US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s visit to South Asia, including India, would suggest that the US administration’s South Asia policy is coming to grips with its minutiae. With the US President’s statement on Afghanistan in August as the centrepiece ~ and also regarded as an articulation of his South Asia policy ~ the region has already been visited by the National Security Adviser in April, the US Defence Secretary in September and, now, by the US Secretary of State (23-25 October). While the US Defence Secretary did not visit Pakistan, which he is expected to do shortly, there have been high-level interactions as well as workinglevel visits between the US and Pakistan for the two sides to get a measure of each other.
The Secretary of State was on an extended tour to the Middle East, South Asia and Europe where his uneasy relationship with the US President came into sharper focus in terms of his personal effectiveness being called into question through diplomatic snubs both in Saudi Arabia as well as in Pakistan.
The South Asia region is facing challenges of uncertainty and instability because of which an assessment of a more engaged US administration with the countries of the region is important. Afghanistan is facing major existential challenges with a resurgence in Taliban military activity casting a shadow on the capital itself. During his unannounced visit to Kabul, Tillerson had the Afghan President and the Chief Executive, Abdullah Abdullah, come to meet him at the US-controlled Bagram airbase.
A degree of political disarray is also palpable in Pakistan where the current Prime Minister, along with his Cabinet, is not seen as someone who is firmly in the saddle for taking the difficult decisions required. The political leadership is unhappy with the Pakistan Army’s attempts to “mainstream” jihadist elements into the political party system.
It is being embarrassed, at the same time, by strong words of condemnation of the government’s policy on jihadist elements in the US as well as elsewhere. In the context of Southwest Asian developments, India alone has a firm leadership and a strong government to play a stabilising role, especially in Afghanistan.
By all accounts, the Secretary of State’s South Asia visit was largely Afghan-centric, including a strong focus on Pakistan’s role in making things better. In India, of course, the gamut of issues covered was much broader in that there was a wider discussion on India-US collaboration in the larger Indo-Pacific region, which is seen as fashioning a policy towards China amongst several countries whose assertive policies are considered as destabilising.
In that context, defence cooperation as well as broader strategic cooperation with high salience for India’s role was emphasised. On Afghanistan, there was encouragement for India playing a somewhat stronger role in defence and security spheres without any direct force commitment; this open encouragement to India goes beyond the earlier US policy and is certainly anathema to Pakistan and, to a certain degree, of concern to China and others.
Geopolitics around that country have shifted considerably with China, Iran, Russia veering towards Pakistan, while India’s growing involvement is seen as supportive of the US objectives and the Afghan leadership. The complexity inheres in the attitude of Pakistan whose denials of support to terrorist elements, including the increasingly violent Taliban with the growing role of the Haqqani network, are not seen as credible. This has invoked stronger critical response from Afghanistan, the US and India.
During his brief interaction in Islamabad, lasting nearly four hours, the Pakistan side stated that its own sacrifices in fighting terrorism and promoting peace and stability in Afghanistan are being ignored by the US. On the eve of the Secretary of State’s visit, the Quadrilateral Dialogue between the US, Afghanistan, China and Pakistan was revived although the outcome of its Muscat meeting, on 16 October, has remained uncertain. In typically hypocritical manner, well understood in India, the Pakistan side told the US delegation that Pakistan will take action if there is credible evidence brought up by the US government.
The US Secretary of State’s message on the necessity for decisive action by Pakistan against terrorist groups was unmistakable and these were stated in Kabul, Islamabad and New Delhi. This, along with the expected deployment of nearly 3000 additional US troops in Afghanistan, with expectations of a matching contribution by the other NATO countries, and a certain fatigue in the US and other participating countries with their longest post-Second World War military engagement, is a strong pointer that US pressure on Pakistan will increase.
Tillerson stated publicly he had told the Pakistan side that the US will take unilateral action in case Pakistan is seen to be not doing as expected by the US. He stated, repeatedly, that Pakistan itself faces instability on account of this policy. What form this pressure on Pakistan will take is something which will be observed in India very closely.
The US and NATO dependence on their military supply routes through Pakistan has been used by the latter to exert pressure on them on several occasions. The earlier northern supply route, through Russia and the Central Asian countries is no longer possible on account of strained US-Russia relations and a different supply route perhaps across Georgia and Azerbaijan and the Central Asian countries might need to be developed to counter Pakistani blackmail.
There is also a somewhat functioning relationship between their intelligence services and the US drones-strike targets inside Pakistani territory. During the Secretary’s Islamabad talks, both sides exchanged lists of terrorists wanted respectively, from Pakistan and Afghanistan and he stated, in New Delhi, that the US and Pakistan will have a mechanism for sharing information and for counter-terrorism action. That apart, it is not clear as to what the attitude of Russia and China would be should the US decide to apply strong military pressure on Pakistan on this issue.
Moreover, Pakistan is a very big country with nuclear weapons ~ a reference made by Trump in the context of the tense military situation between India and Pakistan ~ and it is unlikely that the US would try to completely isolate it.
Despite explicit understanding between India and the US that Pakistan must not allow terrorist camps and freedom for such elements to roam freely on its territory, the coming days will show the extent to which the new US policy will be impacted by these constraints. The US priorities clearly concern the terrorist elements working against Afghanistan as the Indian observers look for similarly strong indications with regard to the terrorist elements working against India.
The Pakistan government’s decision not to bring terrorism charges against Hafiz Saeed coincided with the successful rescue by Pakistani troops of US-Canadian hostages. Understandably, President Trump, personally, thanked Pakistan but, notably, the US did not make any comment on Hafiz Saeed even though he is an internationally designated terrorist carrying a $10 million bounty on his head. At the same time, there has been expression of interest on the part of the US for resumption of dialogue between India and Pakistan.
Tillerson, in his Washington speech on India on the eve of his visit, stated, “And, we intend to work closely with India and with Pakistan to end, we hope, these tensions along their border as well”. As India-Pakistan relations remain tense, the prospects for dialogue still seem remote. However, the US thinking that such dialogue is a factor in the stabilisation of the South-west Asian region is important. India has appointed a Special Representative on Kashmir and there has been a meeting between the Pakistan High Commissioner and the External Affairs Minister. Expectedly, the government has denied that these have a link with either the Afghan peace process or the Tillerson visit. The coincidence is unmistakable.
All elements in this chessboard seem to be in place. How things will develop in future remains subject to several imponderables, both within the region and outside it. With these initial moves, the interested governments as well as strategic observers are watching as to how they will be followed further since the US engagement is underpinned by a clear policy. The domestic factors remain important in the context of US diplomacy towards South-west Asia.
Its transactional manner, characterised by celebration of small victories, will give Pakistan a space to play its game; or, the strength of an adverse development on the ground will force the US to take stronger, decisive action triggering a possibly strong response from Pakistan, China and Russia. While India should welcome a hardened American position on Pakistan, a critical factor in the resolution of the Afghanistan crisis, there is quite a bit of wait-andwatch involved.
The resources of US diplomacy, with possibilities of changes at the top as seen in recent differences between Tillerson and Trump, can also affect the pace and effectiveness of this diplomacy. The prospects of stability in South-west Asia still remain unclear and India will have to be more watchful than ever.
(The writer is a former Ambassador)