Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to have survived the challenge to his leadership after his one-time protégé and leader of the Wagner mercenary group, Yevgeny Prigozhin, called off his uprising against the Kremlin’s military establishment. But the sigh of relief in Beijing is perhaps nearly as loud as the one in Moscow given Chinese President Xi Jinping’s investment in relations with Mr Putin at a personal level and the Russian state strategically. China has looked to the Russian Federation as its main partner in counterbalancing the United States-led West and its allies; both President Xi and President Putin have made their opposition to the US-dominated post-World War II international order very clear indeed. In fact, it is the raison d’être for the ‘no-limits’ partnership between the two countries. So, the Wagner near-rebellion and what it may portend for Russia concerns China deeply.
According to Patricia M. Kim of Brookings, China’s first-order concerns likely revolve around the potential for domestic upheaval in Russia, with which it shares a more than 2,600-mile border, to spill over into China or to destabilise its immediate neighbourhood. Just as American officials have been closely tracking Russia’s nuclear posture since the crisis, Chinese leaders are also anxious about the risk of loose Russian nukes and the threat this would pose to China’s security. The Wagner mercenary army’s undoubted military capabilities and the weakness they exposed in the Russian armed forces even with their aborted rebellion have raised fears in Beijing that China’s strategic alignment with a weakened Russia may turn out to be a burden rather than an advantage. While there is no immediate pressure on President Xi to change tack, Chinese Communist Party strategists will undoubtedly be factoring this development into their policy inputs keeping Beijing’s interests uppermost.
But it is more than just immediate security concerns which would be worrying the Chinese. Russia’s trajectory over the coming months and years is now an undoubted cause for pessimism, especially after its botched invasion of Ukraine and the punishing international sanctions imposed on it as a result. Economists agree that the sanctions are likely to cripple the country’s economy in the near future. Some in the CCP policymaking establishment are reported to hold the view that even Russia’s oil and gas reserves will not help it avert an economic disaster, and its impact will be felt by China as it has significantly deepened economic ties with Moscow. This, added to the reputational damage China has already suffered in not just the West but also parts of the non-aligned world for its backing of Russia on the Ukraine crisis, will undermine chances of a SinoUS détente. Again, that is not in Beijing’s interest. China has till now refrained from openly criticising Prigozhin or expressing direct support for Mr Putin. That in itself tells a story.