Western capitals are abuzz with one question above all others ~ what happens if Russia invades Ukraine? The issue has acquired urgency as neither Moscow nor Washington and its European Union (EU) allies show any signs of backing down and negotiations including the initiative a couple of days ago by French President Emmanuel Macron having little chance of success. Russian demands are far-reaching and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Nato) could never agree to them.
So, what next? A recent piece in The Atlantic by Thomas Wright offers some insight into the emerging thinking in Washington where the realisation has struck home that even if the argument of those pushing for concessions to be made to Russia ~ regarding what the Kremlin terms its security environment due to what it sees as the unrelenting eastward expansion of Nato ~ is accepted, it would not defuse the crisis.
For, even if the trans-Atlantic alliance were, say, to make a statement that Ukraine would not be admitted to Nato for the next 10 years, it would still not stop Kiev’s move away from Moscow and into the West’s and more specifically the EU’s embrace. In these circumstances, a consensus is emerging among experts and policy establishments in the USA and Europe that there can be only two scenarios which will now play out. First, if Russia invades Ukraine, it would accentuate as opposed to assuage Moscow’s security concerns as US-led tough economic and technology sanctions combined with a West-backed insurgency to drive Russian troops out of Ukraine would most likely come into play.
Additionally, fresh US Army deployments in eastern and northern Europe would rise exponentially and would include offensive weaponry. An invasion could, writes Wright, lead even traditionally circumspect Scandinavian countries that neighbour Russia such as Finland and Sweden to join NATO. So, the Kremlin would have a trophy win by wresting control of Ukraine, the nationalists at home would be chuffed, and President Vladimir Putin may well preen at his legacy of having made a substantial advance in reclaiming the power of the erstwhile Soviet Union by its successor Russian state, but the country will be much less secure.
The second scenario is that if Russia de-escalates, the West would be ready to offer a substantive negotiation over Europe’s security architecture including on new, reciprocal arms-control agreements that could address Russian concerns over Nato deployments in eastern Europe.
President Putin would have to give up his ambition of immediately gaining control of Ukraine and collapsing the European security order; but as recompense, he would have additional influence within that order. As things stand, there is no possible third outcome. Those responsible for the Ukraine crisis need to keep this fact on the top of their minds.