All eyes rest on the upcoming 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The CCP Politburo Central Committee meeting on August 30 affirmed the National Congress on October 16. Political pundits assert that the world should expect the coronation of party General Secretary Xi Jinping for a third five-year term. Apart from the nomination of the presidential candidate, the next thing to watch is the reshuffling of China’s Politburo Standing Committee (PSC).

With the assembly nearing, the challenge is whether or not China glues itself to the “seven up, eight down” rule to continue with the PSC membership. If it decides to follow this procedure, any PSC member 68 years old or above during the National Congress is entitled to retire, and any individual 67 years or younger is eligible for another term. Although this modus operandi can’t challenge the current leadership, it can shape the composition of the other members of the PSC. Of the seven PSC members, Li Zhanshu (72), Han Zheng (68) and Xi Jinping (69) have reached the age limit. At the same time, Li Keqiang (67), Wang Huning (67), Wang Yang (67) and Zhao Leji (65) are still eligible for membership. If the existing age provision isn’t modified, the PSC will have a new composition of political leadership. Ultimately, the question persists, who will be the passers-by and the settlers?

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Potentially, the new PSC will have space to accommodate two new members as replacements for Li Zhanshu and Han Zheng. However, there is a possibility of a third replacement. This analysis comes after Li Keqiang’s announcement to retire from the premiership at the closing session of China’s annual National People’s Congress in March. As premier, Li can serve only two terms. Although he is eligible to serve another term as a PSC member, it is implausible for him to continue membership with a demoted designation. Under current circumstances, his likelihood of occupying the top position is impossible. Observers also cite Li’s waning influence, an outcome of the shift from collective leadership to concentrated leadership, as the reason for stepping down from the PSC.

If Li quits the PSC, there is a high possibility of Hu Chunhua (59) filling this position not only as a PSC but also as the new premier of the CCP. Hu currently serves as one of the four vice-premiers of the CCP. He is also known for his association with Hu Jintao and is a member of the Communist Youth League, a faction overshadowed after the rise of Xi. Moreover, he has the authority to recommend the next premier to be appointed by the president. Therefore, it is thinkable that Premier Li could be making way for an official from the Communist Youth League to the PSC to counterbalance the Xi faction. Although China’s singly-party system doesn’t witness multiparty politics, factional politics is part of its history. In this regard, the next two anticipated faces could be supporters of Xi.

The remaining politburo members eligible for two terms are known to be confidants of Xi. However, Chen Min’er’s (62) profile positions him as the leading contender for a coveted seat on the PSC over Ding Xuexiang (59). Working with Xi in the Zhejiang provincial standing committee for five years, Chen’s political career advanced from becoming a deputy to party secretary of Guizhou in three years. This southwestern province, known as China’s big data valley, constitutes a modernday “Third Front” of techno-industrial projects significant to the national development strategy. Undoubtedly, Chen has contributed significantly to its facelift. Besides, Chen is also known for bridging the old and new cohorts of President Xi. Identified as one of the members of the Zhejiang army — officials who worked under Xi’s provincial leadership in 2007 — Chen has become the catalyst in mobilising the Guizhou connection.

Likewise, Chen’s ardent support for Xi’s Three Strict and Three Honest policy earned him the post of party secretary in Chongqing in 2017. Widely acclaimed for his work in Chongqing, his chances of being showered with noble responsibilities are higher. Among the other senior members of the politburo with a single term, the new PSC might attract Cai Qi. Working closely with Xi during his term as the party secretary of Zhejiang province and governor of Fujian, Cai has experienced extraordinary growth from being the deputy head of Xi’s National Security Council to the top municipal rank in Beijing.

Strikingly, in 2017, President Xi made an exception by appointing Cai as party secretary in Beijing, a position only allotted to a politburo member. Like Chen, Cai’s political progress can also be linked to the Zhejiang army that championed Xi and his policies. However, analysing Cai’s current position in Beijing, Xi might want to retain his closest aide. If that happens, it will open the gateway for Chen Quanguo, Huang Kunming, Li Hongzhong, Li Xi and Li Qiang—the remaining politburo members—with a single promotion. Among the bidders, prospects are high that Huang Kunming (65) might take the trophy home.

Currently serving as the head of the publicity department of the Central Committee of the CCP, Huang has worked closely with Xi in Fujian and Zhejiang. Under the patronage of President Xi, the CCP has witnessed the rise of a new power-seeking action. In 2017, the party voted to enshrine Xi Jinping’s thoughts in the constitution that elevated his status to that of the founding father of Communist China, Chairman Mao.

Thus, the new PSC will expect leaders that align with the current leadership. It is evident that during Xi’s administration, China encountered multiple challenges on its security front. Concurrently, this has positioned China’s need to secure its national interest, particularly in Hong Kong, Xinjiang, Taiwan, the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. Accordingly, the PSC could expect leaders who would contribute to strengthening China’s security apparatus.

Likewise, the ongoing trade war with the United States, the Ukraine crisis and the effects of Covid-19 have forced China to rethink its economic reform policies. Under such circumstances, Xi’s decision will also focus on sustaining China’s global position as the world’s second-largest economic power. Consequently, the new PSC might witness a more conventional composition of leadership driven by a nationalistic ideology, encompassing Xi’s reformatory policies to rejuvenate China