Nepal is in flux in terms of emerging perceptions and directions that it seeks vis-à-vis India. From a dire situation where it had swerved hard-left as a counter-reaction to India’s perceived arm-twisting during the framing of its Constitution in 2015 to the ostensible ‘blockade’ enforced by Delhi, Nepal was left fuming and seen to be cozying up to Beijing, on the rebound.
The mood of the nation was further reflected in the increasing ideological popularity of the supposedly ‘anti-India’ and ‘proChina’ strain of Pushpa Kamal Dahal or Prachanda (Communist Party of Nepal ~ Maoist Centre) and KP Sharma Oli (Communist Party of Nepal ~ Unified MarxistLeninist).
While both Prachanda and Oli played down the simplistic notions of anti/pro towards either neighbour, they did posit the sophistry of balance between neighbours. Beijing was thrilled at the political developments and moved in quickly to ensnare the ripe opportunity.
But personal and competitive differences between the Communist coalition partners, Dahal and Oli on account of an internal leadership tussle became publicly irreconcilable.
In an unprecedented departure from mandated diplomatic restraint, the Urdu-speaking Chinese Ambassador to Nepal (part of the wolf warrior diplomat template), Hou Yanqi, was seen furiously mediating between the warring factions of Prachanda and Oli to somehow remain united. He was unsuccessful. The Communist alliance imploded and Nepali Congress under Sher Bahadur Deuba, returned to hold the interim reins.
But the changes in the national leadership of Nepal had more to do with fractious ‘palace intrigues’ within the partisan leadership and less to do with the mood of the people.
While memories of the Indian ‘blockade’ still resonated subliminally, however the interim period of Covid (and Delhi’s support with vaccines) and the global image of China per se suffering from taints of expansionism and ‘debt-traps’, triggered a more nuanced and reasonable appreciation of the reality, besetting Nepal’s options.
Economic and political relationship with India and China were amongst the prominent electoral issues, with Oli’s CPI-UML fronting the preference for China, as opposed to the more ‘pro-India’ Nepal Congress-led coalition that also includes, Oli’s rival Prachanda’s CPMMaoist Centre, CPUnified Socialist, Loktantrik Samajwadi Party and Rasthriya Janamorcha. In a seeming public thaw towards the India-outlook (amongst a host of local issues), the Nepal Congress-led coalition with additional support from the newly formed Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP) crossed the necessary, half-way mark.
While this does not suggest a wave of ‘pro-India’ sentiment unequivocally ~ it does signify a ‘correction’ in the simplistic view of punting on the Chinese card, as a binary counter.
The Nepalese political landscape is indeed fragmented, complex and asymmetric in that even the principal coalition ‘blocs’ and their conjoining would appear counter-intuitive.
The most hardline of the Communist parties i.e., Oli’s CPIUML is in a quixotic alliance with the avowedly monarchist, Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP), which improved its tally from a single seat to seven. Disparate parties can coalesce for a topical agenda, purpose and timing ~ and show matching alacrity in disintegrating, when that limited ‘intent’ is fulfilled or lapsed by circumstances.
Little wonder that since 2008, Nepal has had 12 Prime Ministerial changes (including nine different individuals), with the relationship with India being a matter of constant concern and scrutiny.
Delhi too has not wrapped itself in glory with its own list of miscalculated actions and inactions that rail in the eyes of an average Nepali, who often talks about India’s ‘bigbrother’ syndrome. While the equation had been subjected to many crests and troughs for decades, rarely was the animus as glaring as in the post-2015 period. Recent issues like Agniveers which directly impact the Nepalese socioeconomics is not just a matter of financial benefit for the Nepali (as is often projected, uncharitably) but an emotive matter for a justifiably valorous lot who have given their blood for the dignity and sovereignty of India, far more than many other comparable regions of India itself.
Even the courtesy of explaining and discussing the merits of Agniveer scheme was not afforded till a very late stage, when an opportunity to respectfully align the matter was lost.
The Nepalis did not help matters by willy-nilly propping the Chinese alternative, even if it were to be couched in loose comments, dog-whistling or barely concealed diplomatese.
However, time and the civilisational depth between the two nations, which is usually beyond the machinations of the unhinged politicians, has survived and offered yet another window of healthy and restorative bilateral relations.
Such opportunities are also not forever or always forgiving to withstand too many ruptures. Coalition governments are inherently hazier and mealy-mouthed in their outpourings and given that reality, they may not sound as pro India, as some may want to hear in Delhi ~ but India must tread the path carefully, patiently and allow that space to pan-out in its overall favour without forcing an explicit preference.
Incidents from all sides of the Line-of-Actual-Control (LAC), be it in the Ladakh theatre, Bhutan region (Doklam) or most recently, Arunachal Pradesh validate the persistent threat of Chinese expansionism and ambition. With this backdrop, optics of the 16th edition of Surya Kiran, joint military training exercise of Nepali and Indian Army at the Nepal Army Battle School, Saljhandi, is reassuring.
That it involves a composition of Shree Bhawani Baksh Battalion of the Nepal Army and detachment of 5th Gorkha Rifles of the Indian Army, adds a subtle touch of propinquity that binds the bilateral narrative.
It is not that Nepal would be oblivious of the patented Chinese instinct as it inevitably plays out, be it in neighbouring Bhutan, sabre-rattled Taiwan, debt-strapped Hambantota port in Sri Lanka or its tactical pusillanimity in Ukraine, Afghanistan or Pakistan.
But Nepal has knowingly played the ‘Chinese card’ and like Delhi, must know when pandering to the same (or in the case of Delhi, when forcing Nepal into a corner) starts becoming counterproductive, for both.
The incoming Nepali government is a serendipitous opportunity that must be handled with care and even distance; no talks of ‘interference’ (as often murmured) must be allowed.
There will be occasional speed-breakers that must be spared condescending and coercive innuendoes, as the immediate past of the last seven years must be buried and perhaps the better past that survived for centuries invoked, without suggestions of appropriations and usurpations.