Our hostile neighbours, China and Pakistan, operate in tandem against our interests. The signing of the intelligence sharing agreement between the two countries encompassing exchange of intelligence officials could lead to indirect Chinese involvement in festering terrorism within the country. China provides Pakistan with 90 per cent of its weapons and equipment and is presently constructing four warships for them.

Since the strike at Balakote, Pakistan has been careful to keep levels of terrorism below the Indian threshold of tolerance. The pressure of the FATF has also imposed caution on Pakistan. The Pakistani army which controls the state is unwilling to consider a full-scale conflict but ensures that India faces internal dissension on religious grounds and terrorism in the valley. No talks would resolve relations, unless China gives the green signal to Pakistan, which is unlikely.

For China, India is more than just a competitor. It remains the only nation in Asia to challenge it in every sphere. Recent Chinese intrusions in Ladakh and build up along other portions of the LAC are indicative that the border will always be active. Land may not solely be the reason for Chinese actions; more likely it is aimed at enhancing pressure on India, lowering its global standing and providing relief to Pakistan.

Indian attempts at resolving the current standoff through talks provides China an opportunity to delay resolution. It prevaricates and makes promises, while ensuring Indian forces remain committed. Comments by the Chinese ambassador indicate that China will never accept the LAC as defined by India, hence resolution of the border situation is unlikely.

China and Pakistan have maintained their activities to levels which do not escalate to war. Possession of nuclear weapons by all three precludes possibilities of large-scale conflicts. Operations, if any, are expected to be localised, though this can never be assumed to be a certainty. Hence, force structures remain in place for an all-out war.

On the current scenario, the Chief of Defence Staff stated that in case talks fail, military options remain on the table. Whether it involves pushing intrusions back by application of force or resorting for tit-for-tat measures elsewhere is unclear. In either case, it implies preparing for a full-scale conflict. On the contrary, the Foreign Minister, S Jaishankar, mentioned that dialogue would be the best option, as it has resolved similar situations in recent times. The fact remains that any offensive actions with China will be exploited by Pakistan, making a two-front war a reality.

India has been juggling with its policies on management of defence, mainly due to political lethargy compounded with bureaucratic interference. It has never considered the logic that unless its armed forces are well equipped and a deterrent, threats will never die down. The message of Kautilya, ‘Without Suraksha, there will be no Arth or Dharam’ should have been the guiding factor for every government in power but has been ignored. Even late President APJ Abdul Kalam had stated, ‘national development and national security have to go together.’ Seventy-three years after Independence, India still does not possess a National Security Strategy (NSS) to guide its security forces in countering multifarious emerging threats. The responsibility of ‘defence of India’ remains that of a bureaucratic defence secretary, who has neither made any statement nor been questioned on the current scenario. Lapses are blamed only on the army and political leadership.

Development of the domestic defence industry has just begun, mainly because imports were politically lucrative and in-house development discouraged by exporting nations as it impacted leverage and business. While the current government claims credit for boosting defence capabilities, it has simultaneously reduced the defence budget year after year to alarmingly low levels, leaving almost nothing for modernisation.

This reduction was based on the perception of the current leadership that diplomacy and coupling of economy would reduce one of the two major threats, China. This flawed assessment is the result of possessing no NSS and poor intelligence analysis, compounded by shortfall in intelligence monitoring capability. Intelligence gathering remains concentrated on Pakistan, which will never be a major threat. The result was Chinese incursions, assessment of which was misjudged at the apex level. It was an eye-opener, forcing the government to divert funds for making up critical shortfalls. The sudden rush of formations to Ladakh, prolonged deployment and currently an announcement of contemplating military action are all reactionary, as has happened multiple times in the past.

Was rushing into talks post-Galwan leading to disengagement the right decision? The speed with which China suggested talks as also conversation between the two foreign ministers, again initiated by China, indicates that China was seeking to cool down tempers. For India, attempting to defuse the situation through talks, disengagement appeared to be an option. China, which suffered greater losses, created a buffer zone, ensuring no further clashes as at Galwan, which would shatter the PLA myth. It gave them the option to hold on to the areas it had occupied and delay de-escalation. Since the disengagement, there has been a stalemate. Hence, India possibly played into Chinese hands unknowingly.

As at Kargil, the armed forces, if ordered, would act to push the Chinese out of areas they have transgressed into. How often will we as a nation be surprised and lose lives regaining our own perceived territory.

Chinese actions are indicative of the fact that India has not invested in national security and in-house capacity development. This has compelled military planners to adopt a defensive approach rather than an offensive one. This has been exploited by both China and Pakistan over the decades. With China remaining silent, Pakistan was forced to curtail its agenda.

Israeli premier Benjamin Netanyahu had stated in the Raisina Dialogue in January 2018, “In the case of Israel you need a lot of intelligence to compensate for our size.” I would change it for India to state, ‘we need a lot of intelligence to cater for our poor security policies and low defence budgets.’ Never again should such a situation come to pass. No future government should ignore national security nor misjudge competing nations. It is time to consider national security with utmost seriousness.

The writer is a retired Major-General of the Indian Army.