suggested, at least by implication, that China had no frontier claims; but this was clutching at straws after the main opportunity had been deliberately discarded. The only real gain India could show was a listing of six border passes in the middle sector, thereby defining, even if indirectly, this stretch of the boundary.

On the other hand, the Chinese had secured all they wanted and given away little; and that they regarded even this sanction of some Indian trade agencies and markets in Tibet as an interim concession was made clear by their objection to automatic renewal of the treaty after its first term of eight years.” The historian in Gopal commented, “the chance of securing a clear and explicit recognition of India’s frontier at a time when India had something to offer in return had been lost. This was not because of Nehru’s unrealistic assessment of China’s intent and strength or of his failure to attach importance to this issue but because he allowed his own views, and those of his senior advisers, to be set aside…

The argument that the best defence of the frontier was a friendly neighbour was sound, provided the frontier was a settled one. This was India’s case: But that case could have been immeasurably strengthened by directly making it a part of the negotiations leading to the 1954 treaty.”

This diplomatic lapse, call it an omission, made India give priority to setting up borders and check posts strung out along its entire length, priority to building communications, strengthening the intelligence system. To Nehru’s biographer, “the impact of government would have to make up for remiss diplomacy.

(The writer is a researcher-author on history and heritage issues and a former deputy curator of Prachanmantri Sangrahalaya)