On March 28, China celebrated the 60th anniversary of the Introduction of the Reforms in Tibet and the Serfs’ Emancipation Day. But which reforms?

In 1959, following an uprising of the entire population, the Tibetan capital witnessed the massacre of thousands of Tibetans. This prompted Communist China to introduce ‘reforms’. On the occasion, the Chinese media reported that “representatives from various ethnic groups and walks of life gathered in the Potala Palace square in Lhasa to celebrate the 60th anniversary of the campaign of democratic reform in Tibet.” The colonial mindset is immediately apparent. Note the words “various ethnic groups”. It is as if Tibetans belonged to different ethnic groups. Today due to Han migration, the Tibetans are a minority in their native land; the media should have said, “Tibetans and Hans have gathered” near the Potala.

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In another telling detail, the report stated: “At 10 a.m., Losang Jamcan, director of the Standing Committee of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) People’s Congress, declared the opening of the celebration meeting in both Tibetan and Mandarin.” Lobsang Gyaltsen (the correct spelling of his name) is also TAR’s Deputy Secretary and a member of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) Central Committee.

What is strange is that Lobsang Gyaltsen spoke before the Party’s Secretary (Wu Jingjie), though the Communist protocol is always extremely strict.

But after proclaiming that for the past sixty years, the Tibetan people have been emancipated and are their own masters, it would look strange, if the Party Secretary, always from Han nationality, had spoken before a Tibetan. A small adjustment in the protocol was necessary for the grand show.

Incidentally, not a single Tibetan has ever made it as Party Secretary in Tibet. Why? Simply because despite the propaganda, Beijing does not trust the Tibetans.

According to Xinhua news agency: “In March 1959, the Chinese central government dissolved the aristocratic local government of Tibet and freed more than 1 million serfs, making them the masters of the nation and society.” This is pure historical rewriting of the events of 1959, which resulted in the massacre of thousands of ordinary Tibetans.

Wu Yingjie, the party chief, followed his deputy to the rostrum. He solemnly declared: “The democratic reform completely obliterated the feudal serfdom of theocracy, changed the production relations of the old Tibet, smashed the shackles of feudal spirit and culture and freed local people from feudal political oppression.” Wu asserted: “The democratic reform is a major historic event in Tibet’s development and human rights advancement.” It seems a joke in view of the poor state of human rights in the Land of Snows.

Interestingly in January 1957, while on a visit to India, Zhou Enlai, the Chinese Premier had prolonged discussions with Prime Minister Nehru on the introduction of the so-called reforms. It was decided to postpone them by at least six or seven years. In course of the conversation with the Indian Prime Minister, Zhou pointed a finger at non-existing foreigners in Lhasa: “Those bent on trouble are preparing for an incident in Lhasa. These people have some armed forces. Some three temples in Lhasa also have armed forces and they want to create an incident with the People’s Liberation Army there. If it happened, then there would be bloodshed.” Nehru did not react.

Although there was no ‘foreigner’ in Lhasa, except for the Indian staff of the Consulate- General and a few Nepalis, the bloodshed indeed took place in March 1959; it helped Mao to firmly consolidate the position of the Communist regime, which continues to control the restive nation with an iron hand 60 years later.

According to historian Melvyn Goldstein, the issue of the revolt and subsequent repression was discussed in Beijing by the party leadership as early as 1957: “If Tibetans revolted, Mao asserted clearly that he would use the PLA to destroy the rebels, wipe out the traditional manorial estate system, end the Tibetan ‘local’ government, and quickly implement forced reforms and create a socialist Tibet under direct control by the CCP.”

Goldstein thought that it was for Mao “an alternative path to success since it would enable the CCP to end the traditional system and ‘liberate’ the Tibetan masses much sooner than under the gradualist policy. Mao therefore presented his Tibet policy as a no-lose strategy for China.”

It is a matter of debate if it was an ‘alternative’ or not, but on May 14, 1957, a cable was sent by the CCP’s Central Committee to the Chinese generals in Lhasa. It says: “In today’s Tibet, the separatists are still quite popular, and can still stir up troubles on the issue of reforms. This is not accidental. Rather it has its historical and social causes. Although Tibet became an inseparable part of China a long time ago, it has maintained an independent or semi-independent status in its relations with the motherland…”

This admission is rare and interesting to note.

The Central Committee continued: “The fact that it had achieved long-term independence and semi-independence historically distinguishes Tibet from other minority nationality areas in China.”

The cable continued in the same vein. Was force an alternative? The Central Committee thought thus: “If we use force, it very likely will create a situation in which not only the majority of the elite will oppose us but also the separatists’ conspiracies will succeed, the leftists will be isolated, and a considerable portion of the working class under the elite’s influence and control will follow them to oppose us. If this situation occurs, either it will force us to stop reforms and place us in a passive political situation, or we will need to start a war to mobilize the masses and implement reforms”.

The conclusion of the Central Committee was: “Having considered the historical and current situations in Tibet, the Central Committee has decided that we will not carry out democratic reforms in Tibet for at least six years, or even longer.” This was in consonance with the assurance given to Jawaharlal Nehru by Zhou Enlai in January 1957. It was the condition for the Dalai Lama, then in India, to return to Tibet and not seek asylum in India or America.

In January 1959, Mao and the Central Committee realized that “the Tibetan insurgency had crossed the threshold from local uprisings to a full-scale revolt. The PLA had to be used to control the rebellion.” On January 22, 1959, Mao wrote: “It is good, since there is a possibility for us to solve the problem militarily.”

The ‘great battle’ had come earlier than expected; earlier Mao had thought: “We must do the following: 1) we must win over the masses during the next few years, and isolate the reactionaries; 2) train our army to be strong fighters.”

Two days later, the Central Committee told the Chinese leadership in Tibet: “The armed uprisings have expanded to the next level. The uprisings will continue to expand unless we have a onetime decisive battle. Then and only then will the problem be resolved thoroughly.”

It was indeed resolved thoroughly, the ‘reforms’ were imposed after bloodshed, and the serfs were ‘emancipated’ …the Communist way. Today, the tragic episode is repackaged by Beijing in a White Paper, showing how happy the Tibetans were. President Xi Jinping should hold a referendum and seek the opinion of the Tibetan masses as to whether they are happy or not.

It would be interesting to see the results.

(The writer, an acclaimed writer and commentator, holds the Field Marshal KM Cariappa Chair of Excellence at the United Service Institution of India)