The suicide bomber’s attack on more than 250 paramilitary personnel of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) ~ killing 44 jawans ~ at Pulwama in Jammu and Kashmir on 14 February has been severely condemned both by the government and Opposition parties.

Most of the foreign countries have condemned the terrorism that originates from within Pakistan and have extended full support to India. But despite the severity of the attack and growing pressure for action, New Delhi’s options are more limited than they appear to be.

The Pulwama terrorist attack is one of the worst in recent years. The CRPF is the largest of the central paramilitary forces. It has been discharging law and order as well as counter-insurgency duties in Jammu and Kashmir and the north-east for several decades. It is generally less well trained and less well armed than the Indian Army.

It usually bolsters the local police forces. The government has been under considerable pressure to avenge Pakistan’s complicity. The compulsions are the scale of the attack and the fact that Jaish-e- Mohammed (JeM), a Pakistan-based terrorist group, has claimed responsibility. Another reason is that the Modi government claims to be tough on national security matters and its supporters will expect it to act forcefully.

The surgical strikes in 2016 have led to expectations that India will act more forcefully this time. The national elections are scheduled to be held in the next few months, and this explains the domestic political pressure on the government. India’s options to respond are fairly limited. On the diplomatic side, Indian officials often speak in terms of isolating Pakistan and some steps may be taken on this score.

But these are unlikely to have substantive impact not the least because the level of diplomatic interaction with Pakistan is quite minimal. India could also try to generate diplomatic pressure on Pakistan through its friends in the international community and through multilateral fora such as the United Nations. But these have so far proved of little value and they are unlikely to bear much fruit.

The outrage also raises questions about the Modi government’s Wuhan initiative to smoothen ties with China. There is some indication that Beijing may stop providing cover to Pakistan’s Masood Azhar issue. Finance Minister Arun Jaitley has announced the withdrawal of the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status to Pakistan.

The decision has been taken to isolate the country economically and diplomatically. Every member country of the World Trade Organization (WTO) is required to accord the MFN status to all other member countries, as specified in Article 1 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 1994. The primary objective of WTO is to monitor trade and resolve trade related issues amongst the member nations.

However, MFN itself is a misnomer; it actually means non-discrimination amongst member nations. Being a WTO member, India accorded Pakistan MFN status in 1996, but the latter did not reciprocate by granting the same status to India. The main items that India imports from Pakistan are cement, petroleum products, fresh fruit, finished leather, bulk minerals and ore. The items that are exported to Pakistan include cotton yarn, chemicals, plastics, manmade yarn and dyes.

The decision to revoke the MFN status to Pakistan will mean that India can increase Customs duties on goods imported from there. Currently, India’s Customs duties on goods to WTO members are below the “bound level rates”. The Customs duties imposed are called applied rates and the level at which the duties can be increased are known as “bound rates”.

On 15 February, India raised the Customs duty to 200 per cent on all goods imported from Pakistan, including fresh fruit, cement, petroleum products, bulk minerals and ores, finished leather, processed minerals, inorganic chemicals, raw cotton, spices, wool, rubber products, alcoholic beverages, medical instruments, marine goods, plastic, dyes and sport goods. India imported goods worth $ 489 million in 2017-18 from Pakistan and exported goods worth $ 1.92 billion.

Meanwhile, the total imports from Pakistan increased by 7.70 per cent from $454 million in 2016-17 to $489 million from April to November in 2017-18. The total exports to Pakistan also went up by 5.59 per cent from $1.82 billion in 2016- 17 to $1.92 billion in April- November in 2017-18. India accounts for 1.55 per cent of Pakistan’s imports and 2.55 per cent of its exports.

The top five items India imported from Pakistan in 2017- 18 were mineral fuels and oils, edible fruit and nuts, salt, sulphur, stones, materials, lime and cement, fertiliser and ores. The top five items exported by India to Pakistan in 2017-18 included cotton, organic materials, plastic, dyes and pharmaceutical products. Since the bilateral trade between India and Pakistan is low, many experts believe that MFN makes no difference to either country.

India’s military options are equally constrained. If past crises are any indication, it is unlikely that there are any well-planned contingency options that have been decided in consultation between the political leadership and the military. Thus, any response will have to await definite plans to be drawn up, the forces prepared, and equipment deployed. This is likely to take time, possibly several months.

Surprisingly, the Defence Chiefs are not members of the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS). This country’s defence preparedness is the poorest considering the defence budget for 2019-2020. The outlay is 1.44 per cent of the GDP ~ the lowest since 1962.

It is also not clear if the Indian military has sufficient superiority over Pakistani forces to even consider any full-scale military retaliation. It has been starved of funds during the past several years, with very little capital acquisition and significant weaknesses in critical areas.

The Indian Air Force, for example, is down to about 30 squadrons and it will be years before the country is able to mobilise the full 42 squadrons that have been sanctioned for the Air Force. So is the case with the navy and army.

The Modi government is thus likely to countenance weak options. However, it has only itself to blame for the poor planning and preparation to meet a contingency that was predictable. The greatest danger is that given the pressure to act in haste, Delhi may launch a military offensive with insufficient forethought. This is likely to make the situation worse.

(The writer is retired Professor of International Trade. He may be reached at vasu022@gmail.com.)