Rationale behind China’s overtures

Representational image (iStock photo)


China recently invited journalists from a select media network to Beijing, entertained them, and arranged interactions with select officials who parroted the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) line on Indo-China ties. The network mentioned that its reporters were guests of the ‘Chinese embassy in Delhi.’ The Chinese intent was to project their demands which they expect New Delhi to meet, to enable further progress in ties. This was psychological warfare, aimed at projecting Chinese views to Indian masses.

Why a select network? This media house regularly carries full page Chinese advertisements selling CCP propaganda and publishes opinion pieces by the Chinese ambassador to New Delhi. On the contrary, China Daily or Global Times refuse to carry any article by the Indian Ambassador, or even a clarification statement. The visit was aimed at listing Chinese demands for restoring normalcy in ties to the Indian masses. Chinese authorities attempted to sell the view that the chemistry which existed between PM Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping prior to Galwan has returned. These officials were quoted as mentioning that the two leaders did not refer to prepared notes during their meeting in Kazan but ‘spoke from their hearts.’

The Chinese wish list includes, ‘direct flights between the two countries, easing of visa curbs on Chinese nationals including diplomats and scholars, lifting bans on mobile apps, letting Chinese journalists come to India and report, allowing more Indian movies in Chinese theatres, among others subjects.’ They also reiterated the Chinese government viewpoint that ‘the border issue has to be resolved at a faster pace. But we don’t think that issue should be the centre of the relationship.’ China has repeatedly been stating that the border issue should be kept in its place, a view not endorsed by India. India continues to be cautious on restoring normalcy with China. Trust has been impacted and will take time to restore. This further begs the question why these demands are being projected through the media and not diplomatic channels. There is possibly a hope within China that the Indian opposition and press, some of whom remain pro-China and have yet to criticize Beijing for its actions of 2020, while questioning the Indian government and the army, would attempt to apply pressure on the government to concede. Further, the Indian public could be lulled into believing that it is not China but India which is delaying normalization of ties.

The intent could also possibly be to lull Indians into complacency, though it is unlikely to happen. The media interaction also conveyed other messages. The first was that China is now the head of the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization) and would hold a leaders’ summit in 2025. PM Modi has avoided attending SCO summits in recent years. India has also been the only nation in the SCO which has refused to endorse the Chinese BRI (Belt Road Initiative). A major reason for Modi sidelining SCO summits is because India avoids giving importance to institutions dominated by China.

Hence, the statement in the article quoting Chinese scholars, ‘we hope PM Modi will be coming to China for the same (SCO summit) … Our Premier went to India for the G20 and we also contributed towards the G20 declaration and worked with India on that.’ PM Modi skipping the SCO meet in Beijing would be a setback to the Chinese reputation. It must be noted that the 2017 Doklam standoff was resolved prior to the BRICS summit that China hosted in Xiamen, as PM Modi missing it would have impacted China’s global standing. Is this resolution also linked to the 2025 SCO summit? Though mentioned indirectly, another cause for China seeking normalcy in ties is its economic downslide.

The Chinese economy is slowing, facing a possible recession, with its real estate sector collapsing. Many European markets are setting roadblocks as also seeking diversification of supply chains. Donald Trump has promised 60 per cent duty on all Chinese imports. China desperately needs the Indian market, where it currently faces stumbling blocks in investments. Currently, balance of payments are tilted in China’s favour, compelling India to enhance duty on imports as also restrict investments. Hence the article mentioned the Chinese perception that it ‘wants to integrate and open up to the wider world.’ It also spoke of ‘pushing the relationship to a better situation,’ and ‘more cooperation.’ Another reason for the Chinese wooing India, though mentioned in passing in the article, is the arrival of Trump in the White House.

A reference was made stating that his return ‘indicates a toughening of position by the US. India and China, therefore, should work together to find solutions to common challenges confronting the two countries.’ The reality is that nominees for the Trump 2.0 administration are largely hawks on China. Thus, while pressure would build on China, India would need to tow a careful line. It cannot develop ties with the US while ignoring China. The US would seek to involve India into all its anti-China moves while China would hope India does not wholeheartedly join the Trump bandwagon.

Finally, China appears to have realized that hostility against India is not to its advantage. China has not gained anything militarily from its 2020 misadventures, other than deterioration of trust. It may have infiltrated partially into Indian territory but has been unable to achieve its claim lines nor is in a position to change the alignment of the LAC. The resolve of the Indian government and the determination of the armed forces had placed China in a bind. It almost lost the Indian market and its support in multilateral institutions. Thus, restoring normalcy along the LAC resulting in lifting of restrictions in other avenues was possibly the only option and a face-saver for China.

To avoid embarrassment and avoid justifying to its public as to why it attempted its misadventure and finally withdrew, China exploited diplomacy as a solution. China will continue playing the ‘good friend’ card and woo India for some time, especially as it faces US backlash. It needs India more than India needs it. Simultaneously, it will play psychological games by projecting its demands through third parties, rather than government channels. The Indian government must remain firm and refuse to bend till de-escalation occurs.

(The writer is a retired Major-General of the Indian Army.)