Since the tweet by President Donald Trump at 4 a.m. on 1 January, blaming Pakistan for consuming US funds and doing nothing to battle the Taliban and Haqqani network, relations between the two countries have only been spiralling downhill. The US has suspended all military assistance to Pakistan, issued threats and yet attempted to cajole them to act. As always, back channels employing military to military contacts continue. Pakistan, on the other hand, has been crying as always, saying that its true contribution has been overlooked, that the US should consider its own failures before blaming it and that the groups operate from Afghan soil, not Pakistan.
To further muddle up matters, it briefed the diplomatic corps stationed in Islamabad on Indian interference in their war on terror, ceasefire violations and involvement in supporting anti-Pakistan terror groups in conjunction with the Afghan intelligence service. As a final threat to the US, Pakistan’s defence minister announced suspension of all intelligence and military cooperation with them, while claiming that the aid cut has had no impact.
Factually, Pakistan knows that the US is aware that it has and will continue to provide support to the Taliban and Haqqani network. It may have to repeat General Musharraf’s actions of a 360- degree turn and challenging those whom he supported under US pressure, provided its terms and conditions are met. Pakistan has adopted a strong stance mainly because it feels that the US needs it more than it needs US support. This flows from a collection of reasons.
Firstly, with the Taliban and Haqqani leadership safely ensconced deep within Pakistan, it knows that US strikes if any could cause immense collateral damage, worsening an already deteriorating relationship and compelling Islamabad to react adversely. Secondly, it is aware that without Pakistan’s support, the Taliban may not come to the negotiating table. Thirdly, it knows that the US, mainly because of its enmity with Iran and with sanctions and poor diplomatic relations with Russia, would require the services of Karachi port and Pakistani airspace. Thus, it could always shut access adding to their woes. Finally, it is aware of Chinese support, which came as soon as the US imposed aid cuts.
Many former diplomats including Richard Olsen, the former US ambassador to Pakistan, have stated that such humiliating and penalising action against Pakistan may not work. He states that “it is likely to respond by showing how it can truly undercut our position in Afghanistan”. He also stated that, “the generals (in Pakistan) knew that as long as the US maintained an army in Afghanistan, it was more dependent on Pak, than Pak was on it”.
The US had made a strategy for Afghanistan and must stick to it. It was aware of the crucial role which Pakistan would play in it. Further, throughout its involvement, it was losing soldiers to Taliban strikes which were being financed by the same funds that it gave Pakistan. Thus, indirectly it was paying Pakistan to kill its own. This had to change. The present decision-making leadership in the US is made up of Afghanistan veterans, aware of the pitfalls and blocks which they may encounter from Pakistan and would have evaluated options to counter them.
There would be diplomatic and military options to enforce on Pakistan in case it blocked the use of Karachi port. The US, if compelled, could establish a costly air corridor, while making things difficult for Pakistan in multiple ways. Enhancing drone strikes even deeper into Pakistan and accepting collateral damage while targeting the Taliban and Haqqani leadership would lower the standing and image of the Pakistan army, which it cannot accept. Diplomatically it could commence removing Pakistan from a non-NATO ally status or even declaring it a terror-supporting state, thus denying it funds from international monetary bodies.
However, unless major fears of Pakistan remain unaddressed, it would continue to hesitate. Thus, the importance of back channel diplomacy continuing. These include denying India a significant role in Afghanistan, which it considers its strategic backyard, controlling the TTP, the Pakistan Taliban, which has safe bases within Afghanistan and the fear of failure of the US in subduing the Taliban, which could compel it to turn inwards against Pakistan.
Officially Pakistan has only stated that it would prefer dialogue with the Taliban, rather than an offensive, expressed fears of India supporting the TTP and increased pressures on its eastern borders with India. It would always remain fearful that if it reduces forces on its eastern front to employ against terror groups, India could take advantage and enhance pressure.
Chinese support to Pakistan assures it of being protected from action in international forums. If China could protect Hafiz Saeed from being declared an international terrorist, it would ensure Pakistan is not officially chastised despite the fact it openly supports terror groups as an instrument of state policy. However, with major funding being blocked, China would become Pakistan’s main support base. Slowly and steadily it would devour all Pakistani institutions. This may be detrimental to long term US interests of obtaining cooperation from Pakistan.
Thus, there remain multiple issues which unless addressed by Pakistan and the US and resolved to satisfaction would prevent Pakistan from effectively contributing to US operations. Trump may have spoken in frustration and anger, as he is known to tweet even before his own government is ready, but not without being aware of options available to the US to counter Pakistan. Thus, as a follow up to his tweet, his government has acted and enforced serious cuts in military aid to Pakistan. Strong comments by the leadership have only enforced the US views.
Despite all its bravado, claims and comments, Pakistan would act. It would only be seeking reassurances on its concerns. It was forced to change tack post 9/11 and it would do so now again, as it is aware of the implications of avoiding such an action. Pressure should continue to flow failing which it would backtrack.
(The Writer is a retired Major- General of the Indian Army)